Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 51
Issue 1 Fall 2019

Article 7

2019

Predictive Analytics
Daryl Lim

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daryl Lim, Predictive Analytics, 51 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 161 ().
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol51/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information, please
contact law-library@luc.edu.

Predictive Analytics
Daryl Lim*
“Predictive Analytics” blends the latest research in behavioral economics
with artificial intelligence to address one of the most important legal
questions at the heart of intellectual property law and antitrust law – how
do courts and agencies make judgments about innovation and competition
policies? How can they better predict the consequences of intervention or
non-intervention?
The premise of this Article is that we should not continue to build doctrine
at the IP-antitrust on theoretical neoclassical assumptions alone but also on
the reality of markets using all that AI has to offer us. Behavioral economics
and AI do not replace traditional antitrust analysis. Rather, they are
complements and imbue antitrust law with continuing durability.
Predicting competitive effects is difficult and we need tools to predict
outcomes as precisely and reliably as possible. Until now, antitrust law has
only been able to operate before a veil of assumptions and rhetoric.
Stakeholders have only been able to think about whether and how to
intervene in the exercise of IP rights, particularly patent rights, in the
broadest terms since even the smallest perturbations in a complicated set of
variables can set off ripples that lead to dramatically divergent outcomes.
Facts have always mattered in antitrust law, and a more expansive toolkit
can only increase our likelihood of getting it right.
Behavioral economics sheds light on anticompetitive conduct that
neoclassical antitrust may regard as irrational and therefore improbable.
Once we recognize that it is rational and probable, we need to quantify and
value the effects of the conduct. To do this, we need to employ more of the
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analogical reasoning intrinsic in antitrust law. For that, predictive analytics
is very good in helping stakeholders with pattern recognition and simulation
runs. This brings us closer to being able to ascribe value which human
judgment can be brought to bear. In these, AI provides stakeholders with
augmented capabilities to confront the computational challenges these tasks
require.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in the Fourth Industrial Revolution: an age marked by three
powerful revolutions that appear at first glance to have little to do with
one another. First, artificial intelligence (AI) augments and challenges
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how we think about innovation and creativity. 1 Second, behavioral
economics unveils the heuristics and biases animating how decisions are
made in courtrooms, government agencies, and boardrooms. 2 Third,
wireless connectivity has become the fastest scaling technology in
history, with mobile device use increasing from zero to eight billion
within just a few decades.3
These three revolutions converge at the interface between intellectual
property (IP), antitrust law, and policy. Like contemporary politics, fault
lines obscured by rhetoric and deeply held and equally deeply divided
views of the appropriate treatment of IP and use of antitrust policies can
make it difficult for courts and agencies to apply laws meant to promote
innovation and competition. As more devices become connected to a
common platform, the consequences of legal uncertainty, or worse,
mistakes in implementation, become amplified.
Take for instance the Internet of Things (IoT), which subsists on
standardized patented technology embedded in everyday objects that
allow them to send and receive data. 4 Everything from household
appliances to automobiles will be connected to mobile standards, such as
1. See generally Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change,
52 AKRON L. REV. 813 (2018) [hereinafter Lim, AI & IP]. See also Bernard Marr, What Is Deep
Learning AI? A Simple Guide With 8 Practical Examples, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/10/01/what-is-deep-learning-ai-a-simple-guidewith-8-practical-examples/ [https://perma.cc/BB84-AA97] (“Since deep-learning algorithms
require a ton of data to learn from, this increase in data creation is one reason that deep learning
capabilities have grown in recent years.”).
2 . See generally Daryl Lim, Retooling the Patent-Antitrust Intersection: Insights from
Behavioral Economics, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 124 (2017); Crawford Hollingworth & Liz Barker,
How Behavioural Economics Is Shaping Our Lives, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS GUIDE 19, 19
(2017),
https://www.behavioraleconomics.com/the-be-guide/the-behavioral-economics-guide2017 [https://perma.cc/ZHY3-K52V] (citation omitted) (“Behavioural insights can no longer be
seen as a fashionable short-term foray by public bodies. They have taken root in many ways across
many countries around the world.”); id. at 19 (“Companies using BE include Morningstar, Airbnb,
Disney, Walmart, Jawbone, Unilever, Uber, Barclays, Google, eBay, ING, Virgin, Lilly, Financial
Times, Swiss Re, Prudential, Boots, AIG, Opower and Tinder—and the list keeps growing. In the
public sector, use of behavioural science is also widespread, with multiple governments and
institutions applying it in what they do.”). See also EYAL ZAMIR & DORON TEICHMAN,
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 361 (2018) (noting how behavioral economics has “already
worked [its] way into legislative debates and judicial decisions”).
3. Annsley Merelle Ward, AIPPI Congress Report 1: Standard Essential Patents —Maximizing
Value before Enforcement, THE IPKAT (Sept. 25, 2018), http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/
2018/09/aippi-congress-report-1-standard.html
[https://perma.cc/SHY5-HK95]
(“Wireless
connectivity is the fastest scaling technology we have, going from zero to 8 billion devices in a few
decades.”).
4. Jean-Marc Frangos, The Internet of Things Will Power the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Here’s How, WORLD ECON. F. (June 24, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/
internet-of-things-will-power-the-fourth-industrial-revolution [https://perma.cc/2M7V-6DUD].
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5G, in a market worth more than $11 trillion per year by 2025. 5 A 10
percent increase in mobile broadband can increase the nation’s gross
domestic product between 2–3 percent, as much as the target growth of
the United States economy in 2018.6 As the IoT becomes more pervasive,
the stakes involved in making correct determinations at the intersection
between IP and antitrust law becomes even more critical. Launching an
investigation or litigation addresses the risk of continued competitive
harm, but it comes at a cost.
Antitrust law rests on a venerable body of cases dating back at least to
1890.7 Entrusted by Congress to develop the law, courts have interpreted
operative antitrust terms like “monopolization” and “market power” in a
way that periodically incorporates changes from law, economics, and

5. Claire Huang, The Fuss over 5G, STRAITS TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018) (“[5G] stands for the ﬁfthgeneration mobile network technology. It is faster in data transmission and processing, and capacity
compared to previous generations of technology. It is said to be at least 10 times faster than 4G. . . .
A key feature of 5G is that it reduces network latency—the lag between a signal being sent and
received. This can transform the way things operate in any place that taps the technology. The
technology can be used in more applications, including ships, planes, pacemakers, incubators,
power stations and oil pipelines. . . . [T]he [5G] value chain is made up of device vendors, network
infrastructure vendors, software vendors, network operators who also provide services, service
providers who use others’ networks to reach end users such as WhatsApp and WeChat, regulators
and governments.”). Bardo Schettini Gherardini & Spiro Dhapi, Standard Development
Organizations And IPR Policies: Their Role In Realizing Future Technologies, CPI ANTITRUST
CHRON., Nov. 2017, at 1, 1, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/standarddevelopment-organizations-and-ipr-policies-their-role-in-realizing-future-technologies
[https://
perma.cc/F2XG-TTWM] (“Internet of Things . . . technologies are increasingly used to
interconnect smart devices, vehicles, household appliances and industrial machines using wireless
communication, software or sensors. According to some estimations, IoT systems could represent
a market of more than $11 trillion per year by 2025.”).
6. Ward, supra note 3 (“It is also a technology that directly benefits society: a 10% increase in
mobile broadband takeup increases a country’s GDP by 2 or 3%.”); Jeff Cox, Why Trump’s Goal
of 3 Percent Economic Growth Actually Is Achievable and Sustainable, CNBC (July 27, 2018, 3:38
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/27/trump-goal-of-3-percent-economic-growth-isachievable-and-sustainable.html [https://perma.cc/5VXM-KZ8W].
7. See ALBERT H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 2 (1910) (explaining the history of the Sherman Act, which was enacted in 1890).
Antitrust law has three principal statutory provisions. Section one of the Sherman Act addresses
unreasonable restraints of trade among rivals. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2017). Section two of the Sherman
Act addresses monopolization and attempted monopolization by creating or perpetuating a
monopoly in a relevant market through obtaining, licensing, or asserting a patent. 15 U.S.C. § 2
(2017). Section seven of the Clayton Act prohibits the acquisition of control over any entity or asset
if “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly” in the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2017). Section five of the FTC Act prohibits
“unfair methods of competition,” and is rarely applied beyond the relevant provisions of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2017); see STATEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT PRINCIPLES
REGARDING “UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION” UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT, FTC
(Aug. 13, 2015).
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other disciplines.8 It is this ability to adapt that is one of antitrust law’s
great strengths. For that adaption to continue effectively, however, its
intellectual infrastructure must support the regeneration of ideas.
Together with this, there must also be a capacity to operationalize those
new ideas so stakeholders—those interpreting, enforcing, or advising on
antitrust law (judges, government agencies, attorneys, and in-house
counsel) can meaningfully use them to guide corporate and judicial
decision-making. In recent times, that ability to adapt has ossified.
Since the 1970s, contemporary antitrust law has run on the rails of
neoclassical economics.9 Informed by neoclassical economics’ faith in
free markets and distrust of regulatory competence, the Chicago and
Harvard Schools of antitrust law (collectively known as “neoclassical
antitrust”) have steered courts away from antitrust populism toward an
effects-based approach using economic analysis of prices and output as
targets for intervention.10 Evidence-based reform was an important step
forward in the evolution of antitrust law.
Overlaying IP rights—usually patent rights—can spin antitrust
analysis off into the realm of conjecture.11 Neoclassical antitrust is not
8. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997) (citation omitted) (“In the area of antitrust
law, there is a competing interest, well represented in this Court’s decisions, in recognizing and
adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience. Thus, the general
presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the
Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress ‘expected the courts to give shape to the
statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.’”).
9 . Elizabeth M. Bailey, Behavioral Firms: Does Antitrust Economics Need a Theoretical
Update?, COPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2019, at 1, 2, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational
.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CPI-Bailey.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VMT-5T23] (“Modern day
antitrust is grounded in traditional neoclassical economic theory, which assumes consumers and
firms are rational, profit maximizing entities.”). See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595 (1986) (“[A]s presumably rational businesses, petitioners had every
incentive not to engage . . . .”).
10. Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 583, 598–600 (2018) (“Technical antitrust today comes mainly from the Harvard and
Chicago schools, which started in different places but began to converge in the late 1960s and
1970s. . . . Speaking very generally, the policy changes that gave rise to current antitrust policy
occurred mainly in the late 1970s and 1980s. During that period, antitrust became less
interventionist and more responsive to then-current economic theory. . . . The Chicago school has
had considerable influence on both antitrust decisionmaking and scholarship. Nevertheless, at the
level of specific rulemaking, the course pursued was most generally that proposed by the Harvard
school. That remains true to this day.”); see generally Robert D. Atkinson & David B. Audretsch,
Economic Doctrines and Approaches to Antitrust, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., Jan. 2011,
at 1, 1, http://www.itif.org/files/2011-antitrust.pdf [https://perma.cc/RPK5-SNPA].
11. Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., Antitrust and Intellectual Property in the United States and The
European Union, in THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 99, 100 (Gabriella Muscolo & Marina Tavassi eds., 2019) (discussing how “[m]ost
antitrust cases delineating the border between the two concern patents or, occasionally, copyrights;
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much help in making forward-looking judgments at the IP-antitrust
interface (the “Interface”).12 Whether to do so depends on that cost and,
as the law makes clear, antitrust plaintiffs must also prove the
counterfactual—that the harm would not have occurred but for the
defendant’s conduct. 13 The future is hard to predict, and hypothetical
counterfactuals even more so. Yet predicting the future is precisely what
stakeholders are called to do. Alarmingly, they are without the proper
tools to do so. As a result, both the intellectual infrastructure of antitrust
law and its operationalization can subsist on little more than conjectures
about how innovation and competition interact.14
Consider the following example. We all want things cheap, but we are
also willing to pay a premium to get from a rotary dial phone to the
iPhone. Favoring patentees might benefit upstream innovation, but it may
also inadvertently penalize implementers who can offer follow-on
improvements or simply disseminate technology to the public more
cheaply. 15 At the same time, there is no guarantee that favoring
implementers would lead to anything more than larger annual dividends
to its own stockholders. If antitrust law was applied broadly, IP rights
would be devalued. However, if IP owners could make an end run around
antitrust law by labeling a monopoly tax as a royalty, IP would be little

antitrust cases concerning a trademark or trade secret are relatively rare”); Atkinson & Audretsch,
surpa note 10, at 1 (observing that neoclassical and populist approaches to antitrust law are
“inadequate guides to effective antitrust policy in the twenty-first century, in part because they do
not adequately incorporate dynamic factors and innovation”).
12. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[N]either plaintiffs nor
the court can confidently reconstruct a product’s hypothetical technological development in a world
absent the defendant’s exclusionary conduct.”).
13. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
14. See Wolfgang Kerber, Competition, Innovation, and Competition Law: Dissecting the
Interplay, JOINT DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES ECON. NO. 42-2017, June 10, 2017, at 1, 2,
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers [https://perma.cc/N6SY-M5UU]
(“There is an increasing concern that traditional concepts in competition law that focus mainly on
price effects on existing markets might not be capable of dealing with innovation competition in
the digital economy.”). See also Pedro Caro de Sousa, The Interface of Competition and Intellectual
Law—Taking Stock and Identifying New Challenges, LIBER AMICORUM FREDERIC JENNY
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3279355 [https://perma.cc/8LKG9F6F] (“[T]here is still no consensus about the role of competition on innovation.”).
15 . See, e.g., Jorge Padilla et al., Antitrust Analysis Involving Intellectual Property and
Standards: Implications from Economics, HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at
31), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119034 [https://perma.cc/4LSX-76CD] (“The risk of placing
overly strict limitations upon IPR prices is that the return to innovative behavior is reduced, which
means firms will reduce their investment in further innovations, to the detriment of consumers.
Compounding the problem, with such limits in place, IPR holders will face significant uncertainty
in determining whether their licensing practices violate competition laws, and legal uncertainty is
the enemy of financial investment.”).
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more than a pretext for immunity from antitrust scrutiny.
This inability to anchor policy implementation to more than rhetoric
and ideology results in a body of law that has lurched between vilifying
the exercise of IP on the one hand, and neglect or indifference on the
other. With more than a third of the United States’ Gross Domestic
Product and thirty million jobs dependent upon IP-intensive industries,
that kind of instability and uncertainty is perilous.16
This Article provides a fresh manifesto for revitalizing antitrust law’s
intellectual infrastructure using predictive analytics powered by the latest
research on AI and behavioral economics. Predictive analytics,
comprising the ability to both generate possible options using AI and
judging accurately between them using behavioral economics, can help
stakeholders make smarter decisions at the Interface. In practical terms,
stakeholders using predictive analytics can correlate complex market
variables, estimate the impact of antitrust enforcement on innovation, and
use behavioral nudges to achieve dynamically efficient outcomes in a
way not previously possible. 17 It must be stressed that neoclassical
antitrust remains helpful in framing optimal choices and providing
benchmarks for antitrust enforcement. 18 At the same time, with more
reliable tools both to predict and judge outcomes, agencies and courts can
decide ahead of time and do so with better options. They can also
calibrate with greater precision whether and how to act.19
Part I observes that bipartisan calls for a revival of populist antitrust
are symptoms of a deeper dysfunction that has resulted in a systematic
under-enforcement of antitrust law today. 20 Neoclassical antitrust
provides stakeholders with neither rudder nor compass to reliably
navigate the Interface. This has left antitrust policy vulnerable to dramatic
policy swings, most recently exemplified by the Department of Justice’s
16 . Why Intellectual Property Matters, U.S. DEP’T STATE., https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/
eb/tpp/ipe/why/index.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5UN-JRZT]; But see ZAMIR & TEICHMAN, supra
note 2, at 384 (“Moreover, a large body of empirical literature has shown that predatory pricing is
not, in fact, as rare as dragons, and has documented its occurrence in numerous settings.”).
17. See infra Parts II, III.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Parts II, III.
20. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 745 (2018)
(“[T]he widespread and bipartisan concern that the deck is stacked in favor of large powerful
firms—represent[s] an opportunity, indeed a plea, to strengthen antitrust enforcement.”); Nicola
Giocoli, Neither Populist Nor Neoclassical: The Classical Roots of the Competition Principle in
American Antitrust, SSRN (manuscript at 2) (Jun. 20, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3199703
[https://perma.cc/LF8U-65E7] (quoting Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126
YALE L.J. 710, 803 (2016)) (citation omitted) (“Though relegated to technocrats for decades,
antitrust and competition policy have once again become topics of public concern.”).
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(DOJ) policy positions on standard essential patents (SEPs). 21 These
patents cover inventions necessary to comply with a technical standard
such as 3G/4G networking for cellular phones.22 The smartphone wars
are emblematic of fierce debates at this Interface.23 Patentees wishing to
contribute proprietary technology to a standard like Bluetooth or Wi-Fi
can self-declare patents to be “essential” to its implementation and
undertake to license them on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory”
(FRAND) terms.24
On one side are allegations of opportunistic overcharging by patentees,
abuse of such patent owners’ rights to exclude implementers from
standardized technology, and exploitation of their right to choose how to
license their technology and to whom.25 On the other side are allegations
of implementers depressing royalty rates due to these patentees. 26 The
litigation involving Qualcomm, the world’s largest supplier of
smartphone chips, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is perhaps
the most important modern case embodying these tension-fraught policy
debates.27 The suit both illustrates how key tensions play out in practice
and provides important clues to fixing the fault lines at the Interface.
21. See Caro de Sousa, supra note 14 (manuscript at 17) (“The largest and most immediate
commercial and antitrust concern regarding SEPs is that the owners of SEPs will command very
substantial market power once the standard in question becomes widely adopted.”).
22. Kirti Gupta & Mark Snyder, Smart Phone Litigation and Standard Essential Patents, 12–
13 (Stanford U. Hoover Inst. Working Group on Intell. Prop., Innovation, and Prosperity, Working
Paper Series No. 14006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2492331.
23. Michael A. Carrier, DOJ Giving Cover to Monopolizing Firms that Breach Antitrust Rules,
HILL (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/410958-doj-giving-cover-tomonopolizing-firms-breaching-antitrust-rules [https://perma.cc/4VFG-2LHG] (“Standards present
vital issues lying at the intersection of patent and antitrust law.”) [hereinafter Carrier, DOJ Giving
Cover]; Timothy J. Muris, Bipartisan Patent Reform and Competition Policy, GEO. MASON U. L.
AND ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES, no. 18-46, 2017, at 1, 1, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3292476
[https://perma.cc/RT96-J8GQ] (“More than 250,000 patents may be used in a smartphone,
including many of questionable quality that users of the standards cannot avoid. The result has been
endless intellectual property (IP) litigation, the ‘smartphone wars’ as dubbed in the press.”). See
also Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the
End Game, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) [hereinafter Lim, Triangulating the End Game].
24. Lim, surpa note 23, at 4.
25. Rana Foroohar, Let the 5G Battles Begin, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.ft.com
/content/d8d615ae-cf9c-11e7-b781-794ce08b24dc [https://perma.cc/J4Y9-UB4J] (“The result,
according to one recent survey, is that roughly three-quarters of wireless tech IP holders are refusing
to provide assurances that they’ll license their latest technologies in certain circumstances,
something that could start to undermine connectivity.”).
26. See infra Part I.
27. Rhett Jones, What’s at Stake in Qualcomm’s Blockbuster FTC Antitrust Trial, GIZMODO
(Jan. 10, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://gizmodo.com/whats-at-stake-in-qualcomms-blockbuster-ftcantitrust-t-1831469771 [https://perma.cc/LZG8-DKA9] (“The FTC’s case is seen as a decisive
moment . . . .”).

2019]

Predictive Analytics

169

Part II discusses the heuristics and biases responsible for the
Interface’s endemic instability.28 Just as Newtonian physics opened the
door to deeper truths we now call quantum theory and relativity,
incorporating behavioral economics into antitrust analysis will account
for implicit deviations from assumed rational actor behavior in antitrust
jurisprudence.29 Behavioral economics is gaining recognition in a few
antitrust court and agency decisions.30 Specifically, antitrust driven by
behavioral economics requires clear proof based on objective criteria, but
leaves the door open to plausible theories of harm.31
Part II illustrates how heuristics and biases apply in three ways at the
Interface:
(1) overestimating innovation incentives
while
underestimating consumer harm, (2) crafting smarter remedies, and (3)
explaining the importance of establishing regulatory sandboxes and safe
harbors.
Part III explains how stakeholders can harness AI advances to make
better predictions and judgments at the Interface. Predictive analytics is
the lifeblood of the intelligence community, whose experience provides
an important blueprint to improving antitrust analysis. 32 When
stakeholders assess evidence and identify antitrust issues, they are
looking for abnormalities much in the same way that oncologists look at
a CT scan for cancerous tumors. Predictive analytics can lower the
incidence of false positives. Part III shows how AI can draw upon a
multitude of data sources to estimate the impact on innovation while
behavioral economics ameliorates biases when stakeholders decide
between the options presented. As AI tools enabling prediction become
cheaper and more widespread, the premium on stakeholders’ abilities to
predict innovation outcomes will fall while the importance of their
28. Bailey, supra note 9, at 5 (“Understanding how consumers and firms make decisions is
fundamental to antitrust because the assumptions made are central to predicting competitive
dynamics post-transaction.”).
29. Indeed, as one commentator noted, “[a]ntitrust is the most natural application of behavioral
law and economics because the field is the most completely dependent on economic analysis of all
of the major fields of law.” Max Huffman, A Look at Behavioral Antitrust From 2018, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2019, at 1, 3.
30. Bailey, supra note 9, at 4 (“There are a limited, but slowly growing, number of antitrust
precedents for the reliance on behavioral assumptions.”).
31 . LEONARD MLODINOW, SUBLIMINAL: HOW YOUR UNCONSCIOUS MIND RULES YOUR
BEHAVIOR 3 (1st ed. 2012) (“These subliminal aspects of everything that happens to us may seem
to play very little part in our daily lives. But they are the almost invisible roots of our conscious
thoughts.”).
32. PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
PREDICTION 17 (2015) (“And a big part of what American intelligence does is forecast global
political and economic trends.”).
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judgment will rise.33 Part III concludes by suggesting a readily applicable
framework for how stakeholders can apply predictive analytics at the
Interface, as well as highlighting its limitations.
Part IV concludes with suggestions for future research.
I. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-ANTITRUST DIVIDE
IP law and antitrust law both seek to promote vibrant marketplace
competition today while incentivizing tomorrow’s innovation. 34
Antitrust law generally respects IP rights and only in exceptional
circumstances interferes with how IP owners choose to exercise those
rights.35 IP owners cannot be punished simply because they make life
miserable for their rivals. 36 Accordingly, courts and antitrust agencies
such as the FTC and the DOJ exercise considerable self-restraint in
finding for antitrust plaintiffs in cases involving IP. 37 Besides strict
thresholds, plaintiffs are held to at each stage of the litigation process,
33. AJAY AGRAWAL ET AL., PREDICTION MACHINES: THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 19–20 (2018) (“The drop in the cost of prediction will impact the value of other
things, increasing the value of complements (data, judgment, and action) and diminishing the value
of substitutes (human prediction).”).
34. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.0, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 12, 2017), www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/download
[https://perma.cc/N3XT-Y4L5] (“The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the
common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare. The intellectual
property laws provide incentives for innovation and its dissemination and commercialization by
establishing enforceable property rights for the creators of new and useful products, more efficient
processes, and original works of expression. . . . The antitrust laws promote innovation and
consumer welfare by prohibiting certain actions that may harm competition with respect to either
existing or new ways of serving consumers.”). See also Alison Jones & Renato Nazzini, The Effect
of Competition Law on Patent Remedies, PATENT REMEDIES & COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A
GLOBAL CONSENSUS (Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 372),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3248905
[https://perma.cc/4AU4-4W46]
(noting that “[i]t is often said that patent law (and intellectual property (IP) law more broadly) and
competition law ‘constitute complementary components of a modern industrial policy’ which aim
to improve innovation and consumer welfare”). Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897
F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting antitrust and IP law “are actually complementary, as both
are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”).
35. Jessica K. Delbaum and David Higbee, IP & Antitrust Know-How 2018, MONDAQ (Oct. 31,
2018),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/750422/Patent/IP+Antitrust+KnowHow+2018
[https://perma.cc/C7HZ-A9XJ] (“Absent exceptional circumstances, an IP owner, even one with
monopoly power, has no duty to license to others and a unilateral refusal to license generally will
not be a basis for an antitrust violation.”).
36. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“Taken as a whole, the
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not
competitors.”).
37. Andreas Mundt, CPI Talks . . ., CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. Apr. 2018, at 1, 2, https://www.
competitionpolicyinternational.com/cpi-talks-3/ [https://perma.cc/VJP6-ATAM] (“This is why it is
so difficult in the digital economy to determine when an agency should intervene.”).
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this restraint may also stem in part from a lack of confidence in
deciphering what would be the correct remedy even if an abuse is
found. 38 There is also concern that antitrust defendants would be
ensnared in a web of private litigation, which forms the bulk of antitrust
litigation in the United States.39 The consequences are severe. Violators
face compensatory and treble damages as well as behavioral remedies.40
Antitrust remedies may circumscribe rights conferred under patent law,
including providing injunctive relief, licensing of the patented
technology, or varying the terms of the license.41
While IP owners are not particularly suspect, neither are they immune
from antitrust scrutiny in the absence of an express statutory exception.42
38. Jones & Nazzini, supra note 34, at 424 (“[A]ppropriate terms of dealing (especially pricing)
as well as the realistic prospects for monitoring of that behavior in the future.”). The lack of
enforcement may also be due to the increased use of consent decrees against patentees, particularly
in the standard-setting area. Id. at 426. (“This procedure has also been relied upon quite frequently
by the U.S. authorities in enforcement actions involving the anticompetitive licensing or
exploitation of patents, particularly (in recent years) within the context of technical standardsetting.”). See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in
Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (2015)
(discussing and collecting these decrees). See generally, Renata Hesse & Frances Marshall., U.S.
Antitrust Aspects of FRAND Disputes, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 263–89 (Jorge L. Contreras
ed., 2017); In re Dell Computer Corp. 121 F.T.C. 616, 619–23 (1996) (failure to disclose to a
standard-setting organization, thereby exploiting an unfair method of competition in violation of
Section 5 of the FTC Act); In re Robert Bosch GmbH, F.T.C. File No. 121-0081, Decision and
Order (Apr. 23, 2013); In re Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 121-0120,
Decision and Order (July 23, 2013) (seeking injunctive relief against unlicensed implementers of a
technical standard as to which they had made FRAND commitments). A consent decree is endorsed
by the court that makes the judgment and has the legal force of an adjudicated decision, and a
breach of the consent decree by the defendant attracts contempt of court. United States v. Swift &
Co., 286 U.S. 106, 112 (1932) (actionable contempt).
39. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Relationship
Between Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement, at 8, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD (June 15, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/823166/download [https://perma.cc/7LT5-JBRG] (“While these
cases are important examples of civil non-merger enforcement actions brought by federal and state
enforcement agencies, most civil non-merger antitrust cases are brought by private enforcers.”);
Spencer Weber Waller, The Omega Man or The Isolation of U.S. Antitrust Law (forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript at 49), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295988 (“[T]he Supreme Court has restricted the
substance of antitrust rules for fear of overenforcement, almost always in the context of a private
treble damages case.”).
40. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1964).
41. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 346 (1904) (explaining that the broad
scope of antitrust injunctive relief will “bring about the dissolution or suppression of” the illegal
conduct).
42. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Indep.
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000)) (“Intellectual property rights do
not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.”); see Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff may not rely solely upon a patent to establish
that a manufacturer of ink containers has market power); see, e.g., Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)
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As the Supreme Court recently observed, “patent and antitrust policies
are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and
consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”43
The rejection of immunity from antitrust scrutiny is sound as a matter of
doctrine and policy. As a practical matter, however, this begs the question
as to when and how antitrust law should be operationalized.
One way to do this is to look at antitrust policy goals. Antitrust law
values and safeguards contestability to create room for mavericks to grow
by preventing IP owners from squashing them through collusion,
mergers, and acquisitions, or through IP owners’ market dominance.44
Courts generally assess competitive effects under a “rule of reason,” in
which “the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding
whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an
unreasonable restraint on competition.”45 The rule of reason is apt in IP
cases because it can be difficult to detect market power and distinguish
legitimate exclusion from illegitimate abuse. 46 Courts have used
industry-specific heuristics as evidence of anticompetitive conduct; such
as the size of a reverse payment from a brand pharmaceutical to a
potential generic challenger, the presence of pretextual justifications in
refusing to license patented technology, and the exclusion of nascent
competition by leveraging on a dominant operation served as evidence of

(2010) (providing that a unilateral refusal to license cannot be either patent misuse or an antitrust
violation, or that tying of patented goods is unlawful only in the presence of tying market power).
43. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 148 (2013); Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377
U.S. 13, 24 (1964) (concluding that the IP laws “are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and
modify them pro tanto”); Ginsburg et al., supra note 11, at 100 (“Neither regime is subordinate to
the other; rather, the antitrust and IP laws relate to the same general subject and must be applied in
a manner that harmonizes them.”).
44. Richard Blumenthal & Tim Wu, What the Microsoft Antitrust Case Taught Us, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 2018), [https://perma.cc/WUS9-F664] (“Microsoft was itself, in the early 1980s, the
beneﬁciary of another antitrust case, against IBM, the computing colossus of its time.”); see, e.g.,
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400–402 (1948) (finding horizontal price-fixing
agreement involving patent royalties illegal under antitrust law); New York ex rel. Schneiderman
v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 659 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding product hopping illegal); In re Robert
Bosch GmbH, F.T.C. File No. 121-0081, Decision and Order (Apr. 23, 2013) (entering a consent
order for acquisition requiring the SEP owner to license some patents on a royalty-free basis).
45. Cont’l Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); see also Nat’l Soc’y
of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978) (applying the rule of reason when a
restraint of trade is “ancillary to a legitimate transaction,” including a patent license).
46. Padilla et al., supra note 15 (manuscript at 20) (“[It] is particularly important in IP matters
where it is often more difficult to determine monopoly power because IP holders must necessarily
charge more than marginal costs in order to recoup their investment, and there are substantial risks
involved in seeking to create and commercialize IP. . . . The risk here is in inferring monopoly
power from shares of a defined market, an approach that is fraught with error, particularly in hightech business models involving IP.”).
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anticompetitive conduct. 47 Eventually when the courts “have had
considerable experience” with “conduct that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,” such as pricefixing or market division, then the restraint is condemned as per se
unlawful.48
Antitrust law today faces pressure for it to be employed in pursuit of
populist goals. In particular, the rise of income inequality and expansion
of the Internet economy has prompted calls to enforce antitrust law more
vigorously against big companies.49 For instance, in Amazon’s Antitrust
Paradox, Professor Lina Khan warned that Amazon’s entrenched
position confers market power over retailers, delivery companies, and
consumers, and she points to antitrust law’s “hostility to false positives”
for its impotence in dealing with the unassailable durability of tech
companies.50 This movement consists of many voices and has been called
many things—“populist antitrust, neo-Brandeisian antitrust, or hipster
antitrust.” 51 In particular, “hipster antitrust” is “animated more by
concerns about the political power of large corporations than by concerns
about their economic power” and is attempting to remold antitrust law for
the Fourth Industrial Revolution.52
47. See, e.g., Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504
U.S. 451, 461 (1992) (stating that a plaintiff may rebut an asserted business justification by
demonstrating either that the justification does not legitimately promote competition or that the
justification is pretextual); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79 (“We may infer causation when exclusionary
conduct is aimed at producers of nascent competitive technologies as well as when it is aimed at
producers of established substitutes.”).
48. United States v. Kemp & Assocs., Inc., 907 F.3d 1264, 1272 (10th Cir. 2018) (citations
omitted) (“The per se rule is not a different cause of action than the rule of reason, but rather only
an evidentiary shortcut through the rule of reason morass. It reflects the recognition that some
practices will nearly always invite condemnation under the rule of reason, and in those cases the
per se rule is appropriate because “for the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency we . . .
tolerate[] the invalidation of some agreements that a full-blown inquiry might have proved to be
reasonable.”).
49. Giocoli, supra note 20, at 2 (“Triggered by the aftermaths of the great financial crisis, the
alleged rise of inequality in the American economy and the expansion of the web economy, a lively
debate has recently started (actually, re-started) in the US about antitrust law. . . . ‘[C]ompetition is
now on the front pages, as concerns over rising concentration, extraordinary profits accruing to the
top slice of corporations, slowing innovation, and widening income and wealth inequality have
galvanized attention.’”).
50. Khan, supra note 20, at 738; see also Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) (“It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political
values in interpreting the antitrust laws.”).

51. Joshua N. Holian et al., FTC Opens Doors and Minds to New Approaches for Competition
and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, LATHAM & WATKINS CLIENT ALERT COMMENT.
(Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-ftc-doors-minds-competitionconsumer-protection-21st-century [https://perma.cc/NZ3B-RX9B].
52. Shapiro, supra note 20, at 28.
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A. “Hipster” Antitrust: What was Old is New Again
Populist sentiments animated antitrust law at its genesis, condemning
companies more due to their size rather than any actual harm they
inflicted on the competitive process or consumer welfare. 53 From the
1970s onward, however, neoclassical economics tethered antitrust law to
consumer welfare.54 Over the years, antitrust law continued its evolution
toward an evidence-based approach. 55 Maximizing consumer welfare
would mean “enable[ing] markets to produce the highest output of the
highest quality goods and services consistent with competition.” 56 As
part of the DOJ and FTC’s commitment to evidence-based economic
analysis, they employ a sizeable force of about 130 Ph.D. economists.57
Beginning around 2016, however, bipartisan undercurrents began to
criticize antitrust law’s inability to address vast concentrations of the
market and political power.58 They point to how antitrust enforcement
53. Id. (“Antitrust was born and then fortified during a period of populism in the United States
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.”); see Richard M. Steuer, Incipiency, 31 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 155, 157 (2019) (“When the first antitrust laws were adopted at the end of the Nineteenth
Century, supporters of the new legislation were motivated by a desire not only to protect consumers,
but to limit the power of big business and preserve small businesses.”); Knowledge@Wharton &
Herbert Hovenkamp, How to Build a Better Antitrust Policy, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Dec 14,
2017), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/anti-trust/ [https://perma.cc/7PXT-3XMA]
(“The original progressive movement in the early 20th century had that motive, and the result was
very significant expansion of the antitrust laws.”).
54. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (1978); See Steuer, supra note 53, at 158 (“Professor Bork advocated that consumer
welfare—low prices, high output, good quality, and maximum efficiency—is the only legitimate
goal of antitrust, and that no other objectives should be recognized.”); id. (“In the ensuing years,
courts interpreting the antitrust laws increasing have come to adopt the consumer welfare standard
as the sole standard for judging alleged antitrust violations. Enforcement agencies likewise have
come to rely on the consumer welfare standard as the only standard for assessing mergers and
acquisitions, and deciding whether to challenge allegedly anticompetitive conduct in court.”).
55. BORK, supra note 54, at 51 (stating that “[t]he only legitimate goal of American antitrust
law is the maximization of consumer welfare.”); Thomas J. Horton, Rediscovering Antitrust’s Lost
Values, 16 U.N.H. L. REV. 179, 190 (2018) (“Indeed, neoconservative scholars have been
outspoken in proclaiming that Congress was necessarily focused on increasing economic
efficiency.”); id. at 181 (“Such heady proclamations are based on the rapid ascendance over the last
40 years of neoclassical economics, which largely rule American antitrust today.”); id. at 182
(“Discussions of modern antitrust often emphasize its evolution, over the last several decades, into
a rigorous economic discipline that is largely technocratic and apolitical.”); Hovenkamp, supra note
10, at 611 (“[T]he rule of reason was a joint enterprise of the Chicago and Harvard schools. Bork’s
scholarship [building on Taft’s work] developed the argument for the rule’s domain by arguing for
fewer applications of the per se rule. Subsequent Harvard school scholarship fashioned the rule of
reason’s modern, burden-shifting process of proof.”).
56. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 620.
57. Marcel Boyer et al., The Rise of Economics in Competition Policy: A Canadian Perspective,
CIRANO, at 2 (Dec. 2017).
58. Lina Khan, The Supreme Court Just Quietly Gutted Antitrust Law, VOX (July 3, 2018, 9:40
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has been reduced to a trickle,59 and how antitrust law has become “totally
inadequate” in reining in abuses by tech giants such as Google, Apple,
Facebook, and Amazon, and the threat they pose to “American
democracy.”60 One reason for this apparent lack of antitrust activity is
that neoclassical antitrust assumes that market inefficiencies tend to
correct themselves. 61 Further, as Professor Herbert Hovenkamp
observed, neoclassical antitrust “often appears to be under-deterrent
because of its insistence on due process and rationality, administrability
and clear proof.”62
The slow antitrust litigation process is another reason for the increasing
irrelevance of antitrust law in industries where business cycles are
measured in months rather than years.63 Regardless of whether a private
party or government enforcer brings a case, litigation may take too long
AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/7/3/17530320/antitrust-american-express-amazonuber-tech-monopoly-monopsony [https://perma.cc/ZG3Z-V5NQ] (describing this as a time “when
politicians, journalists, and members of the public increasingly recognize that America has a major
market power problem and that we must revitalize our antitrust tradition. When companies have
too much market power, they can depress wages and salaries, raise prices, block entrepreneurship,
stunt investment, and exert undue political power.”); Shapiro, supra note 20, at 2 (“[I]n July 2017
Congressional Democrats unveiled ‘A Better Deal: Cracking Down on Corporate Monopolies and
the Abuse of Economic and Political Power.’”).
59. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 55, at 186 (“[E]conomics and empiricism do not provide
answers to all questions arising in antitrust law.”); Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust
Debate, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 649, 649–50 (2014) (observing that “some antitrust scholars would
preserve a limited role for other values [while] others challenge the central role of economics more
frontally”); Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making:
Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 584 (1986) (“If pressed to take account of harms
beyond output restraint . . . jurists may find that they can advance values of antitrust law—diversity,
opportunity, fair process, choice, and fairer distribution—without also raising the costs of goods
and services to consumers.”); Blumenthal & Wu, supra note 44 (“Between 1970 and 1999, the
United States brought about 15 monopoly cases each year; between 2000 and 2014 that number
went down to just three.”).
60. See Horton, supra note 55, at 193.
61. See Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with
Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 30 (2015) (“[T]he oddly selective conservative skepticism
about the competence of courts to make factual assessments appears to reflect a reflexive hostility
to exclusion cases, rather than a sober response to limits on the courts’ institutional competence.”).
62. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 594.
63. Jean Tirole, Taming the Tech Monopolies, STRAITS TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.
straitstimes.com/opinion/taming-the-tech-monopolies [https://perma.cc/UZ5Z-JSMS] (“With
rapidly changing technologies and globalisation, traditional regulatory tools have become less
effective, causing competition policy to lag.”); Timothy Cowen & Stephen Dnes, The Good, Bad
& Ugly in Competition Law Enforcement: Observations From The Technology Sector, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON. 1, 5 (2017) (observing “that the current antitrust and regulatory system doesn’t
work well in promptly addressing established issues. In short, it is simply too slow.”); see also id.
(“Microsoft, Intel and Google, affect many other sectors and involve huge factors of production;
and yet the Microsoft investigation took 10 years, and the Google investigation continues, 10 years
on.”).
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to meaningfully benefit the innovative process. Currently, this is a
necessary evil because agency and court decisions need to stand up to
scrutiny on appeal.64
Other commentators point to neoclassical antirust law’s convoluted
rules, which are “so complicated that it is no longer understandable to
many, including not only the electorate and juries, but also judges armed
with solely general legal sophistication.” 65 As Professor Elhauge
explained:
[T]he fact that modern technocratic antitrust stresses open-ended caseby-case all-things-considered analysis of whether welfare is enhanced
or harmed by any specific conduct. That makes it incomprehensible to
most judges and juries, so they can be bamboozled with bad arguments
like the claim that anticompetitively creating monopsony power
upstream should be permitted because it does not harm consumer
welfare.66

Advocates of “hipster” antitrust call for nothing less than “a radical
redefinition of its main goal and, consequently, the abandonment of the
[neoclassical] view.”67 They say that the root of the problem may lie in
antitrust law’s focus on short-term effects such as price and output, which
“fails to capture the architecture of market power in the twenty-first
century marketplace.”68 Their solution is to encompass non-price effects
that facilitate income redistribution.69
The “hipster” movement highlights neoclassical antitrust’s inadequacy
in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. 70 Neoclassical antitrust analysis
focuses on static factors and has no tools to deal with questions pertaining
to political economy, behavioral biases and institutional complexities.
Ideologically, neoclassical antitrust, with its belief in little or no
government intervention, has been criticized as “generally promoted by
64. Mundt, supra note 37, at 3 (“So we have to find the right balance between procedural
efficiency and thoroughness.”).
65. Interview by John Briggs with Einer Elhauge, Professor, Harvard Law School (transcript
available at https://eventbrowse.com/city/na/event/6th-bill-kovacic-antitrust-salon-an-interviewwith-einer-elhauge/ [https://perma.cc/L372-K556]) [hereinafter Elhauge Interview].
66. Id.
67. Giocoli, supra note 20, at 2.
68. Khan, supra note 20, at 716.
69 . Samuel Himel & Robert Seamans, Artificial Intelligence, Incentives to Innovate, and
Competition
Policy,
CPI
ANTITRUST
CHRON.
1,
5
(2017),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CPI-HimelSeamans.pdf [https://perma.cc/33VV-9KG7].
70. Elhauge Interview, supra note 65 (“I think Antitrust Populism has brought great new energy
to the field by correctly stressing that our current approach has produced a system-wide
underenforcement of antitrust law and by making non-technocratic arguments that are
understandable to the general public.”).
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right-wing think tanks funded by rich libertarians who want to pay less
tax.” 71 In particular, neoclassical antitrust tends to make simplifying
assumptions such as a single “equilibrium” for the economy and “rational
expectations” among a homogeneous pool of economic actors.72
At the same time, “hipster” antitrust is both ideologically and
structurally unsound. It rides on a simplistic and long-discarded notion
that “big is bad,” which courts and commentators have long rejected.73 A
retrograde retreat to an age when successful competitors are penalized
simply for winning the market would be a mistake.74 Wielding antitrust
against victorious commercial Goliaths would chill vigorous competition
and undermine economic growth. 75 While antitrust law should be
retooled, it should not be wielded as a populist pitchfork. Antitrust law
was not designed to fix political problems and in any case populism rides
on outsized expectations about what it can accomplish.76
Compared to the lobotomizing of economic policy from antitrust,
incremental retooling is the better option. As Professor Jonathan Baker
observed, “[s]o long as competition policy remains the product of a
political understanding aimed at capturing economic efficiencies, as it
should, economic analysis will remain the essence of antitrust policy,
enforcement, and litigation.” 77 While the ambit of “economic
efficiencies” is not crystal clear, departing from the consumer welfare
standard risks prioritizing rivals over the process of competition itself and
causing marketplace inefficiency. How then can neoclassical antitrust
evolve to remain relevant in this technological age?
71. Ben Chu, The Economics Profession Does Not Need a ‘Reformation’, INDEPENDENT (Dec.
26, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/economics-heterodox-reform-supplydemand-politics-a8128606.html [https://perma.cc/75C6-5KDK].
72. Id.
73. Shapiro, supra note 20, at 26.
74. William A. Galston & Clara Hendrickson, What the Future of U.S. Antitrust Should Look
Like, HARV. BUS. Rev. (Jan. 9, 2018) (“[A] radical revision of the current framework would mean
transforming antitrust into an arena of political contention without clear standards to guide
administrators and judges, ultimately weakening the antitrust regime.”).
75 . Shapiro, supra note 20, at 28 (“Economic growth will be undermined if firms are
discouraged from competing vigorously for fear that they will be found to have violated the antitrust
laws, or for fear they will be broken up if they are too successful.”).
76. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 140–41 (1961)
(“Insofar as that [Sherman] Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that condemns trade
restraints, not political activity . . . . The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the
business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena.”).
77. Horton, supra note 55, at 191 (2018); Pitofsky, supra note 50, at 1051 (agreeing that
economic concerns should “remain paramount,” and that “[t]he issue among most serious people
has never been whether non-economic considerations should outweigh significant long-term
economies of scale” in interpretations of the antitrust laws and concrete antitrust analyses”).
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1. The Neoclassical Antitrust Paradox
Antitrust drifts on a foundation of broadly-worded statutes.78 This was
not an oversight by Congress. Antitrust law governs a vast array of
corporate behavior in diverse industries. It would not be possible to
prospectively legislate the rules of competition to cover all industries in
any meaningful way for all time. Congress therefore strategically
delegated to courts and agencies the responsibility of developing antitrust
law.79
Congress’s decision means the law developed erratically.80 As early as
1898, less than a decade after Congress enacted the Sherman Act, courts
were already concerned with “[t]he manifest danger in the administration
of justice according to so shifting, vague, and indeterminate a standard,”
and attempted to establish a framework of “reasonableness” that would
serve as a doctrinal anchor. 81 To balance anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects, they applied the rule of reason.82 It insisted “that
theories of both competitive harm and offsetting explanations be well
developed, and that fact findings be both sufficient and justified.” 83 If a
practice was “reasonable,” it survived antitrust scrutiny.84 However, that
balancing was more illusory than real. Empirical studies show courts
78. Eriq Gardner, Trump, Time Warner, AT&T and How to Win the Antitrust Trial of the
Century, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 8, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
features/trump-time-warner-at-t-how-win-antitrust-trial-century-1092542 [https://perma.cc/CVN8
-FAPQ] (“But the laws have vague language, so regulators and courts must spell out the rules of
competition.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 597–98 (criticising the Sherman Act, which
condemns restraints on trade or monopolization without further elaboration, and the Clayton Act,
which addresses price discrimination, “tying and exclusive dealing, and mergers,” because
operative terms such as “substantially lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly,” are “so
general that it can mean practically anything.”).
79. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2418 (2015) (citation omitted) (“[S]tare
decisis has ‘less-than-usual force in cases involving the Sherman Act.’ . . . But this distinction is
unwarranted. We have been more willing to reexamine antitrust precedents because they have
attributes of common-law decisions.”).
80. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 597 (“Much of the discrepancy between movement antitrust
and technical antitrust results from the very broad and sparse language of the principal antitrust
laws.”).
81. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898).
82. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason in The Post-Actavis World, COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
25, 29 (2018) [hereinafter Carrier, The Rule of Reason] (“[The Court in] Continental T.V. v. GTE
Sylvania replaced a formalistic analysis centering on whether title to an article had passed with an
economic approach analyzing competitive effects.”).
83. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 600–01.
84. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1501 (4th ed. 2017) (“The court held that
agreements in restraint of trade are enforceable if they are reasonably ancillary to a lawful principal
transaction . . . if the restraint is reasonable . . . and so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate
protection . . . without injuring the public.’”).
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instead rely on a burden-shifting approach in about 97 percent of cases.85
Over time, courts developed heuristics to simplify the analysis,
including higher prices or lower output, a market power requirement, and
the notion of “antitrust injury” for private litigants.86 Even so, the rule of
reason was regarded as “unduly cumbersome,” “costly to litigate,” and
“unwieldy.” 87 With per se offenses, things are easier. Market power
generally need not be proven, and anticompetitive effects are largely
inferred from the conduct itself. 88 However, the varieties of cases
amenable to the per se rule shrink, leaving most cases subject to analysis
under the rule of reason.89
A robust antitrust regime can coexist with robust IP rights. As former
United States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO) Director David Kappos
observed, there is “no doctrinal or philosophical reason why strong IPRs
cannot be reconciled with antitrust law.” 90 He explained that the
“differences in perspective and time scale between the two bodies of law
85. Carrier, The Rule of Reason, supra note 82, at 30 (“First, the plaintiff must show a significant
anticompetitive effect, either an actual effect (such as a price increase or output reduction) or
potential effect (such as market power). Second, if the plaintiff can make such a showing, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate procompetitive justification for the restraint.
Third, if the defendant can offer a justification, the plaintiff can show that the restraint is not
reasonably necessary to achieve the defendant’s objectives or that the objectives could be achieved
by alternatives ‘less restrictive’ of competition. And fourth, courts balance anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects.”); id. at 29 (“This view, however, is not accurate. In two empirical studies
covering all Rule-of-Reason cases from 1977 to 1999 and 1999 to 2009, I found that courts engaged
in a burden-shifting approach.”); id. at 30–31 (“Finally, in 4% and 2% of cases, the court balances
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.”); id. at 38 (“With ninety-seven percent of cases today
dismissed at the first stage due to plaintiffs’ failure to show an anticompetitive effect, the Actavis
shortcuts are significant.”).
86. See generally Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 335 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1066–68 (N.D. Ill.
2018).
87. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 601 (“The Harvard school’s approach to the rule of reason
has the advantage that it takes evidence of both harm and offsetting justifications more seriously.
It has the disadvantage that the rule of reason has become unduly cumbersome and costly to
litigate.”); See also Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 363, 363–64 (bemoaning how antitrust “vacillated between the policy of preserving
competition and the policy of preserving competitors from their more energetic and efficient
rivals”).
88. See, e.g., Newman v. Universal Pictures, 813 F.2d 1519, 1522–23 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[The]
per se rule relieves plaintiff of the burden of demonstrating an anticompetitive effect, which is
assumed . . . .”); see Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2407 (2015) (demanding
royalties on a patent that has expired is per se unlawful).
89. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 83 (2018) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason] (“Today it extends to ‘naked’ price fixing and market division
agreements, a small subset of boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal, and—by a very thin thread—
some tying arrangements.”).
90. David J. Kappos, The Antitrust Assault on Intellectual Property, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
665, 672 (2018).
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can obscure their common ground.”91 Antitrust law, he noted, focuses on
the “immediate effects, particularly on prices and market outcomes.”92 In
contrast, “as drivers of innovation [IP rights] work dynamically and
gradually to create an entirely different world, one containing new
products, businesses, or even industries, as well as to facilitate
technologies that improve the operation of existing markets.”93
In other words, while consumers benefit from lower prices and higher
outputs in the short run, innovation gives the single greatest boost to
consumer welfare in the long run.94 Firms may innovate to reduce costs
or launch new products and services. 95 Constitutionally enshrined IP
rights encourage this sort of innovation. 96 Owners rely on them to
appropriate the rewards of innovation through sales and licenses that
might otherwise be misappropriated by free-riders.97 In turn, the rewards
spur future innovation by providing an income stream and driving rivals
to invent around patented technology. 98 IP rights thus “protect the
competitive process in innovation, which also benefits consumers.”99 In
the long run, consumers benefit when the price of technology drops.
When Thomas Edison patented the incandescent lamp in the early 1800s,
artificial light cost about 400 times what it does today. 100 Its cheap
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Caro de Sousa, supra note 14 (manuscript at 1) (“It is widely accepted that innovation and
technological progress are the single most important determinant of economic growth.”); Padilla et
al., supra note 15 (manuscript at 2, 4) (While consumers gain from increases in static efficiency in
the short run, economics teaches us that dynamic efficiency, including societal gains from
innovation, are an even greater driver of consumer welfare. . . . [T]he social value of process and
product innovation is very large.”).
95. Padilla et al., supra note 15 (manuscript at 2) (“Product innovation may lead to better
products (vertical product innovation) or products that are different from the existing ones without
being superior (horizontal product innovation). It may also lead to entirely new products or ways
of doing things (often referred to as drastic or leapfrog innovation). Process and product innovation
are extremely valuable to social welfare.”).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (empowering Congress “[t]o promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries”); Padilla et al., supra note 15 (manuscript at 5) (“IPRs exist to
stimulate innovation by increasing the return on costly investments in research and development
(‘R&D’).”).
97. Kappos, supra note 90, at 667 (“IPRs encourage innovation by assuring that the rewards of
innovation go to the innovator, whether the innovator chooses to sell the innovation or license it to
others.”).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 671.
100. See William D. Nordhaus, Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing, 67 J.
ECON. HIST. 128 (2007) (noting that in the early 1800s it would have cost four hundred times what
for the same amount of light).

2019]

Predictive Analytics

181

abundance lit up the world and transformed how we lived and worked.
The same might be said of the ubiquity of computing in photography,
autonomous vehicles, and city planning. 101 This means IP deference
needs to balance between protecting the initial innovator’s rights and
fostering follow-on or cumulative developments. 102 It also means that
inapt intervention “has the capability to destroy incentives to innovate
and economies of scale.”103
An important takeaway here then is that where competitive problems
may have their roots in the IP system itself, antitrust should not use it as
a compensatory tool. The better solution is endogenous, not
exogenous. 104 The answer is to focus on specific defects in the
acquisition and exercise of IP rights. 105 Further, IP law has endogenous
policy levers to curb opportunism by patentees such as patent misuse, the
first sale doctrine, and patent-post grant review.106
That conclusion, however, does not address when the inflection point
of dynamic gains is reached. The focus should be on static efficiency.
Every antitrust case involving IP requires some consideration of two “but
for” worlds, one in which intervention takes place and one in which it
does not.107 Whether IP-deference yields greater innovation is difficult to
prove. 108 There is some consensus that IP and innovation exist on an
101. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 12 (“The advent and commercialization of computers
made arithmetic cheap.”).
102. Caro de Sousa, supra note 14 (manuscript at 2) (“All IP rights seek to promote innovation
and creativity by striking a balance between protecting the initial creator’s rights and fostering
follow-on or cumulative developments.”); id. (manuscript at 4) (“An important consequence of the
inverted U-shape relationship between market concentration and innovation is that, in general,
moderate amounts of competition enforcement create a market environment that is more conducive
to innovation.”).
103. Mundt, supra note 37, at 2.
104. See Caro de Sousa, supra note 14 (manuscript at 10) (“[I]t would be inappropriate to use
competition law for the purpose of remedying the defects of IP regimes.”); See also William E.
Kovacic & Andreas P. Reindl, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Improving Competition Policy and
Intellectual Property Policy, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.1062, 1067–68. (noting that using antitrust to
expand access to IP rights is a crude, second-best solution to cure weaknesses that reside in the
rights granting process).
105. Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 299, 304–05 (2014) [hereinafter Lim, Patent Misuse].
106. Id. at 385 (suggesting judges can help by finding patent misuse when appropriate); see,
e.g., Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent Misuse, 51 IDEA 559, 560,
590 (2011) (noting the various sources of relief for misuse and monopolization by patentees).
107. Padilla et al., supra note 15 [manuscript at 19] (“In order to protect an IPR holder’s core
right to exclude, when considering whether specific conduct has anticompetitive effects, the
analysis will include a determination of what would have happened in the absence of a license (the
‘but for world’) . . . .”).
108. Koren W. Wong-Ervin & Georgios Effraimidis, Recommendations Following the FTC’s
October
2018
Hearings
on
IP
and
Innovation,
CPI
2
(Oct.
2018),
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inverted U-shaped curve—that too much or too little protection harms
innovation.109
The stakes involved and costs of mistaken intervention provide a clue
as to why courts are normally reluctant to grant fiats against patentees
unless the theory of anticompetitive harm has been clearly made. 110 As
one dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court recently noted, “because
the relevant question is a comparison between reality and a hypothetical
state of affairs, to require actual proof of reduced output is often to require
the impossible—tantamount to saying that the Sherman Act does not
apply at all.”111
The open-ended nature of antitrust law has resulted in untethered
swings in its approach to IP rights. For instance, the early 1900s, IP rights
were immune from antitrust scrutiny. 112 By the 1940s, antitrust law
severely limited the restrictions patentees could impose on their
licensees.113 This anti-patent sentiment reached a high-water mark in the
1970s when the DOJ’s treated numerous licensing practices as per se
violations.114 In 1988, the DOJ shifted to a rule of reason approach to

https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/recommendations-following-the-ftcs-october2018-hearings-on-ip-and-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/HXX4-4JS6] (“Professor Michael Frakes
explained that any attempt to approach empirically the question of whether the patent system
incentivizes and/or results in innovation encounters notable obstacles, perhaps the most difficult of
which is the construction of the necessary counterfactual.”).
109. Id. (“[T]he economics literature taken as a whole suggests that the relationship between IP
and innovation is an inverted-U shape, i.e., either too little or too much IP protection lowers
innovation.”).
110. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1073–80 (10th Cir. 2013).
111. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2302 (2018).
112. Bennett v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) (noting “absolute freedom in the use
or sale of rights under the patent laws . . . . The very object of these laws is monopoly . . . .”).
113. See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456–58 (1940) (rejecting
restrictions using patents when the interests can be protected in other ways which do not implicate
monopolized practices); Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 34 n.4
(1931) (noting that an attempt to use a patent to unreasonably restrain commerce is both beyond
the scope of the patent and a direct violation of the antitrust laws); see also United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 282 (1942) (holding that the power to hold a patent and price fix is
an “injury which the Sherman Act condemns [which] renders it illegal per se”); Morton Salt Co. v.
G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Independ. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28, 37 (2006); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Int’l. Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 37.
114. Bruce Wilson, Dep’t of Justice Luncheon Speech, Law on Licensing Practices: Myth or
Reality?, APLA BULL. 54, 58–59 (Jan.–Feb. 1975) (remarking that the “nine no-no’s” include
prohibitions on (1) tying; (2) grantbacks; (3) resale; (4) covenants covering non-patented products
or services; (5) restricting licenses by licensor; (6) package licensing; (7) metered royalties; (8)
restricting the resale of products made by a patented process; and (9) minimum resale price
maintenance).
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patent licensing. 115 In 1995, the DOJ and FTC jointly issued the
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property and endorsed a rule
of reason approach to patent licensing.116 By the 2000s, a “scope of the
patent” approach had developed, whereby everything falling within the
patent claims or duration of the patent is immune to antitrust scrutiny,
thus all but coming a full circle.117 And as mentioned at the beginning of
Part I, the current approach directs courts to find their way through the
rule of reason using heuristics.118
Stakeholders do not know tomorrow’s impact on today’s intervention.
For that matter, they do not know if non-intervention is better than
intervention. Either side may be accused of making “claims that are
impossible to deliver, or adopt[ing] speculative, unprovable theories
about competitive harm.” 119 This makes the quest for dynamic
efficiency—which is inherently focused on the long run—an elusive one.
Those seeking more patent deference and those seeking less seem like
blind men arguing over the colors of the rainbow.
2. Like Blind Men Arguing Over the Color of a Rainbow
It would be overly simplistic to say that the tension between IP and
antitrust comes about because IP law confers exclusive rights while
antitrust seeks to correct anticompetitive market outcomes. The modern
view acknowledges that both antitrust and IP laws accommodate each
other—a “yin-yang” approach which defines IP scope by both IP and
antitrust policies—but agencies and courts face the task of accounting for
innovation incentives. 120 Antitrust law’s merger analysis offers a clue
about the difficulty in prophylactic intervention. Merger analysis is
structured to be forward-looking, mandated by statute to curb incipient

115. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INT’L OPERATIONS,
64, 68 (Nov. 10, 1988).
116 . U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.4 (Apr. 6, 1995), available at https://www.justice.gov
/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQL5-7BET] (announcing
the intention to evaluate patent licensing practices under a balancing test); id. (“In the vast majority
of cases, restraints in intellectual property licensing arrangements are evaluated under the rule of
reason.”).
117. In re Indep. Service Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding
that Xerox’s refusal to license was “squarely within the rights granted by Congress to the copyright
holder and did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws” in the absence of definitive rebuttal
evidence).
118. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 148 (2013).
119. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 594 (explaining how movement antitrust differs from
technical antitrust).
120. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 148.
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harm. 121 However, even merger analysis has increasingly focused on
price effects rather than non-price effects such as innovation.122
Schumpeterians offer one vision of innovation, betting it comes from
rewarding the IP owners. 123 Monopolies are temporary and rapidly
displaced by new monopolies through the process of creative
destruction.124 Clamping down on innovators may chill entrepreneurship,
ward off investors, and prevent society from ascending the inverted Ushaped innovation curve. Arrovians, on the other hand, believe that
competition creates better and cheaper products, with innovation based
on the need to outperform competitors. 125 If a newcomer has a better
product than the incumbent, it might want to block the entrant from
gaining even a partial foothold in the market. Ignore exploitative and
exclusionary conduct, and innovators may wrest control over the vital
arteries needed for the creation and dissemination of technology.
Insulation from competition thus results in reduced “firm dynamism,
increased firm age, decreased labor mobility and lower total factor
productivity growth.” 126 In such situations, “by addressing and
eliminating anticompetitive restraints imposed by private firms in
innovation-focused markets, competition authorities create space and
opportunities for innovation and growth.”127 The key then is to keep the
market contestable.128
121. Steuer, supra note 53, at 160 (“The Clayton Act was adopted in 1914 to fill gaps that had
appeared in the coverage of the Sherman Act. Troubling mergers and acquisitions were escaping
the reach of the Sherman Act, and exclusive dealing and tying persisted in closing off competition.
The Clayton Act did not purport to change the goals of the antitrust laws. Instead, it amplified those
laws by changing the time horizon for analysis in adopting what would become known as the
‘incipiency’ doctrine.”).
122. Himel & Seamans, supra note 69, at 5 (“[T]owards assessing what is measurable.”).
123. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (2d
ed. 1942) (recognizing that patent-based innovation produces the best results for the economy, in a
process he called “creative destruction”).
124. Kappos, supra note 90, at 672 (“Crucially, the negative effects of weakening IPRs are
neither immediate nor apparent: when we weaken incentives to innovate, we cannot know what
innovations we have preempted and how much better off those innovations would have made us.”).
125. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITIES: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 626
(R. Nelson ed., 1962); see also Caro de Sousa, supra note 14 (manuscript at 3–4) (“The proponents
of Arrow and, to some extent, of Aghion et al., see an important role for antitrust agencies in
supporting innovation because they understand competition to be an important the driver of
innovation.”).
126. Himel & Seamans, supra note 69, at 4.
127. Caro de Sousa, supra note 14 (manuscript at 4).
128. Tirole, supra note 63 (“A new enterprise that is more efficient or more innovative than an
established monopoly must be permitted to enter the market; or, in the economic jargon, the market
in question must be ‘contestable.’”).
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Hindsight sometimes supports intervention, such as the government’s
indictment of Microsoft in the 1990s. Despite Microsoft’s popularity
among consumers, courts found it used its triple monopoly in its
operating system, applications, and Internet browser markets to exclude
rivals and perpetuate its market power.129 Microsoft’s supporters warned
that interfering with its business practices would harm innovation and
chill the nation’s economic lifeblood. 130 History makes at least a
plausible case that cracking down on Microsoft allowed innovation to
surge in newly opened markets such as Internet search and, ecommerce.131 Google, the tiny start-up, might not have prevailed against
Internet Explorer which was so snugly integrated into Windows.
Similarly, Myspace would have been the default social network instead
of Facebook. Netflix and Amazon may never have come to be. The
enduring lesson Microsoft taught then is that keeping markets contestable
requires decisive action from courts and agencies even when products
and producers are popular.132 Ironically, many of these once fledgling
startups have since become embroiled in their own antitrust
controversies.133
The debate over patented standards vividly captures the diametric
narratives between those who seek access to the technology and those
who seek control. Standards provide a common platform for information
and communications technology covering myriad technologies. On the
surface, the goal of both camps is similar—to incentivize the
development of technologies and standards by preserving a fair and
adequate return for patented technology, while ensuring widespread
dissemination of standardized technologies based on fair access
conditions. However, both sides see the other as the source of
opportunistic profiteering.
The nature and scope of both “holdups” and “holdouts” remain
129. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
130. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation, 4 J. COMP.
L. & ECON. 915, 962 (2008) (explaining how innovation will be stifled if antitrust authorities
require standardization).
131. Blumenthal & Wu, supra note 44 (“But what we do know is that the remedy pushed
Microsoft to act with more caution, creating an essential opening for a new generation of ﬁrms.”).
132. Id. (“The enduring lesson of the Microsoft case was that keeping markets open can require
a trustbuster’s courage to take decisive action against even a very popular monopolist.”).
133. Id. (“Some limitations were placed on Microsoft’s behavior, such as a requirement that it
share certain programming information with third-party companies. The appropriateness of that
remedy is still debated.”); see, e.g., William Robinson, Antitrust Scrutiny of Technology Companies
Continues to Expand, NAT’L L. REV. (July 24, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
antitrust-scrutiny-technology-companies-continues-to-expand
[https://perma.cc/XS86-QYH8]
(noting various antitrust disputes including those against tech giants like Apple and Qualcomm).
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controversial. Holdups generally refer to a patentee’s refusal to grant a
license on FRAND terms to extract higher fees unconnected to technical
contribution to the standard or exclude an implementer from the market.
Holdouts generally refers to an implementer’s refusal to take a license
offered on FRAND terms in order to opportunistically depress fees or
extract additional concessions holdups and holdouts result from
technology-specific investments, since neither can completely specify the
terms before committing themselves.
FRAND obligations mitigate holdup.134 For this reason, courts have
found that SEP owners unconstrained by FRAND commitments pose an
anticompetitive threat by monopolizing technology markets. 135
However, like the antitrust statutes, FRAND obligations governing SEP
industries are vaguely worded and the terms provide no mechanism on
how to determine what those obligations mean in practice. 136
134. See, e.g., CSIRO v. Cisco Sys. Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citations
omitted) (“This value—the value of the technology—is distinct from any value that artificially
accrues to the patent due to the standard’s adoption. Without this rule, patentees would receive all
the benefit created by standardization—benefit that would otherwise flow to consumers and
businesses practicing the standard.”); Ericsson v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1232–33 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“In other words, a royalty award for a SEP must be apportioned to the value of the patented
invention . . . , not the value of the standard as a whole.”); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12 (W.D. Wash. April 25, 2013) (citations omitted)
(“A RAND royalty should be set at a level consistent with the SSOs’ goal of promoting widespread
adoption of their standards. . . . In the context of a dispute concerning whether or not a given royalty
is RAND, a proper methodology used to determine a RAND royalty should therefore recognize
and seek to mitigate the risk of patent hold-up that RAND commitments are intended to avoid.”);
In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at *8 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 3, 2013) (“The RAND commitment, which standard-setting organizations extract from patent
holders from demanding excessive royalties that capture value beyond the value of the patented
technology itself”).
135. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 315–316 (3rd Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted) (“[T]he alleged anticompetitive conduct was the intentional false promise that
Qualcomm would license its WCDMA technology on FRAND terms, on which the relevant SDOs
relied in choosing the WCDMA technology for inclusion in the UMTS standard, followed by
Qualcomm’s insistence on non-FRAND licensing terms.”); see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012) (noting that courts
have recognized the antitrust market power conferred on a patent incorporated into a standard as
opposed to a normal patent); see also Research in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., 644 F.Supp.2d
788, 794 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (“Even if Motorola’s conduct does not eliminate competition entirely,
it has the power to harm it. If Motorola licenses only at exorbitant rates, it will force its competitors
to increase prices in the downstream market in order to make a profit. This increase in prices . . .
except Motorola’s will harm competition.”).
136. See RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES
OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 103
(2012), available at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_
072197.pdf [https://perma.cc/53GS-V6C4] (“None of the policies in the study set seeks to define
the term ‘reasonable’ (and/or the term of ‘fair’ if the policy refers to FRAND). Likewise, ‘nondiscriminatory’ also is left to the parties involved to agree upon (or to the courts, if they cannot).”).
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Understanding the evolution and contours of the FRAND debate can
therefore provide important clues as to how the same can be done more
broadly at the IP-antitrust interface.
B. “Flip-Flop” FRAND
Antitrust concerns in standard setting have arisen in several forms over
the years, usually in the form of patent holdups. Patent holdups can occur
when patentees leverage on standardized technology, such as the value of
an end product dependent on compliance with the patentee’s standard, to
get outsized royalties, such as the value of an end product dependent on
compliance with the patentee’s standard, by threatening to exclude
implementers from the market unless they take a license on terms
favorable to the patentee. 137 The market power from switching costs
make it unfeasible for implementers to adopt rival technologies
previously available during standard setting.138
Some patentees deceptively fail to declare patents as essential and
extract higher royalties from implementers after Standard Setting
Organizations (SSOs) incorporate their technology into the standard.139
Even if the patented technology was introduced without deception,
patentees may be liable under antitrust law for leveraging on a standard
to exclude rivals and exploit consumers in contravention of FRAND
obligations.140 In 2007, the DOJ and FTC issued a joint report on antitrust
137. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments
More Effective, 127 YALE L. J. 2110, 2114–15 (2018) (“[T]he shadow of litigation is particularly
problematic in the communications and technology sector, in which products typically include
hundreds or thousands of patented technologies. A court-ordered injunction involving such
products would deprive the implementer of not only the value of the technology covered by the
patent-in-suit, but also the value of the entire product.”); id. at 2115 (“In effect, the SEP holder is
often compensated for alleged patent rights that it in fact does not own.”).
138. See, e.g., Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1233 (noting the difficulty in adopting rival technologies
because once a technology is adopted into a standard it is “necessary to comply with the standard”);
see also Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Before an SSO adopts a
standard, there is often vigorous competition among different technologies for incorporation into
that standard. After standardization, however, the dynamic shifts, as industry members begin
adhering to the standard and the standardized features start to dominate.”).
139. See, e.g., In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., 88 F.2d 492, 494–95 (C.C.P.A. 1937) (patentee
illegally monopolized technology market through deceptive conduct by misrepresenting it lacked,
or would not assert, rights in car emissions research results); see also Rambus, 522 F.3d at 469
(breach of a duty to disclose during standard setting could violate antitrust law if disclosure would
have led SSO to switch); see also Daryl Lim, Patent Holdups, in ANTITRUST INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HIGH-TECH HANDBOOK 249 (Daniel D. Sokol & Roger D. Blair eds., 2017)
(explaining that patentees will induce adoption by offering a reasonable price and later reneging on
the promise when the invention is incorporated in the invention).
140. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
Qualcomm’s conduct and allegations of “reliance on Qualcomm’s assurances” gave raise to
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enforcement and IP rights, recognizing the competitive harm from holdup
when patentees demand royalties reflecting the cost of switching from the
standard rather than the value of their patented technology. It noted that:
Before, or ex ante, multiple technologies may compete to be
incorporated into the standard under consideration. Afterwards, or ex
post, the chosen technology may lack effective substitutes precisely
because the SSO chose it as the standard. Thus, ex post, the owner of a
patented technology necessary to implement the standard may have the
power to extract higher royalties or other licensing terms that reflect the
absence of competitive alternatives.141

In 2012, the FTC acted against patentees seeking injunctions against
locked-in implementers.142 The agency required the patentees to refrain
antitrust liability); Jones & Nazzini, supra note 34, at 381 (“[T]o exploit customers and/or to holdup
implementers of the standard and adversely impact on innovation and the quality, variety, and cost
of products/services available in a downstream market.”); Daryl Lim, Unilateral Conduct and
Standards, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS (Jorge L. Contreras ed. 2017) (noting that Qualcomm’s
practices which led to standardization “‘significantly expanded Qualcomm’s market power by
eliminating alternatives . . .’ even if ‘the standard did not expand Qualcomm’s exclusory rights as
a patent holder’ . . . may constitute actionable anticompetitive conduct”) .
141. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33–36 (2007)
(“These issues involve the potential for ‘hold up’ by the owner of patented technology after its
technology has been chosen by the SSO as a standard and others have incurred sunk costs which
effectively increase the relative cost of switching to an alternative standard.”); see also Fei Deng &
Mario Lopez, The Economic Approaches Used to Determine FRAND Royalty Rates in TCL v.
Ericsson, EDGEWORTH ECONOMICS (Jan. 2018), https://edgewortheconomics.com/files/
documents/The_Economic_Approaches_Used_to_Determine_FRAND_Royalty_Rates_in_TCL_
v_Ericsson.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RVP-U9XE] (“Economists have long recognized that a holdup
problem can arise in the context of standard-setting: once a standard is set and implementers are
locked-in to the standard, licensors have the incentive to charge rates in excess of the inherent value
of the underlying SEPs.”).
142. See Complaint at ¶ 19–20, ¶ 23, In re Robert Bosch GmbH, File No. C-4377 (FTC 2012)
(seeking injunctive relief against SPX Service Solutions); Complaint at ¶ 19, ¶ 25–27, ¶ 31, In re
Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., File No. C-4410 (FTC 2013) (violating Section 5 of the
FTC Act by breaching FRAND obligations by seeking injunctions against willing licensees
distorted the negotiating process, undermining the integrity and efficiency of the standard-setting
process, raising prices to consumers, and injuring competition); see also Edith Ramirez,
Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Standard-Essential Patents and Licensing: An Antitrust
Enforcement Perspective Address at the 8th Annual Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium,
Georgetown University Law Center 7 (Sept. 10, 2014) (“In the standard-setting context, the risk of
patent holdup creates the type of competitive harm that falls properly within the scope of antitrust
enforcement.”); Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y. Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
The Art of Persuasion: Competition Advocacy at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual
Property, Address in Seattle, Wash. 9 (Nov. 8, 2013) (“We also continue to explore where there is
room for liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act in cases where holders of FRANDencumbered SEPs seek injunctive relief after a standard is in place. Even in cases where the patent
holder did not intentionally deceive the SSO during the standards-setting process, competition and
consumers can be harmed . . . .”).
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from “initiating, or threatening to initiate, any Action demanding
injunctive relief” unless the implementer refused in writing to take a
license or refused a license determined to be on FRAND terms.143 That
same year, the DOJ Antitrust Division emphasized the importance of
policing the risk of holdups, noting that holdups were “[a]t the forefront
of many of the Antitrust Division’s intellectual property (IP) related
enforcement and advocacy efforts . . . .”144
In 2014, the Federal Circuit recognized that patent holdups could result
from patentees charging locked-in implementers royalties in excess of the
value of their technology. 145 In 2015, the DOJ published a business
review letter approving the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Incorporated’s (IEEE’s) revised policy prohibiting SEP
holders from seeking injunctive relief against willing licensees. It also
dictated factors in determining an appropriate FRAND rate based on the
“smallest saleable unit.”146 The letter noted that the IEEE’s provisions
would further the “procompetitive goal of providing greater clarity
regarding” FRAND commitments, “which could facilitate licensing
negotiations, limit patent infringement litigation, and enable parties to
reach mutually beneficial bargains that appropriately value patented
technology.”147
Under the Trump administration, the DOJ dramatically changed its
approach.148 Makan Delrahim, the DOJ’s new antitrust chief, dismissed
FRAND-related holdouts as being an antitrust problem.149 Holdups are
143. Decision and Order § IV.D–E, In re Robert Bosch GmbH, File No. C-4377 (FTC 2013).
144. Fiona M. Scott Morton, Deputy Assistant Att’y. Gen. for Econ. Analysis, Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep’t. Justice, The Role of Standards in the Current Patent Wars, Presented at the Charles
River Associates Annual Brussels Conference: Economic Developments in European Competition
Policy 2 (Dec. 5, 2012).
145. See Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Patent hold-up
exists when the holder of a SEP demands excessive royalties after companies are locked into using
a standard.”).
146. Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP 13 (Feb. 2, 2015) (on file with the
Department of Justice).
147. Id. at 11; see also Peter J. Levitas et al., DOJ Shifts Focus from SEP Holders To SEP
Implementers and SSOs, MONDAQ (Nov. 23, 2017), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/
649254/Antitrust+Competition/DOJ+Shifts+Focus+from+SEP+Holders+to+SEP+Implementers+
and+SSOs [https://perma.cc/75AD-XDDZ] (“The business review letter was widely considered to
be an endorsement of SEP policies designed to limit the potential for patent holdup, consistent with
past DOJ statements and FTC enforcement efforts.”).
148 . Levitas et al., supra note 147 (“[A] clear departure from prior agency policy and
enforcement views, and a refutation of the DOJ IEEE Business Review letter.”).
149. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and
Intellectual Property Law, Keynote Address at University of Pennsylvania Law School (Mar. 16,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-
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quite simply “an empirical enigma in the academic literature.”150 And the
“proponents of using antitrust law to police FRAND commitments
principally rely on models devoid of economic or empirical evidence that
holdup is a real phenomenon.”151 Professor Dennis Calton observed that
Delrahim is a “Chicago School thinker,” and “is wary of the
government’s ability to mess around through intervention.”152
Delrahim criticized prior enforcement actions against SEP holders
seeking injunctions as undermining the foundation of patent rights,
attacking them as “anathema to the policies underlying the intellectual
property system,” “a serious threat to the innovative process,” and “a
misuse of antitrust or competition law.”153 Instead, “[s]tating that a patent
holder can derive higher licensing fees through holdup simply reflects
basic commercial reality.”154 In articulating the DOJ’s responsibility on
dynamic efficiency, he observed that “[a]s enforcers, we have a
responsibility to ensure that antitrust policy remains sound, so that United
States consumers continue to enjoy the benefits of dynamic competition
and innovation”155
Delrahim warned that “[e]very incremental shift in bargaining leverage
toward implementers of new technologies acting in concert can
undermine incentives to innovate.”156 Failure to account for this “risks

keynote-address-university [https://perma.cc/4PHV-2CB7] [hereinafter Delrahim, New Madison]
(“[H]oldup is fundamentally not an antitrust problem, and therefore antitrust law should not be used
as a tool to police FRAND commitments that patent-holders make to standard setting
organizations.”).
150. Id.
151. Id. (“Advocates of using antitrust law to reduce the supposed risk of patent holdup fail to
identify an actual harm to the competitive process that warrants intervention.”); see also Makan
Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Take it to the Limit: Respecting Innovation Incentives in the
Application of Antitrust Law, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the USC Gould School of Law
4 (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download [https://perma.cc/
4PW4-B6UA] [hereinafter Delrahim, Take it to the Limit] (referring repeatedly to the “so-called
holdup problem” to emphasize its “shaky empirical foundations”).
152. Gardner, supra note 78.
153. Delrahim, Take it to the Limit, supra note 151, at 4 (arguing that using antitrust laws
“threatens to disrupt the free-market bargain, which could undermine the process of dynamic
innovation itself”); see also id. at 3 (“[A]nd perhaps risk undermining incentives for IP creators,
who are entitled to an appropriate reward for developing break-through technologies.”).
154. See Delrahim, New Madison, supra note 149, at 3 (explaining that theories claiming patent
hold-up is an antitrust problem can go wrong because, for example, “a patent holder can derive
higher licensing fees through hold-up simply reflects basic commercial reality”).
155. Id.
156. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at
the USC Gould School of Law’s Center for Transnational Law and Business Conference 2 (Nov.
10, 2017), transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-generalmakan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-gould-school-laws-center [https://perma.cc/PF3T-LH78].
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creating ‘false positive’ errors of over-enforcement that would discourage
valuable innovation.” 157 He was convinced of an “asymmetry”
disfavoring patentees who “must make significant upfront investments in
technology before they know whether it will pay off, whereas
implementers can delay at least some of their investments until after
royalty rates have been determined.” 158 To rectify this, Delrahim
promised a “fresh look at concerted actions within SSOs that cause
competitive harm to the dynamic innovation process.” 159 In referencing
the IEEE policy changes, Delrahim pointed out that the DOJ would
be skeptical of rules that SSOs impose that appear designed specifically
to shift bargaining leverage from IP creators to implementers, or vice
versa. SSO rules purporting to clarify the meaning of ‘reasonable and
non-discriminatory’ that skew the bargain in the direction of
implementers warrant a close look to determine whether they are the
product of collusive behavior within the SSO.”160

Delrahim also rejected the Federal Circuit’s measure of royalties,
stating that “[w]hile the so-called smallest salable component rule may
be a useful tool among many in determining patent infringement damages
for a multiple-component product, its use as a requirement by a concerted
agreement of implementers as the exclusive determinant of patent
royalties may very well warrant antitrust scrutiny.” 161 As to the nondiscriminatory obligation in FRAND, Delrahim stated that it “does not
compel” patentees to abide by the non-discriminatory obligation, as
antitrust law “does not authorize courts to determine ‘reasonable’
licensing rates” and “does not police ‘fair’ prices or competition.” 162
157. See Delrahim, New Madison, supra note 149, at 3 (“Antitrust law demands evidence-based
enforcement, without which there is a real threat of undermining incentives to innovate.”).
158. Id.; see also Delrahim, Take it to the Limit, supra note 151, at 10 (“When implementers
act together within a standard-setting organization as the gatekeeper to sales of products including
a new technology, they have both the motive and means to impose anticompetitive licensing terms.
At the extreme, they can shut down a potential new technology in favor of the status quo, all to the
detriment of consumers.”).
159. Delrahim, Take it to the Limit, supra note 151, at 10 (“Given the incentives participants in
SSOs face to bend licensing negotiations to their benefit, there is a risk that members of standard
setting bodies could engage in collusive, anticompetitive behavior.”).
160. Id. at 11; see also Jorge L. Contreras, Taking It To The Limit: Shifting U.S. Antitrust Policy
Toward Standards Development, 103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES (Fall 2018) (manuscript at 6),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3218360 [https://perma.cc/K7NC-3JAC] (“These comments appear to be
directed at IEEE’s 2015 policy amendments, which seek to clarify the meaning of ‘reasonable and
nondiscriminatory’ . . . .”).
161. Delrahim, Take it to the Limit, supra note 151, at 11.
162. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at
IAM’s Patent Licensing Conference in San Francisco: Antitrust Law and Patent Licensing in the
New Wild West 3 (Sept. 18, 2018), transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-iam-s-patent-licensing
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According to Delrahim, antitrust law is agnostic to the rate SEP owners
charge and is “indifferent” to price discrimination.163
On April 10, 2018, Delrahim indicated that DOJ’s support for the letter
was limited. He noted that “this letter should never be cited for the
proposition that what IEEE did is required, or that a patent holder who
seeks an injunction is somehow in violation of the antitrust laws.”164 In
December 2018, Delrahim withdrew from a 2013 joint report by the DOJ
and USPTO discouraging SEP owners from blocking implementers from
using their SEPs, reasoning that “[a] FRAND commitment does not and
should not create a compulsory licensing scheme.”165 Indeed, according
to Delrahim “[t]he fundamental right of the patent holder [is] to exclude
competitors,” which commentators have likened to “putting patents on
the same footing as other fundamental rights like, say, freedom of speech
and equal protection.”166
Former FTC Chairman Tim Muris, who was appointed by President
George W. Bush, dismissed Delrahim’s skepticism toward holdups as
being “wrong and miss[ing] the point.” 167 Pointing to SSO policies
specifically recognizing FRAND obligations that deal with holdup, Muris
argued that those policies “should be conclusive evidence of its
importance,” and that patentees have “sought royalty rates orders of
magnitudes greater than what the courts found appropriate under
FRAND.”168 The need for burglar alarms suggests the risk of burglary.
[https://perma.cc/SSA9-Q4TL].
163. Id.
164. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Keynote
Address at the LeadershIP Conference on IP, Antitrust and Innovation Policy: The Long Run:
Maximizing Innovation Incentives Through Advocacy and Enforcement 3 (Apr. 10, 2018),
transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makandelrahim-delivers-keynote-address-leadership-conference [https://perma.cc/PGE6-MDHP].
165 . Victoria Graham, Changing U.S. Patent Policy on Tech Standards Stirs Concerns,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 26, 2018, 4:31 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-andantitrust/changing-us-patent-policy-on-tech-standards-stirs-concerns
[https://perma.cc/9EBJCP2Z].
166. Thomas Cotter, DOJ Speech May Leave SEP Implementers In Dire Straits, LAW360 (Dec.
10, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1109674/doj-speech-may-leave-sepimplementers-in-dire-straits [https://perma.cc/8C4M-VXXV] (“Never mind, of course, that the
Constitution only authorizes, but does not command, Congress to grant patents and copyrights—or
that Congress itself didn’t get around to authorizing the federal courts to grant injunctions in patent
infringement actions until some 40 years after the Constitution itself entered into force, in 1819.”).
167. Muris, supra note 23, at 9.
168. Id.; see, e.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL
5593609, at *9 (E.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (concluding that “patent holdup is a substantial problem that
[F]RAND is designed to prevent”); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JL R,
2013 WL 5373179, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 2013) (noting that “holdup took place in this
case”).
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Similarly, these policies, as well as efforts by implementers to avoid
holdup, all reflect the threat of holdups is real and avoiding that threat
imposes a real cost to society. 169 Muris also argued that holdouts in
standard-setting are more serious than those that occur in contractual
situations, noting that “[t]he lock-in value exists only on one side of the
exchange. No such asymmetry is present in the typical contractual
holdout scenario.” 170 Accordingly, “antitrust cases have attacked
anticompetitive conduct related to patents essential to industry standards,
violations of SSO [patent] policies, and FRAND commitments. These
cases reflect the potential harm to competition that can arise with patents
incorporated into industry standards.”171
Similarly, Doug Melamed, who headed the Justice Department’s
Antitrust Division under the Clinton Administration, criticized
Delrahim’s position as “not well-reasoned” and “potentially
dangerous.” 172 He explained that it “could deter SSOs from
strengthening FRAND requirements; innovation and economic welfare
would be better served by making clear that the antitrust laws require
SSOs to adopt FRAND-type rules that are effective in preventing
exploitation by SEP holders of the monopoly power that standard-setting
often creates.”173 Others cautioned that “[t]he government’s shift could
increase the risk of litigation for product manufacturers that use standardsetting technology patents and decrease their incentives to innovate”174
As more companies steer away from interoperability, they warn that
United States dominance in technology will be reduced.175
Melamed, together with Carl Shapiro, the Obama Administration’s
Chief Economist at the DOJ and Member of the President’s Council of
Economic Advisers, warned that “Delrahim’s approach is inconsistent
169. Muris, supra note 23, at 9 (“Patent holdup skeptics tend to ignore the costs borne by
potential infringers to avoid patent holdup. Similarly, the great efforts of SSOs to avoid holdup and
of others to oppose clarifying FRAND are all costs attributable to the holdup problem.”).
170. Id.; see also Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 137, at 2120 (“[O]thers who oppose effective
measures to prevent ex post opportunism argue that so called ‘patent holdout’ by implementers—
the unwillingness of some implementers to bargain in good faith for patent licenses—is a more
serious problem. We know of no factual support for this argument.”).
171. Muris, supra note 23, at 10.
172. Giorgio Motta et al., Antitrust in the Technology Sector: Policy Perspectives and Insights
from the Enforcers, SKADDEN (Mar. 7, 2018, 4:31 AM), https://www.skadden.com/insights/
publications/2018/03/antitrust-in-the-technology-sector [https://perma.cc/F5N9-4ZJM].
173. Id.
174. Graham, supra note 165.
175 . Id. (“The DOJ’s view ‘represents a threat to U.S. competitiveness in standardized
technologies’ . . . . ‘This kind of uncertainty creates a real disincentive to invest in standardized
technologies within the U.S.’”).
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with both sound economic analysis and the policies animating patent
law,” as “excessive royalties [to patentees] undermine incentives for
follow-on innovation and can have other adverse economic consequences
as well.”176 Patentees make FRAND commitments “to gain volume (by
including their technologies in the standard) in exchange for unit price
(by agreeing to charge only FRAND royalties).” 177 The research and
development costs patentees experience “[are] common in the
development of all types of products.”178 In contrast, implementers are
“vulnerable to extraction of supra-competitive royalties based not just on
the value of the patented technology, but on the entire value of the
implementer’s standard-compliant product.”179 For this reason, antitrust
law prohibits patentees seeking to introduce a new product from acting
anticompetitively on the pretext that they need to recoup sunk R&D
expenses.180 As Meleamed and Shaprio note:
[t]hat kind of self-help would be especially inappropriate in the context
of SEP licensing, because enabling SEP owners to engage in
opportunism would harm all implementers, including those who would
readily pay the patent holder the ex ante value of its invention. Allowing
SEP owners to engage in such opportunism would inhibit innovation
and the adoption of new technologies by implementers, which are often
significant innovators themselves.181

FRAND obligations are intended to limit patentees to the royalties to
which they are entitled.182
With respect to Delrahim’s stance on injunctions, they note that the
Supreme Court rejected an automatic right to injunctive relief. 183
Moreover, “the purpose of patent law is to promote innovation, not to
maximize the returns to patent holders, and the remedies for patent
infringement provided by the patent statute reflect that goal.” 184

176. Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 137, at 2121.
177. Id. at 2118 (“If the standard is successful, that bargain is generally very profitable; if the
standard is not successful, the bargain leaves the SEP holder no worse off than if it had not made
the commitment.”).
178. Id. at 2119.
179. Id. (“The implementer is therefore vulnerable to a kind of ex post opportunism that is very
different from the risk knowingly incurred by a technology developer.”).
180. See United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 2015) (rejecting the argument
that a firm might engage in otherwise illegal conduct if necessary to compete against an incumbent
monopoly as “a concept of marketplace vigilantism that is wholly foreign to the antitrust laws”).
181. Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 137, at 2119–20.
182. Id. at 2121 (noting that FRAND obligations were intended to “reduce excessive royalties
further the policies of both the antitrust laws and the patent laws”).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2122.
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Automatic injunctive relief would facilitate “patent holdup [which]
would obstruct innovation by leading to royalties in excess of those in an
ex ante market bargain.”185 More broadly, they note that [t]o effectively
prevent ex post opportunism involving SEPs, antitrust law should be used
in conjunction with contract law and patent law to constrain
anticompetitive conduct by both SEP holders and SSOs.186
What should judges, attorneys, and members of industry make of this
deep divide in the agencies’ approaches to SEPs? To answer this
question, it would be helpful to understand the key points of contention:
what is a “fair” royalty? When should injunctions be granted on a
FRAND-encumbered license? When should a patentee’s licensing
strategy be curtailed?
1. What is a “Fair” Royalty?
Antitrust law generally permits patentees to freely structure patent
royalties.187 Where boundaries exist, they do so to prevent overreaching,
such as clauses that insist licensees continue to pay royalties post-patent
expiration.188 The problem in assessing “fairness” is that it requires at
least one counterfactual that accounts for rates that sufficiently reward
risk and investment in innovation for highly differentiated products.189
The first battleground is between whether to use ex ante or ex post
royalties. For some, an ex ante price most accurately recreates the
hypothetical negotiation parties are assumed to undertake with all the
185. Id.
186. Id. (“[C]ontract and patent law are not sufficient to ensure that FRAND commitments are
effective in preventing ex post opportunism. Antitrust law is also needed to constrain
anticompetitive conduct by both SEP holders and SSOs.”).
187. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 830–
33 (1950) (noting that a patentee may seek a single lump-sum payment, fixed payments, or per-unit
royalties or alternatively, that a patentee can set the royalty as a percentage of total downstream
sales so long as licensees need not to pay for unpatented products and may request a royalty rate
based upon actual use); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135–36
(1969) (noting that patentees may decide how they wish to determine royalties on their patents);
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 265–66 (1979) (noting that patentees may also
seek royalties on pending patents).
188. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(noting that nothing in the Patent Act prohibits post-expiration royalties, and patent holders may
insist they be paid); see also Lim, Patent Misuse, supra note 105, at 352 (noting that courts have
allowed post-expiration payments under certain conditions).
189. Padilla et al., supra note 15 (manuscript at 31) (“Absent information about the prices of
unconstrained market transactions, it can be particularly difficult to identify a “fair” price.”); see
also id. (“Indeed, it is even more difficult to assess the ‘fairness’ of prices associated with licensing
IPRs both because the fixed costs of innovation requires prices well above marginal cost in order
to secure an adequate return on investments in innovation, and because IPRs themselves are highly
differentiated products, which makes reliable price comparisons difficult, if not impossible.”).
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facts, including the non-infringing alternatives available.190 For others,
ex ante pricing lacks “real-world applicability.”191 This is in part because
“it is impossible even to hypothesize what parties negotiating ‘ex ante’
would do if they had all the facts.”192
Determining whether royalty rates are excessive requires a baseline.
However, “agencies do not have the requisite information to determine
market prices generally, let alone royalty rates for a particular
invention.”193 It is also tricky to say what a “fair” royalty means when
the standard involves a large number of patents. 194 Methods for
calculating FRAND royalties, even for patents covering the same
standard, have varied “dramatically from court to court and case to
case.”195 Conventional wisdom teaches that a fair royalty rate reflects the
incremental value of the technology.196 SSOs choose between alternative
technologies and the difference in the value between the chosen
technology and the next best alternative. The next best alternative gives
a notional “upper bound” to that value.197 However, SSO meetings often
consist of engineers whose focus is the quality of the technical
contribution, not its price. 198 Moreover, the reward required to entice
patentees to contribute toward the standard may be a winner takes all
value of the technology post-standardization.199
A second battleground is the correct royalty base—the point of
reference by which a percentage royalty is multiplied to derive the actual
190. Jonathan D. Putnam, Economic Determinations in “FRAND Rate”-Setting: A Guide for
the Perplexed, 41 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 953, 975–76 (2018) (“[T]he point of the hypothetical
negotiation rule in patent damages is to determine what hypothetical reasonable parties might have
done, had they had all the facts, including knowledge of non-infringing alternatives.”).
191. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *13 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
192. Putnam, supra note 190, at 976.
193. Padilla et al., supra note 15 (manuscript at 31).
194. Putnam, supra note 190, at 956 (“Given that it is hard for economists to price large numbers
of patents, pricing them ‘fairly’ invites speculation and expands the scope for error, not to mention
mischief.”).
195. Id.
196. See id. at 976 (citing long-established patent damages law, the standard FRAND paradigm
states that the standardized invention should be priced based on its “incremental value”).
197 . Id. (“The difference in the value of the standardized product when using these two
alternatives is the value of the chosen alternative, or potentially an “upper bound” on that value.”);
id. at 983 (“FRAND arbitrators are likely to be told that computing a standardized invention’s ‘ex
ante incremental’ value is the only legally and economically acceptable method for valuing it.”).
198. Id. at 977 (“No prices are involved, because the discussion of prices (and commercial terms
more generally) is banished from the standardization process. . . . The only thing that matters to the
SDO is the quality of the contribution.”).
199. Id. at 980 (“For this system to be economically rational, the winner’s compensation must
pay the cost of everyone’s R&D—not just its own.”).
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amount owed to patentees. One option is the “smallest saleable patent
practicing unit” (SSPPU), which uses the sale price of the smallest
infringing component sold as a stand-alone product (e.g., a chip). As early
as 2011, the FTC endorsed this as the proper standard, noting that “[t]he
practical difficulty of identifying a royalty rate that accurately reflects the
invention’s contribution to a much larger, complex product often
counsels toward choosing the smallest priceable component that
incorporates the inventive feature.” 200 In 2014, the Federal Circuit
adopted this view “to help our jury system reliably implement the
substantive statutory requirement of apportionment of royalty damages
to the invention’s value.”201
The alternative royalty base is the “entire market value rule,” which
uses the end-product implementing the patented feature (e.g., a
smartphone). Patentees may target device makers to extract their royalties
because of monitoring difficulties in dealing with players at intermediate
stages of the value chain. A royalty determined by the finished product
reflects different connectivity needs, which prices should reflect. 202
However, chip makers are best placed to determine the value of the
technology since they have the most proximate relationship to the
suppliers. The law on patent damages therefore uses SSPPU rather than
the entire market value as the denominator for calculation.203
A third battleground is the extent that patentees under a FRAND
obligation can discriminate in what they charge to similarly situated
licensees.204 At least one district court has held that similarly situated
firms include “all firms reasonably well-established in the world market”
for telecommunications products.205 Low-end producers enjoy the same
200 . Federal Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice &
Remedies with Competition 212 (Mar. 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federaltrade/110307patentreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB6N-3FAW].
201. See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys. Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining
apportionment and balance of damages); see also Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v.
Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1303–04 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reiterating the SSPPU measure as “the
most effective method of estimating the asserted patent’s value”).
202. Foroohar, supra note 25.
203. See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1229–30 (holding that the appropriate basis for the calculation
of a royalties is the smallest saleable unit rather the revenues associated with the end product).
204. Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate-Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential Patents?,
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 16) [hereinafter Contreras, Global Rate-Setting]
(“Today, most courts and commentators agree that in order to comply with the non-discrimination
prong of a FRAND commitment, a SEP holder must treat “similarly situated” licensees in a similar
manner.”).
205. See TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. CV 152370 JVS(DFMX), 2018 WL 4488286, at *30 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018) (“The Court concludes
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favorable royalty rates previously offered to high-end producers.
Whether or not the patentee breached its non-discrimination obligation is
a conclusion that follows from “an examination of the whole of each
license agreement, and not just the effective royalty rate.”206 Patentees
may violate both the non-discrimination requirement and antitrust law if
they grant certain implementers exclusive licenses or preferential
terms. 207 Patentees who tie SEPs with non-SEPs or other goods in
licensing implementers could also violate antitrust law on the theory that
“the SEP holder can extract more consideration for the other patents” than
attributable to the SEPs alone.208
Does it make a difference that implementers want both SEPs and nonSEPs, or the goods embodying the SEPs? Commentators argue it should
not. The rationale for excusing such an agreement is that if implementers
want both sets of products, patentees cannot charge the same monopoly
profit twice. 209 However, “[t]his rationale has no application in the
FRAND context, where the SEP holder has already agreed to limits on
its market power. The tying arrangement simply serves to enable the SEP
holder to violate the FRAND commitment and thus to exercise market
power not otherwise available to it.” 210 This position has also been
embraced in Europe.211
The debate on level discrimination is an important one because it
that for purposes of license comparisons the analysis should include all firms reasonably wellestablished in the world market.”).
206. Certain Wireless Devices With 3G Capabilities and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337TA-800 USITC Pub. 46, 432 (June 28, 2013) (Final).
207. Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 137 (“[T]hose agreements could violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act if they injure or are likely to injure competition among implementers.”). See, e.g., In
re Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 415 (Oct. 13, 1998), aff’d on other grounds, 221 F.3d 928 (7th
Cir. 2000) (holding that “exclusive dealing contracts that tie up 40% or more of the supply in a
relevant antitrust market can create cognizable competitive problems”).
208. Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 137, at 2127 (“[B]ecause the SEP holder has market power
in the technology market in which the SEPs are licensed, the arrangement could well be deemed to
be an unlawful tying arrangement.”). See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
19–22 (1984), abrogated by Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006)
(finding tying violation if there is separate demand for them); id. at 9, 13–14 (unlawful per se tying
when seller has market power at least one of them).
209. Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 137, at 2128 (“Even if that language might ordinarily
preclude a tying claim involving multiple products that the buyer wants to purchase from the seller,
it should not do so in the case of a tying arrangement that violates a FRAND commitment.”).
210. Id.
211. Edward J. Kelly & Regina Sam Penti, Comparing EU & US Standard-Essential Patent
Guidance, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/
2017/12/Comparing-EU-And-US-Standard-Essential-Patent-Guidance.aspx.
[https://perma.cc/
FW47-QA8L] (“While the commission endorses the practice of licensing entire patent portfolios,
it notes that rights holders cannot require a licensee to accept non-SEPs in order to license SEPs.”).
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reflects the core points of tension at the Interface. Level discrimination
properly compensates patentees since their technology enhances the
functionality of the entire product. Unlike non-SEPs, when an
implementer needs to comply with the standard, there are no substitutes
that it can use. On the other hand, the essentiality of a function with the
value of its contribution is different from the end-product. Patentees are
no worse off aligning themselves with component manufacturers since
both seek the common goal of maximizing their profits based on the endproduct manufacturer’s marginal utility. The patentee’s contribution to
the standard is therefore already captured in the price of the component
incorporated into the end-product. Indeed, patent exhaustion prevents the
patentee from double-dipping into the end-product’s revenue.
2. Of Injunctions & Property Rights
While antitrust law may sometimes appear to treat IP rights with more
deference than non-IP, antitrust rules for licensing are like those
governing other types of property.212 Antitrust law is sensitive to the risk
of setting the bar too low for compulsory access to technology. A low bar
may encourage lazy rivals or cheap implementers seeking an easy crack
at getting to the technology rather than encourage them to innovating
themselves or paying a “fair” price for the technology. 213 It may also
encourage collusion between implementers.214 At the same time, this is
not an absolute rule. Courts have required access be granted in instances
when the party seeking access is willing to pay the market rate for access
and where prior access had been terminated.215 Similarly, commentators
observe that in the IP context, the “[t]he benefits of compulsory licensing
will be greatest when: (a) the IP is indispensable to compete, and (b) the
refusal to license (i) causes the exclusion of all competition from the
downstream market, and (ii) prevents the emergence of markets for new
products for which there is substantial demand.”216 The USPTO issued a
212. See Jones & Nazzini, supra note 34, at 377 (”[C]ompetition law frequently sets the bar
particularly high for a finding of breach of its rules when an IP right is involved (the rules of
engagement of antitrust liability are set higher than in non-IP rights cases). Antitrust law thus
recognizes the need to preserve innovation incentives in justifying “conduct that would otherwise
be held to be anti-competitive.”).
213. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–
08 (2004) (warning that sharing could “lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to
invest in those economically beneficial facilities”).
214. See id. at 408 (calling collusion “the supreme evil of antitrust”).
215. See generally Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
216. Padilla et al., supra note 15 (manuscript at 12). See also Lim, Triangulating the End Game,
supra note 23, at 90 (“Defendants facing a potential patent holdup may be able to show an actual
or constructive reneging of the FRAND commitment in bad faith, such as where SEP owners refuse
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Joint Statement with the DOJ in 2013, recognizing that:
In some circumstances, the remedy of an injunction or exclusion order
may be inconsistent with the public interest. This concern is particularly
acute in cases where an exclusion order based on a F/RANDencumbered patent appears to be incompatible with the terms of a patent
holder’s existing F/RAND licensing commitment to an SDO. A
decision maker could conclude that the holder of a F/RANDencumbered, standards-essential patent had attempted to use an
exclusion order to pressure an implementer of a standard to accept more
onerous licensing terms than the patent holder would be entitled to
receive consistent with the F/RAND commitment—in essence
concluding that the patent holder had sought to reclaim some of its
enhanced market power over firms that relied on the assurance that
F/RAND-encumbered patents included in the standard . . . .217

This insight informs the conditions for patentees whereby they can
exclude implementers on FRAND-encumbered patents since injunctions
amount to a constructive refusal to license. 218 Injunctions may force
implementers to delay the time-to-the-market business and increase entry
costs through litigation. 219 Accordingly, a case for compulsory access
exists where SEP owners refuse access to FRAND-encumbered
technology indispensable to downstream competition resulting in the
stifling of the emergence of standard-compliant products and services. As
Professor Rudy Peritz noted, “[i]n a fundamental sense, current antitrust
policy reflects longstanding tensions between public policies favoring
competitive markets and those favoring private rights of property and
contract.”220
In 2018, the Supreme Court clarified that patents were not property
rights, but more akin to a public franchise.221 Earlier on, Federal Circuit
precedent held that a unilateral refusal to license a lawfully obtained

to have the decision adjudicated or where it hinders implementers from offering a new product for
which there is unmet consumer demand.”).
217. DOJ & USPTO, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to
Voluntary FRAND Commitments, U.S. DOJ (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/
atr/page/file/1118381/download [https://perma.cc/8239-VVKF].
218 . Giorgio Corda & Antonio Nicita, “That’s What Frands Are For”: The Antitrust
Boundaries
of
The
Patent
Holdup
Problem,
CPI
(2017),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CPI-CordaNicita.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8ZR-9MTH].
219. Id.
220. Horton, supra note 55, at 194.
221. See Oil States Energy Serv., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373–
75 (2018) (noting that “patents are ‘public franchises’ that the Government grants to [] inventors”
by statute).
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patent does not violate the antitrust laws.222 That view has been criticized
for shielding patentees from antitrust law scrutiny, despite being neither
exempted by the Patent Act nor similarly extended to owners of tangible
property.223
Cases purporting to confer that sort of immunity should be treated with
some skepticism. Indeed, this line of precedent suggests that SEP owners
who refuse to license in violation of FRAND commitments that allow
them to create or enhance market power in a related market may be
similarly vulnerable. 224 Antitrust precedent finding a violation for
refusals to deal potentially enjoy a new lease of life.225 Such an outcome
would bring the United States in line with norms abroad. Professor Tom
Cotter noted that “the civil law doctrine of abuse of right, nebulous that
it sometimes may appear to be, arguably could provide a basis for more
frequently denying injunctive relief on proportionality grounds, or in a
manner analogous to the discretionary standards for injunctive relief
applied in common-law countries.”226 Japan, as well as several European
countries including Belgium and the Netherlands have uniformly denied
injunctions to SEP owners when it is found that they have abused their
rights.227
222. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the
absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham
litigation, the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using,
or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust laws.”).
223. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, Unilateral Refusals To Deal in Intellectual and Other
Property, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 369 (2009) (“[F]actors will be magnified where IP is at stake, but
they are not so systematically different for IP that refusals to supply IP should be exempted from
the antitrust standard applicable to other property.”); A. Douglas Melamed, Ali M. Stoeppelwerth
& Barbara Blank, Refusals to Deal in Patents and Patented Goods, 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY 2061, 2066–68 (Wayne D. Collins et al., eds., 2008) (discussing how circuit courts
have reached conflicting conclusions regarding a patent holder’s immunity from antitrust law when
it refuses to licenses patents or to sell products to other firms—despite general unwillingness to
mandate that patent holders deal with others).
224. Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 137, at 2126 (“This would be true if the refusal to deal
enhanced the SEP holder’s market power as an implementer of the standard or if the SEP holder’s
refusal to deal enabled an unaffiliated implementer to gain market power for which it compensated
the SEP holder by inflated royalties for a license to the SEPs or otherwise.”).
225. See generally Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 389 (1973).
226. Thomas F. Cotter, Léonard on Abuse of Right Under Belgian, French, and E.U. Law,
COMP. PAT. REMEDIES (Mar. 15, 2017), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/
2017/03/leonard-on-abuse-of-right-under-belgian.html [https://perma.cc/9PWM-8QFU].
227. Id. (“For further guidance, the Belgian courts have developed a list of ‘specific’ criteria,
including (1) an owner’s exercise of a right with an intention to harm; (2) the exercise of a right
contrary to the objective intended by the legislation granting it; (3) a disproportionate exercise of a
right; (4) the exercise of a right without a legitimate and reasonable interest; and (5) when a right
could be exercised in different ways, and the owner chooses the own most prejudicial for third
parties or for the general interest.”); Kelly & Penti, supra note 211 (“The right to an injunction
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In contrast, those who view patents as property rights conclude that
when patentees decide to refuse to license even under FRAND
obligations, there is nothing illegal as a matter of antitrust law. 228
According to Delrahim, to conclude otherwise would “fundamentally
transform the nature of patent rights away from their constitutional
underpinnings. [Advocates of the public franchise position] convert a
property rule into a liability rule, and amount to a troubling de facto
compulsory licensing scheme.” 229 This would allow “an implementer
[to] freely infringe, knowing that the most he or she will eventually have
to pay is a reasonable royalty rate.”230
Until such a time that Delrahim’s views become the law, the settled
position is that while injunctions are essential when compensatory
damages are insufficient to deter willful or delaying behavior, 231 SEP
owners can violate antitrust law by refusing to license if the refusal
accrues or preserves market power in a market in which patentees would
otherwise have to compete. 232 Refusing to license SEPs to rivals may
amount to improper leverage where the patentee, as the technology
owner, is vertically integrated into the chipset supply.
If the patentee is a producer, it would be guilty of monopoly
maintenance. If not, it would still be an exclusionary abuse of the patent
right, and there may be an unmet demand which the patentee itself does
not attempt to meet and is preventing others from meeting. The FRAND
commitment functions both as a shield against infringement actions, as
well as a sword to compel licensee access to the technology. Whether that
is indeed so in practice was the key question in the FTC’s case against
Qualcomm.

remains subject to principles of proportionality, an often-used European doctrine of fairness.”).
228. Delrahim, New Madison, supra note 149 (“Equipping patent holders with the property
right to exclude therefore goes hand-in-hand with the goals Madison envisioned for the U.S. patent
regime.”).
229. Id.
230. Id. (“Antitrust laws should not be used to transform an inventor’s one-time decision to
offer a license to a competitor into a forever commitment that the inventor will continue licensing
that competitor in perpetuity.”).
231. See, e.g., Padilla et al., supra note 15 (manuscript at 16) (“The threat of injunctive relief
induces implementers of patented technology to negotiate reasonable terms and conditions without
undue delay.”).
232. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997);
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); BellSouth Advert.
& Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988). For a general
discussion, see Daryl Lim, Beyond Microsoft: Intellectual Property, Peer Production and the
Law’s Concern with Market Dominance, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 291
(2008).
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3. The Qualcomm Question
It should be easy for antitrust law to love a company like Qualcomm,
the world’s largest maker of baseband chipsets. Its microprocessor
technology beats at the heart of countless smartphones and tablets.
However, in 2017 the FTC sued Qualcomm in federal district court,
alleging it maintained a monopoly for baseband processors used in
mobile telephones to “impose onerous and anticompetitive supply and
licensing terms” on licensees that manufacture mobile phones. 233 In
January 2019, the suit proceeded to trial.234
The court found that Qualcomm’s “no license, no chips” policy,
combined with its refusal to license, foreclosed licensees from
challenging Qualcomm for fear of losing access to its chipset supply. 235
This forced handset makers to do business with Qualcomm even if they
may prefer to buy chips from a Qualcomm rival. The court also held that
Qualcomm’s non-discriminatory obligations required it to license even to
rivals.236 FRAND obligations do not allow patentees to engage in “level
discrimination,” where they license only handset makers and not rival
chip makers. The issue arises in multicomponent products such as tablets
and smartphones where the technology is implemented at multiple levels.
Qualcomm’s insistence on package licensing does not allow licensees to
exclude patents from a package that it does not regard as “essential,”
useful, or valid. Finally, Qualcomm’s five percent royalty rate on the total
value of the end-use device, imposed on implementers since 2006, likely
breached FRAND obligations because “both handset technology and
Qualcomm’s SEP portfolio ha[ve] changed dramatically over the past
decade,” and connecting to a cellular network is just one of many things
smartphones do today, even as phones themselves have become more
expensive.237
233. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Charges Qualcomm with Monopolizing
Key Semiconductor Device Used in Cell Phones, Jan. 17, 2017, https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-qualcomm-monopolizing-key-semiconductor-deviceused [http://perma.cc/7VUG-CPRE].
234. Fed. Trade Comm’n Complaint for Equitable Relief at ¶ 147, Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Qualcomm Inc., No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK, 2018 WL 5848999 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018).
235. In re Qualcomm Antitrust Litig., 292 F. Supp. 3d 948, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
236. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2018 WL 5848999, slip
op. at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018) (“Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments include an obligation to
license to all comers, including competing modem chip suppliers.”).
237. Jay Jurata, FTC v. Qualcomm: Trial and Possible Implications, CPI, Jan. 2019, at 3
(quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 5:17-cv-0020-LHK, at 28 (N.D. Cal. June 26,
2017) (order denying motion to dismiss)); see also Michael E. Salzman, Antitrust Fight, INTELL.
PROP. MAG., Feb. 2018, at 47, 49 (“The rate has stayed the same, but the rate base, even on a per
unit basis, has risen several fold.”); id. (“The FTC’s complaint alleges that Qualcomm’s proportion
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As one commentator noted, “the holding is consistent with the patent
law damages principle requiring that reasonable royalty damages for
infringement be apportioned to the smallest salable unit that actually
practices the relevant patent, as opposed to the entire device.”238 In the
face of rising smartphone prices, it is doubtful implementers are willing
to pay ever more royalties for ever less value. Excessive pricing is not an
antitrust offense, but forcing implementers to pay more for less using
market power obtained from excluding rival chipset makers in violation
of FRAND commitments is arguably a different kettle of fish.
In favoring the FTC’s arguments, the judge was decidedly more
Arrovian than Schumpeterian in her approach. There was no serious
attempt to deal with Qualcomm’s complaint that the FTC was trying to
enjoin “legitimate, procompetitive business practices that facilitated the
growth of a phenomenally successful industry that bears all the hallmarks
of healthy and vigorous competition.” 239 Nor did the court deal with
Qualcomm’s argument that margin squeezing is an invalid antitrust
theory unless the low-priced product is sold for less than marginal cost.240
The DOJ’s “flip-flop” and cases like Qualcomm illustrate
susceptibility to ideology and biases. 241 In a recent article titled
Rediscovering Antitrust’s Lost Values, Professor Thomas Horton
investigated congressional intent underlying antitrust law.242 Congress,
he observed, intended to promote a system of competitive capitalism
“designed to also protect such sacred American values as equality of
opportunity, diversity, and economic ethics and morality.” 243 That
process of economic decision-making “invariably requires normative
values judgments,” and different individuals “bring different ideological
views to bear on antitrust enforcement.”244 For that reason, he argues, we
“need to stop treating neoconservatives’ economic values as a supposedly

of SEPs in smartphones has declined to 13% as the phones evolved from 2G to 4G.”).
238. Jurata, supra note 237, at 3.
239. Reuters, Long-awaited Qualcomm Antitrust Trial Begins, Probing Key Cellular Patent
Practices, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 4, 2019, 10:12 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/01/04/longawaited-qualcomm-antitrust-trial-begins-probing-key-cellular-patent-practices/ [http://perma.cc/
LY56-HYYH].
240. Fed. Trade Comm’n v Qualcomm Inc., No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK, at 35–38 (N.D. Cal. June
26, 2017) (order denying motion to dismiss) (distinguishing Pac. Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine
Comm., Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009)).
241. Lao, supra note 59, at 653 (attributing this to the fact that “economic theory and empirical
evidence are indeterminate.”).
242. Horton, supra note 55, at 188.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 188–89.
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neutral set of scientifically objective economic laws.”245
Professor Horton’s observation reflects the fact that antitrust decisionmaking is biased because humans are biased in their decision making.
People decide in surprisingly irrational ways, not because they intend to
do so, but limited time and brainpower force them to rely on heuristics to
make judgments.246 Decisionmakers can over generalize from small bits
of data, can infer causality where none exist, and can confuse the ease
with which an event comes to mind with the probability of it occurring.247
In addition, they can compound the problem through their overconfidence
in the quality of their decisions. Agencies, attorneys, and even judges may
operate as advocates for their own biased views rather than as impartial
appliers of the law. 248 Biases will similarly affect how stakeholders
decide to optimize dynamic efficiency in FRAND and other antitrust
cases involving IP. This is where neoclassical antitrust falters and an
alternative model must be found.
Behavioral economics incorporates biases and heuristics into its
analysis that neoclassical antitrust assumes away. Professor Richard
Thaler won the 2017 Nobel Prize in economics for his work on behavioral
economics.249 He noted that neoclassical economics is “deduced from
axioms of rational choice, whether or not those axioms bear any relation
to what we observe in our lives every day.”250 In contrast, “the real point
of behavioral economics is to highlight behaviors that are in conflict with
the standard rational model.”251
Similarly, neoclassical antitrust accounts for deviations from its
economic models by including error terms and assuming stakeholders’
245. Id. at 239–41.
246. RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 22
(2015) (“Humans have limited time and brainpower. As a result, they use simple rules of thumb—
heuristics—to help them make judgments.”). See also MLODINOW, supra note 31, at 34 (“Some
scientists estimate that we are conscious of only about 5 percent of our cognitive function. The
other 95 percent goes on beyond our awareness and exerts a huge influence on our lives—beginning
with making our lives possible.”).
247. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST & SLOW (2011).
248 . MLODINOW, supra note 31, at 208 (“[W]hen people want to believe in a scientific
conclusion, they’ll accept a vague news report of an experiment somewhere as convincing
evidence. And when people don’t want to accept something, the National Academy of Sciences,
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Geophysical Union, the
American Meteorological Society, and a thousand unanimous scientific studies can all converge on
a single conclusion, and people will still find a reason to disbelieve.”).
249. Richard H. Thaler, Nobel Prize Lecture, From Cashews to Nudges: The Evolution of
Behavioral Economics, NOBEL PRIZE (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/
economic-sciences/2017/thaler/lecture/ [http://perma.cc/RJE7-DTFP].
250. THALER, supra note 246, at 348.
251. Id. at 261.
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random errors cancel out on average. Behavioral economics adds nuance
to the analysis by positing that deviations from rational choice models are
not random, but predictable, because people decide under conditions of
uncertainty.252 Ironically, those in the neoclassical antitrust opposed to
incorporating behavioral antitrust resemble dominant undertakings, who
when challenged by maverick entrants, attempt to exclude them.253 The
forms those biases take, how antitrust law should be retooled, and how it
illuminates the FRAND debate is the subject of Part II.
II. INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
Optimizing can be hard work. Anyone shopping at Costco faces
millions of combinations of items within their budget. Neoclassical
economics, on the other hand, assumes shoppers can optimize their
utility. 254 In reality since we cannot reflect our utility perfectly in our
combination of goods and services, we cannot and do not optimize our
budget. Instead, our minds have found an easy solution when faced with
the task of doing so. We rely on heuristics and biases to make the
shopping experience manageable and even enjoyable. As Professor
Bailey commented, “decision-makers do not make the best choice after
maximizing a complex optimization problem. Rather, decision-makers
make choices by taking short cuts, such as using rules-of-thumb, or
through satisficing, by making a choice that exceeds some minimally
acceptable level. These short cuts make complex problems more
tractable.”255
Behavioral economics informs choice architecture by recognizing
these factors that influence decision-making. Human judgment is tainted
with cognitive biases such as an “insensitivity to the quality of the
evidence on which the judgment is based.”256 In a study done by Tversky
252. Bailey, supra note 9, at 2 (“Behavioral economics, and the concept of bounded rationality,
recognizes the real-world limitations on fully rational behavior.”). Richard Thaler, Behavioral
Economics: From Nuts to “Nudges”, CHI. BOOTH REV. (May 7, 2018), http://review.chicagobooth
.edu/behavioral-science/2018/article/behavioral-economics-nuts-nudges [http://perma.cc/ALK8C9CV] [hereinafter Thaler, From Nuts to “Nudges”] (“This was a crucial insight. It implies that,
at least in principle, it would be possible to improve the explanatory power of economics by adding
psychological realism.”).
253. See Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against
Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517, 1530–31 (2012) (arguing that dissatisfaction with
mainstream antitrust jurisprudence has led to a “behaviorally informed” approach to competition
policy).
254. THALER, supra note 246, at 326 (“Nudges are effective for Humans, but not for Econs,
since Econs are already doing the right thing.”).
255. Bailey, supra note 9, at 2.
256. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 35 (“A defining feature of intuitive judgment is
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and researchers from Harvard Medical School, a group of physicians had
to decide between radiation or surgery for cancer.257 When told that the
one-month survival rate was ninety percent, eighty-four percent chose
surgery. When told that there was a ten percent mortality rate in the first
month, that rate fell dramatically to fifty percent. Both phrases meant the
same thing, but framing affected the outcome in a way which an AI
decision-maker would not, a point discussed in detail in Part III.
Policymakers and judges employing behavioral economics resemble
architects who determine a building’s functionality before they determine
its form. It recognizes that the answer to “what is the chance the patentee
will not innovate if forced to share its proprietary technology?” may be
influenced by how easy it is for the decisionmaker to recall instances of
innovators they like and what they think about patents.258 Like a fly print
on a urinal,259 behavioral nudges can be used positively to attract our
attention and influence our behavior. In doing so, nudges offer both a
more realistic and useful way of understanding how patentees and other
stakeholders think about innovation harms and incentives. Accounting
for systematic biases allows us to better understand and either minimize
or correct those biases. That knowledge in turn can help courts and
policymakers achieve dynamic efficiency more effectively. 260
IP owners and implementers are subject to these biases and heuristics
even if they operate through corporations.261 For instance, neoclassical
its insensitivity to the quality of the evidence on which the judgment is based.”); id. at 23 (“In
forecasting, as in other fields, we will continue to see human judgment being displaced—to the
consternation of white-collar workers—but we will also see more and more syntheses, like
“freestyle chess,” in which humans with computers compete as teams, the human drawing on the
computer’s indisputable strengths but also occasionally overriding the computer.”).
257. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33.
258. Thaler, From Nuts to “Nudges”, supra note 252 (“People guess that in the United States
today, gun deaths by homicide are more frequent than gun deaths by suicide, although the latter are
about twice as common. The bias comes because homicides are more publicized than suicides, and
thus more available in memory.”).
259. Christopher Ingraham, What’s A Urinal Fly, And What Does It Have to With Winning a
Nobel Prize?, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2017/10/09/whats-a-urinal-fly-and-what-does-it-have-to-with-winning-a-nobel-prize/
[http://perma.cc/8WQD-KA8U] (“Thaler calls the urinal fly his “favorite illustration” of a
nudge.”). See also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008) (What's a nudge? In, their 2008 book on the
topic, Richard Thaler and co-author Cass Sunstein define it as a choice “that alters people’s
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their
economic incentives.”).
260. THALER, supra note 246, at 131 (“The primary reason for adding Humans to economic
theories is to improve the accuracy of the predictions made with those theories.”).
261. Bailey, supra note 9, at 2 (“Like consumers, firms make decisions using short cuts and
rules of thumb.”).
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economics teaches that firms would reduce output when demand falls,
allowing them to cut wages and prices and still make a profit. Princeton
economist Richard Lester showed that corporations do not adjust output
or wages based on demand.262 Instead, wages and prices are “sticky,” and
firms respond instead by laying off workers to remain profitable. One
explanation is that firms prefer to avoid making workers angry by cutting
their salaries, and instead to eliminate excess workers who would then
not be around to complain while waiting for inflation to reduce real
wages.263
Incorporating behavioral economics does not require overhauling
neoclassical antitrust. Behavioral economics functions as a refinement
rather than a replacement. There are four specific ways that behavioral
economics can improve outcomes in IP cases: (1) analyzing incentives to
innovate and harm to innovation, (2) explaining the ideological gap
between the SEP and implementer camps, (3) crafting smarter remedies,
and, (4) explaining why regulatory sandboxes and safe harbors are critical
to developing the IP-antitrust interface.
A. Incentives & Harm
Neoclassical antitrust gives little weight to either incentives or harms
and systematically fails to recognize and remedy practices which may be
harmful.264 When faced with the task of predicting how patentees and
implementers will act, stakeholders usually use heuristics to guide them.
As a result, innovators may be less induced to innovate by high profits
than we might think. Similarly, implementers may suffer from more
anticompetitive harm than neoclassical antitrust law predicts. Moreover,
confirmation and availability biases provide a cogent narrative as to why
parties, such as those from the current DOJ and their critics, speak past
each other. These are considered below.
1. Overestimating Incentives
Some advocates of IP deference view a near absolute right to refuse
262. See generally Richard Lester, Shortcomings of Marginal Analysis for Wage-Employment
Problems, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 63 (1946) (doubting the validity of conventional marginal theory
and the assumptions on which it rests).
263. THALER, supra note 246, at 131–32 ( “[W]hen a recession hits, either wages do not fall at
all or they fall too little to keep everyone employed . . . [because] firms find it better to keep pay
levels fixed and just lay off surplus employees (who are then not around to complain). It turns out,
however, that with the help of some inflation, it is possible to reduce “real” wages (that is, adjusted
for inflation) with much less pushback from workers.”).
264. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 596 (“The claim that technical antitrust is underdeterrent
has some traction.”).
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access and dictate terms of that access as the key to promoting dynamic
efficiency.265 For instance, in 2004 Delrahim, then deputy head of the
antitrust division, argued that antitrust law should “support the rights of
intellectual property owners to decide independently whether to license
their intellectual property to others,” even on FRAND encumbered
patents. 266 Professor Michael Carrier, disagreeing, noted that “[i]n
addition to mischaracterizing antitrust policy, AAG Delrahim
mischaracterizes the conduct at issue.”267 Specifically, Professor Carrier
faulted Delrahim for referring to FRAND as “‘compulsory licensing’
even though a patent holder voluntarily chooses to license on FRAND
terms to increase its likelihood of obtaining high volume from being part
of the standard.” 268 Professor Carrier also observes that FRAND “is
essentially a duty to deal” as quid pro quo for enjoying “benefits of [a]
high volume” of licensees.269 As a matter of law, he concludes that the
Supreme Court made clear that “‘[a]ntitrust analysis must always be
attuned to the particular structure and circumstances of the industry at
issue’ and a central aspect of the Court’s decision was its emphasis on
context and reliance on ‘a regulatory structure designed to deter and
remedy anticompetitive harm.’”270
The assumption that exclusive rights incentivize innovation has a
visceral appeal to it, but the length that exclusive right needs to persist in
order to achieve those incentives is surprisingly short due to hyperbolic
discounting. Deference may encourage a patentee’s incentives to
innovate, but the effect loses its intertemporal significance. Since at least
1759, economists like Adam Smith recognized gratification now is better
than gratification later. 271 In 1937, Economics Nobel Laureate Paul
Samuelson formalized the idea of discounting future utility.272 So if next
265. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2004)
(“Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the
underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival,
or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.”).
266. Makan Delrahim, Maintaining Flexibility in Antitrust Analysis: Meeting the Challenge of
Innovation in the Media and Entertainment Industries, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 343, 356 (2005).
267. Carrier, DOJ Giving Cover, supra note 23.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. (quoting Verizon Commc’ns, 540 U.S. at 399).
271. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 284 (2nd ed. 1759) (“The pleasure
which we are to enjoy ten years hence interests us so little in comparison with that which we may
enjoy to-day.”).
272. Paul Samuelson, A Note on the Measurement of Utility, 4 REV. ECON. STUDIES 155 (1937),
https://econpapers.repec.org/article/ouprestud/v_3a4_3ay_3a1937_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a155-161..htm
[https://perma.cc/6YCZ-EGVT].
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year’s dinner is worth ninety percent of dinner today, we would discount
it by ten percent.273 In the same way, behavioral economics suggests that
humans are incapable of forecasting more than a few years in advance.274
Gains to IP owners become less meaningful once they have covered their
costs, including those related to research and development only a few
years out.
In terms of innovation policy, even innovators who ascend the heights
of power with technological breakthroughs cannot be depended on to
innovate because they gradually become insensitive to financial
incentives as they grow more distant in time. Today’s incentives are best,
tomorrow’s less so, and those five years out may have much less effect
on their R&D decisions. Arguments by the successful incumbent
promising the “next big thing” should, therefore, be taken with a grain of
salt.
In one study, gamblers ahead in a game treated their winnings more
liberally than the money that they had brought into the casino with them,
almost as if there were two ledger columns in their minds. This behavior
is so pervasive that there is even a term for it—“gambling with the
house’s money.”275 This conclusion is contrary to the idea that money is
fungible. Royalties above sunk costs have a smaller positive impact on
patentees’ incentive to innovate than advocates of a “property rights”
view of patents may care to acknowledge. Indeed, this “house money”
effect—along with a tendency to extrapolate immediate returns into the
long run—may encourage “innovation bubbles” driven not by actual
returns, but perceived returns based on current royalties.276 Similarly, Dr.
Amos Tversky published a 1988 study of basketball players showing that
players who made a shot were no more likely to make the next one.
Indeed, the study surprisingly revealed that the player who made a shot
may even be a little less likely to do so the next time.277
Those who think there can never be an “innovation bubble” should

273. See THALER, supra note 246, at 131.
274. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 88–89 (“[H]uman cognitive systems will never
be able to forecast turning points in the lives of individuals or nations several years into the future—
and heroic searches for superforecasters won’t change that.”).
275. THALER, supra note 246, at 81 (describing this behavior as “gambling with the house’s
money”).
276. Id. at 83 (“It occurs whenever there are two salient reference points, for instance where
you started and where you are right now. The house money effect—along with a tendency to
extrapolate recent returns into the future—facilitates financial bubbles.”).
277. Karen Freeman, Amos Tversky, Expert on Decision Making, Is Dead at 59, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 6, 1996, at B016 (“There is no ‘hot hand’ in basketball, he showed by analyzing every shot
taken by the Philadelphia 76ers in a year and a half.”).
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look at the stock market. Like innovation, stock prices are intrinsic and
not susceptible to scientific observation the way plant growth might
be.278 Financial economists thus believed for a long time that there was
no way to beat the market, since all publicly available information is
reflected in stock prices.279 John Maynard Keynes, however, observed
that emotions, or what he called “animal spirits,” played an important role
in investment decisions.280 Every time fund managers buy stocks, they
are predicting which ones other investors will later decide are worth more
than they are today, even with ephemeral and insignificant data. In
contrast, behavioral economics teaches that loss aversion will lead
individuals and firms to view risks to their bottom line more severely. An
investment banker who makes a large profit will receive relatively modest
rewards, but incurring an equal-sized loss will likely get him fired.281
Even risk-neutral stakeholders will, over time, tend toward risk
aversion.282
Consistent with the Arrovian view prioritizing market contestability
over profits to IP owners, innovation is driven by IP owners striving to
maintain their bottom line, which will have a greater impact on spurring
innovation. At the same time, antitrust enforcement can be consistent
with strong IP rights and higher royalties where IP owners are driven by
consumer demand rather than anticompetitive shenanigans. Indeed,
rewarding IP owners under these circumstances provides an incentive for
others to innovate and compete against the incumbent. This in turn
promotes precisely the kind of dynamic competition we want.283
278. THALER, supra note 246, at 206 (“[F]inancial economists lived with a false sense of
security that came from thinking that the price-is-right component of the EMH could not be directly
tested—one reason it is called a hypothesis.”).
279. Id. at 207 (“Because all publicly available information is reflected in current stock prices,
it is impossible to reliably predict future prices and make a profit.”); id. (“Most of the early
academic research on the EMH stressed the second component of the theory, what I call the ‘no
free lunch’ principle—the idea that there is no way to beat the market. . . . Michael Jensen’s PhD
thesis provided the most convincing analysis. In it he showed that professional money managers
perform no better than simple market averages, a fact that remains true today. If the pros can’t beat
the market, who can?”).
280. Id. at 209 (“Keynes was particularly insightful on this front. He thought that emotions, or
what he called ‘animal spirits,’ played an important role in individual decision-making, including
investment decisions.”).
281. Id. at 187 (“In many companies, creating a large gain will lead to modest rewards, while
creating an equal-sized loss will get you fired.”).
282. Id. (“Under those terms, even a manager who starts out risk neutral, willing to take any bet
that will make money on average, will become highly risk averse.”).
283 . Delrahim, New Madison, supra note 149 (“Antitrust law is intended to protect this
behavior, not punish it, so that others will have incentives to innovate and compete themselves, all
for the benefit of consumers. Such dynamic competition should be encouraged by our enforcement
policies.”).
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It follows too that behavioral economics would caution against
adopting a total welfare view of IP deference. The total welfare view
includes welfare both accrued and lost by all stakeholders whether it
“actually produces higher prices” or whether “lower output is
permissible, provided that efficiency gains to producers are at least as
large as consumer losses.”284 Professor Hovenkamp observed that this
standard “is impossible to apply in any but the most obvious cases.”285
He explained that there is great difficulty quantifying consumer losses
and comparing them with producer efficiency gains.286 In contrast, the
current “consumer welfare standard queries only whether output will be
higher or lower (or prices lower or higher) under the restraint.”287 This
standard is “difficult enough, but is nevertheless much simpler than the
proof requirements for a general welfare standard.”288
Professor Elhauge concluded that “the consumer welfare standard not
only better comports with the law, but also ironically better advances
overall societal total welfare.” 289 Protecting consumer welfare means
condemning anticompetitive practices that limit downstream access to
technology.290 In some instances where patentees have bound themselves
with FRAND commitments, behavioral economics could support the
conclusion that a “liability approach” would better facilitate access at a
fair rate without the owner’s consent and may be more likely to achieve
dynamic efficiency. 291 As with indefinite concepts like “fairness” and
284. Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, supra note 89, at 118.
285. Id. at 84, 119 (footnotes omitted) (“Measuring consumer harm under a general welfare test
requires not only predicting whether the price will rise or fall, but also what will be the size of the
‘deadweight’ loss cause by inefficient consumer substitutions. There are almost no cases that have
ever attempted to assess general welfare in reasonably close situations, and very likely no United
States cases at all where a court has actually found an anticompetitive output reduction and price
increase that was justified by offsetting efficiencies.”).
286. Id. at 118 (“This is far easier than quantifying all consumer losses and producer gains, and
netting them out against each other.”).
287. Id. at 84 (“This approach is consistent with antitrust’s consumer welfare principle, which
identifies antitrust’s goal as competitively low prices and high output, whether measured by
quantity or quality.”); id. at 118 (“Suffice it to say that, whatever its ultimate value, the consumer
welfare approach has one enormous advantage over a general welfare principle—
administrability.”).
288. Id. at 84.
289. See Elhauge Interview, supra note 65.
290. Id. (“Any anticompetitive harm to upstream suppliers will suppress upstream output, and
if that has any effect on downstream output, it will be to reduce it and thus harm consumer
welfare.”).
291. Corda & Nicita, supra note 218 (“If the SEP holder is not allowed to issue an injunction
against the implementer, when a commercial agreement has not been signed in the first instance,
granting a ‘FRAND defense’ for licensees is equivalent to saying that the implementer has a right
of access without the need of obtaining a preliminary consent by the SEP. That is to say that the
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“beauty,” consumer welfare is only as defensible and well-defined as it
appears to the beholder. 292 Those who favor little or no intervention
invoke a total welfare standard to justify presumptive legality to patentee
conduct, no matter how the gains are eventually allocated between
patentees and the rest of society. In contrast, those favoring greater
scrutiny of patentee conduct give more weight to consumer choice and
market contestability in their goal setting.293 Total welfare is more of an
ideal state than a tool of economic analysis and makes antitrust an even
more nebulous enterprise than it needs to be.294
2. Underestimating Harm
According to behavioral economic theory, implementers of FRAND
encumbered patents may make less rational judgments about whether a
price is “fair” than neoclassical antitrust would entertain. 295 As the
licensors, SEP owners know their licensing terms’ rates but have no
incentive to disclose them to potential implementers. The result is that
“[t]he information on those costs that is available to purchasers tends to
be anecdotal, and service providers lack the incentive to disclose the data
that they possess.”296 Implementers must then decide whether to take a
license or not based on an advertised FRAND rate and not on the total
lifecycle cost of the portfolio. This makes implementers susceptible to
hyperbolic discounting, underestimating how much the royalties
aggregate over the duration of the license, and paying more than they
think they will over the lifetime of the agreement.297

SEP holder’s right is protected by a liability rule.”).
292. William A. Galston & Clara Hendrickson, What the Future of U.S. Antitrust Should Look
Like, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 9, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/what-the-future-of-u-s-antitrustshould-look-like. [https://perma.cc/7Q5S-3RC5]. (“Both conservatives and progressives invoke
‘consumer welfare’ as antitrust’s core concern, but they oﬀer divergent interpretations of
this concept.”).
293. Id. (“For their part, progressives also focus on the consequences for consumers, but employ
a broader understanding of consumer welfare that encompasses quality, innovation, and choice as
well as price.”).
294. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 621 (“[W]e lack the econometric tools to apply them in
litigation in any but the clearest cases.”).
295. Cowen & Dnes, supra note 63, at 8 (“Analysis should reflect these increased risks, which
are an order of magnitude greater than they were during the period when Chicago school thinkers
called vertical foreclosure theories into question.”).
296. Max Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 105,
137 (2012).
297. Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEX. L. REV. 573, 588 (2014).
(“While perfectly rational consumers in the primary market would have sufficed to deter Kodak
from exploiting aftermarket power, the same does not necessarily hold for boundedly rational
consumers who may systematically underestimate or fail to consider the future costs of parts.”).
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Once implementers decide to adopt a standard, the likelihood of them
switching is reduced by sunk costs. This weakens competition by
exacerbating their perceived switching costs.298 Similarly, deciding to go
to a concert despite a snowstorm allows attendees to settle their mental
account without taking a loss on their ticket purchases. Foregoing the
price of the ticket does not. The tendency for people to continue futile
efforts was vividly illustrated by the United States’ decision to continue
its war in Vietnam because it had invested too much to quit. Professor of
organizational behavior Barry Staw called this an “escalation of
commitment.”299
Behavioral economics also sheds light on anticompetitive conduct that
neoclassical antitrust may regard as irrational and therefore improbable.
While an entrant like Intel may view its market share increase as a gain,
Qualcomm, as the incumbent chip producer, perceives this as a loss of
market share. This may lead Qualcomm to choose a risk-seeking strategy
with a negative present value. Moreover, overconfidence bias and the
benefits from gaining a reputation for toughness may have led Qualcomm
to err in their assessment of the potential benefits of its “no license, no
chips” policy.300
What may at first glance seem irrational is contextualized as an action
plan for systematic biases. This may be worth Qualcomm’s time and
effort, particularly if it manages to deter entry by new entrants. If
implementers are not aware of total costs and do not learn over time,
competition in the market for wireless technology does not sufficiently
tame Qualcomm’s power to behave independently on the chipset market.
By the same token of logic, patentees should treat rivals and
implementers alike as far as from where their pennies come. If they do
not, it creates at least a rebuttable presumption that their refusal to do so
is fueled by the expectation of higher royalties from device makers than
they would otherwise receive from chipset makers.
In the FRAND context, behavioral economics suggests courts should
continue to peg royalty rates to the SSPPU as the Federal Circuit did,
298. Amelia Fletcher, The EU Google Decisions: Extreme Enforcement or The Tip Of The
Behavioral Iceberg?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 3 (2019) (“For example, if consumers exhibit status
quo bias or myopia—both common behavioral tendencies—they are less likely to take the time to
seek out better options that may be available in the market. But if this is the case, then firms will in
turn have less incentive to improve their offerings, since they will gain fewer customers by doing
so, and the process of competition will thus be less vigorous.”).
299. Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a
Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 27, 41 (1976).
300. ZAMIR & TEICHMAN, supra note 2, at 32–33 (“Existing game theoretic models based on a
rational-choice approach have shown that predation can also emerge from the reputation that
predation generates.”).
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rather than the end-product. Patentees prefer to license the device makers
because royalties tend to be larger due to (1) a reference point bias, (2)
the larger economic impact of obtaining an injunction over an entire
phone rather than a chip within the phone, and (3) the fact that device
makers are less well-informed about the value added of the patented chip
technology than a chip maker. All these conditions also suggest that the
risk of holdup is more likely at the device level.
It is harder for juries to apportion the value of the SEPs when the
anchor point is a complex multicomponent product. With such a wide
base value, jurors may overestimate the royalty rate since they cannot
accurately account for royalty stacking. During actual negotiations, it is
also easier for the component manufacturer to estimate the contribution
of the patented technology than the end-product manufacturer or retailer.
Even if plaintiffs can show that end-product manufacturers are charged
excessive royalties, that in and of itself is not illegal under United States
law. However, that may be the smoking gun that prompts closer scrutiny
of conduct, agreements, or both, which facilitate excessive royalties.
Neoclassical antitrust sees no problems with high prices. Patentees are
simply maximizing profits by charging whatever the market will bear.
Those profits will attract entrants to compete until those profits go away
soon enough. Yet, humans do not think quite so rationally. For instance,
while people generally understand that the rich have access to better
health care, the notion of auctioning access to the highest bidder is
repugnant. Similarly, when Uber raised the prices of its rides after a
blizzard, New Yorkers were viscerally upset at the company’s price
gouging.301 The New York attorney general launched a probe, and Uber
had to agree to cap surge charges in emergency situations.302 In contrast,
companies like Walmart and Home Depot, who offer emergency supplies
in regions affected by disasters, forgo profit maximization. Thus seen, the
fairness of patentee-set royalties and other license terms is not merely a
cognitive exercise in rationality.
It is difficult to show competitive harm when end-product
manufacturers continue to offer products containing the patented
technology. Equating some degree of innovation with a dynamically
301. THALER, supra note 246, at 129 (“When a store raises the price of snow shovels the day
after a blizzard, people feel very much like someone has poked them with a sharp object. And
indeed, in many places there are laws against gouging, suggesting that people find the practice
offensive.”).
302. Thaler, From Nuts to “Nudges”, supra note 252 (“They were later sued by the New York
State attorney general for violating a law that bans ‘unconscionably excessive prices’ and agreed
to a settlement in which surge pricing is capped during emergency situations.”).
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efficient outcome is a mistake, since intervention could deliver
considerably more innovation or even innovation on a whole different
level. In this, pro-patentee advocates fall into hindsight bias, which is the
propensity to overestimate the probability of an event once people know
that the event has occurred. Hindsight bias is compounded by our
tendency to see bias in others but not in ourselves, which the discussion
moves onto next.303
3. Confirmation & Availability Biases
Neoclassical antitrust assumes people impartially weigh the costs and
benefits of their peferences, both present and future. 304 In contrast,
behavioral economics shows IP stakeholders may treat evidence
supporting their biases as independent and robust, when it is not. 305
Confirmation bias can cause belief to transmute into evidence, rather than
beliefs forming based on evidence. 306 In an experiment, University of
Chicago graduate students were required to rate reports, but they did not
know that the reports were phony.307 A significant number of students
regarded the reports supporting their opinion as being true.308 Moreover,
the stronger they felt about an issue, the stronger their belief in the
research’s robustness.309 Sometimes decision-makers ignore unfavorable
evidence altogether.
People also may actively avoid information that undermines their
beliefs.310 In a study, respondents were randomly assigned the role of
303. THALER, supra note 246, at 22 (“What makes the bias particularly pernicious is that we all
recognize this bias in others but not in ourselves.”).
304. Russell Golman et al., Information Avoidance, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 96, 102 (2017);
Shahram Heshmat, What Is Behavioral Economics? PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 3, 2017),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-choice/201705/what-is-behavioral-economics
[https://perma.cc/JEG8-2TMP] (“The rational person is assumed to correctly weigh costs and
benefits and calculate the best choices for himself. The rational person is expected to know his
preferences (both present and future), and never flip-flop between two contradictory desires.”).
305. MLODINOW, supra note 31, at 158 (“The challenge science presents to the legal community
is to move beyond that, to address the more difficult issue of unconscious discrimination, of bias
that is subtle and hidden even from those who exercise it.”).
306. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 490 (1990)
(noting that human thought processes consistently tend to point from belief to evidence, not vice
versa).
307. Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence
Quality, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28, 34–35 (1993) (where students were
asked to rate research reports dealing with issues on which they already had an opinion).
308. Id. at 37.
309. Id. at 37 (showing that they had indeed judged the studies that supported their beliefs to be
more methodologically sound and clearly presented than the otherwise identical studies that
opposed their beliefs—and the effect was stronger for those with strong prior beliefs).
310. Id. at 29 (noting that people sometimes avoid information, even if acquiring this knowledge
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plaintiff or defendant in a vehicle personal injury lawsuit based on an
actual case. 311 If they guessed what the judge actually awarded the
plaintiff, they would be given a cash bonus. Rational actors would ignore
whether they were playing the role of plaintiff or defendant and focus
solely on the law and evidence. Yet those playing plaintiffs and those
playing defendants differed greatly, each tending toward their own sides
while purporting to objectively rely on the evidence and law they had.312
This explains why it is so hard to bridge the beliefs of those who are propatentee and those who are pro-implementer; even though both appear to
support, in broad terms, the value of both innovation and competition.313
The more ambiguous the law and policy benchmarks, the greater the
tendency for this divide.314 Antitrust law is notoriously ambiguous. This
explains why the Interface has been so vulnerable to swings throughout
its history.315 The divide between those seeking IP deference and those
cautioning against opportunism results from a basic desire to favor traits
similar to our own, however detached.316 For instance, a study showed
that people married others with similar family names to their own as
much as they married others with different family names, even when
those different names are more common.317 The attributes that decisionmakers favor may have no empirically provable correlation with
innovation or competition.318 For instance, our trust in our physician may
would be to their own benefit).
311. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP., 109, 112 (Winter 1997) (noting that researchers randomly
assigned volunteers to the role of plaintiff or defendant in a mock lawsuit based on a real trial that
occurred in Texas).
312. MLODINOW, supra note 31, at 212–13.
313 . Kerber, supra note 14, at 2 (“[W]e generally have so many problems to deal with
innovation in competition law—despite the broad consensus that innovations are one of the
important benefits of market competition.”).
314. MLODINOW, supra note 31, at 205 (noting that this was “especially in the social sciences,
in which there is greater ambiguity than in the physical sciences”).
315. See, e.g., E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902); Carbice Corp.
of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 34 n.4 (1931); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 309 U.S. 436, 456–58 (1940); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 282 (1942);
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670 (1944); Int’l. Salt Co., Inc. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
316. N.J. Blackwood et al., Self-Responsibility and the Self-Serving Bias: An fMRI Investigation
of Causal Attributions, 20 NEUROIMAGE 1076, 1076 (2003) (identifying a discrete area of the brain,
called the dorsal striatum, as the structure that mediates much of this bias).
317. MLODINOW, supra note 31, at 19 (demonstrating that people tended to marry others with
the same family name as themselves as often as they married those with different family names,
even when the different family names were more common; for instance, Browns would marry other
Browns as often as they married Smiths, even though Smiths are more common than Browns).
318. Id. at 20 (“Most of us are satisfied with our theories about ourselves and accept them with

218

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 51

have more to do with his or her listening skills than his or her technical
expertise.319 This bias accentuates the ideological gap that exists at the
Interface, and accounts for much of the impasse we see today.
Neoclassical antitrust teaches that without transaction costs, resources
will flow to their highest valued use.320 Even when transaction costs were
zero, however, behavioral economics indicates resources do not
necessarily flow to their highest valued use due to the “endowment
effect.” People value what they had more than what others would give
them for it by a factor of about two.321 A FRAND royalty for patentees
will always be higher than FRAND royalties for implementers. This is
because the SEP owner values its technology more highly because it has
formed part of their endowment. In contrast, implementers have yet to
acquire access to the technology and value it less.
Knowing this, the solution would then be to write FRAND obligations
in such a way as to keep parties on track to resolve disputes in this way
until the parties opt out. By tying increases in usage to royalty increases,
loss aversion would be averted. By asking parties to commit to a decision
that would manifest in the future, the present bias would be mitigated.
Patentees and implementers may also decline what may be FRAND
terms if either or both regard the terms as “unfair.” 322 One legal study
interviewed attorneys from twenty civil cases in which injunctive relief
was sought. In all cases, the parties did not attempt to negotiate after the
court had issued its order.323 Perceptions of “fairness” are also affected
by the endowment effect in the sense that both patentees and licensees
feel entitled to the terms to which they have become accustomed. These
parties then treat pressure to deviate from the status quo to less favorable
terms as a loss and dig in to fight.324 One may suggest that the endowment
effect is simply a transaction cost. However, the endowment effect is a
confidence, but we rarely see those theories tested. Scientists, however, are now able to test those
theories in the laboratory, and they have proven astonishingly inaccurate.”).
319. Id. (“You might think you trust your gastroenterologist because she is a great expert, but
you might really trust her because she is a good listener.”).
320. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 40 (1960).
321. THALER, supra note 246, at 265 (“[T]he reason was the endowment effect: people given
mugs valued them about twice as much as people not given the mugs.”).
322. Id. at 268 (“For the Coase theorem to work, that losing party has to be willing to make an
offer to the other side if he puts a greater value on the property right he just lost. But if people are
angry, the last thing they want to do is talk to the other side.”).
323. Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain after Judgment? A Glimpse
Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 382, 384 (1999).
324. Thaler, From Nuts to “Nudges”, supra note 252 (“[T]his feature immediately offers an
explanation for the difference in the buying and selling prices . . . . I demand more to sell an object
than to buy it because giving it up would be coded as a loss.”).
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preference, not a “cost” as neoclassical economics understands it.
Professor Thaler explained that “[i]f we are free to re-label preferences
as “costs” at will so that behavior appears to be consistent with the
standard theory, then the theory is both untestable and worthless.”325
People value the ability to avoid losses more than the same amount of
monetary gains. 326 Whether something is framed as a discount or a
charge matters to the irrational decision-maker.327 Framing also informs
the “non-discriminatory” aspect of FRAND. Studies show that
consumers are willing to pay more for beer sold at a fancy restaurant than
at a beach shack because in their minds, it is unfair for the shack owner
to charge as much as the restaurant.328 The ability to punish is particularly
important in situations where there are repeated interactions, as often is
the case between licensors and licensees. Behavioral economics teaches
that most people are “conditional cooperators,” cooperating if enough
people do the same.329 Maintaining a critical mass of cooperative players
requires the ability to punish wrong-doers such as free-riders, the bane of
IP owners.330
B. Smarter Remedies
Behavioral economics offers insights to craft smarter solutions.
Nudging is one way to get consumers to make better choices. 331 The
European Commission found Microsoft guilty of tying its Windows
operating system to its Media Player, but noted that while users could
have downloaded competing media players they did not. 332 Professor
325. THALER, supra note 246, at 266, 268.
326. Id. at 34 (“Roughly speaking, losses hurt about twice as much as gains make you feel
good. . . . The fact that a loss hurts more than an equivalent gain gives pleasure is called loss
aversion. It has become the single most powerful tool in the behavioral economist’s arsenal.”);
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of
Economics, 59 J. BUS. 285, 288 (1986) (noting that buyers were willing to pay about half of what
sellers would demand, even with markets and learning).
327. DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 46 (2000)
(calling this distinction “framing”).
328. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thalersupra note 326, at 288.
329. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 980, 984 (2000) (finding that a large proportion of people can be categorized
as conditional cooperators).
330. Id.
331. Thaler, From Nuts to “Nudges”, supra note 252.
332. R. Hewitt Pate, The Thirteenth Chime of the Clock, 4 CPI 51, 54 (Spring 2008), (“Just as
before the decision, consumers consistently choose to install the fully functional version of
Microsoft Windows. WMP is present on practically every (non-Apple) PC sold, and consumers
retain the option to purchase or down-load—often for free—alternative media players from other
providers. The CFI in fact recognized that the use of multiple competing media players was
becoming increasingly common among consumers throughout the period in question.”); see also
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Andreas Heinemann observed that status quo bias imposed a real cost on
rival media player developers, who had to “expend resources to overcome
end-users’ inertia and persuade them to ignore the pre-installation of
WMP.”333
To remedy this, the European Commission imposed a duty on
Microsoft to offer a version of Windows without the media player.334 The
Commission also required Microsoft to make a ballot screen available
that allowed users to download the browser of their choice instead of, or
in addition to, Internet Explorer. 335 This ballot screen helped in
“overcoming the default bias and giving consumers an autonomous
choice of the browser they are going to use . . . . [T]he remedy promotes
competition on the merits since the product is not chosen because of its
immediate availability but because of its quality.” 336 At the same time,
Microsoft had to avoid overloading consumers with choices.
“Consequently, the ballot screen should not strive for completeness but
contain the most important products plus a choice of the less usual
products which should vary randomly.”337
C. Sandboxes & Safe Harbors
Antitrust law develops through cases “rather than by statute or
regulation and frequently—approaching always, at the appellate and
Supreme Court levels—enjoying the benefit of expert insights by amici
from the federal and state enforcers, the academy, and sophisticated
think-tanks representing all political views.” 338 Agencies, courts, and
attorneys should be encouraged to try new theories, run simulations, and
keep track of what happens internally. It will take time, but eventually the
antitrust system should allow and even encourage stakeholders to make
evidence-based decisions regardless of the outcomes ex post. This will
encourage everyone to contribute toward the common enterprise of
advancing the “useful Arts” that lie at the heart of technological

Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n of the European Communities, 2007 WL 2693858
(Sept. 17, 2007).
333. Andreas Heinemann, Facts Over Theory: The Contribution of Behavioral Economics to
Competition Law, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2019, at 1, 5, https://www.
competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CPI-Heinemann.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9XM5-LM2J].
334. Id. at 6 (“This product did not have any success on the market, though.”).
335. Commission Decision No. AT.39.530 (Microsoft), 2013 O.J.C 120/15, http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39530/39530_3162_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5S4-7DD4].
336. Heinemann, supra note 333, at 6.
337. Id.
338. Huffman, supra note 29, at 3.
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progress.339
However, behavioral economics suggests managerial decisions are
judged more harshly in hindsight, even to the extent of imputing
negligence. 340 Hindsight bias may chill the willingness of litigants or
lower courts to advance antitrust theories on dynamic efficiency even if
they are sound or if they may be excoriated when the result turns out
badly at court, or on appeal. Judicial meekness and self-doubt harms
consumers since we want stakeholders to take efficient risks, even if they
turn out wrong.
This can be fostered by a safe-harbor norm that protects stakeholders
if they make a value-maximizing decision ex ante with all the information
available to them, even if it turns out badly ex post. 341 Hindsight bias,
however, will make implementing the safe-harbor difficult since
“[w]henever there is a time lapse between the times when a decision is
made and when the results come in, the boss may have trouble
remembering that he originally thought it was a good idea too.”342
Remaining open to creative theories of harm, or even sorting through
mundane ones, can be cognitively taxing. To use a simple example, a
lunch menu in a foreign language contains many choices, but people
sometimes have waiters choose for them or limit their own options to
popular choices because they cannot read it. Getting to the right outcome
comes at a cognitive tax that decision-makers ignore.
Just as behavioral economics supplies a theoretical rudder to steer one
form of predictive analytics used at the Interface, AI supplies the engine
to power it. AI offers stakeholders at the Interface, for the first time, the
possibility of enhanced predictive capabilities to achieve dynamically
efficient outcomes. A properly trained system could allow stakeholders
to predict key antitrust metrics; such as market entry, innovation
trajectories, and price effects; with considerably more confidence than
the current system powered by neoclassical antitrust theory alone.
As a concept, predictive analytics may sound esoteric, but anyone with
a credit card has likely already been assessed by an AI-enabled system
for their credit risk. Credit card companies also use predictive analytics
339. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the basis for United States IP law).
340. ZAMIR & TEICHMAN, supra note 2, at 7 (“Judging managerial decisions in hindsight may
have a chilling effect on managers, deterring them from taking efficient risks, for fear that if these
decisions turn out badly, they will be held legally liable.”).
341. THALER, supra note 246, at 190 (“The misbehavior is in failing to create an environment
in which employees feel that they can take good risks and not be punished if the risks fail to pay
off.”).
342. Id.
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to guess if a purchase was fraudulent. They use multi-dimensional
customer data to do this, including past purchases, geographical location,
age, and gender.343 Predictive analytics enables credit card companies to
confidently block a card and issue a new one without their customers even
experiencing the inconvenience of being declined.344 Its accuracy gets
better the longer it is used, the more frequently it is used, and the more
legitimate transactions it receives.
AI can speed up the process of investigation and dispute resolution in
antitrust cases, a reason for the revolt against neoclassical antitrust as
discussed in Part I. Rather than analyze each option one at a time, AI
lowers the cost and accelerates the speed of identifying options for
stakeholders to determine the payoffs. Over time, the continual feedback
loop enables the algorithm to improve its predictive capabilities. How this
happens at the Interface is the subject of Part III, which the discussion
turns to next.
III. LEVERAGING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AI permeates our daily lives. It powers popular features in our
smartphone apps, guides autonomous vehicles on our roads, and informs
merchants of our unconscious purchasing preferences. 345 AI raises
important legal questions. Who is the inventor when the AI made the
primary inventive contribution? 346 Should companies that use training
data be allowed to hide behind the fair use exception in copyright law?347
Should companies who use AI to track market movements be liable for
violating antitrust law?348 Does big data constitute a cognizable antitrust
343. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 24–25.
344. Id. at 27 (“Innovations in prediction technology are having an impact on areas traditionally
associated with forecasting, such as fraud detection. Credit card fraud detection has improved so
much that credit card companies detect and address fraud before we notice anything amiss.”).
345. Id. at 133 (noting how Amazon’s Echo uses AI to predict the intention of user speech,
Apple’s Siri to predict command context, and Amazon’s recommendations to predict purchases).
346. See Jeff O’ Neill, Predicting Future Patent Outcomes, IPWATCHDOG.COM (May 30,
2018),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/30/predicting-future-patent-outcomes/id=97410/
[https://perma.cc/P8HA-MKSU]. Patent attorneys have begun using data analytics to improve
prosecution strategy. Allowance rates give attorneys valuable insights into the probability of
obtaining a patent after a first office action, such as how difficult an examiner is and when the
applicant can expect to be granted the patent. See Lim, AI & IP, supra note 1, at 818.
347. Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 283 (2019).
348 . See, e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Former ECommerce Executive Charged with Price Fixing in the Antitrust Division’s First Online
Marketplace Prosecution (Apr. 6, 2015) (on file with the Department of Justice) (rivalling online
sellers implemented an agreement not to undercut each other’s prices through repricing software
that automatically set prices in line with other online sellers); Matthew Levitt et al., EU Antitrust
Enforcement 2.0—European Commission Raises Concerns About Algorithms And Encourages

2019]

Predictive Analytics

223

barrier to entry?349 This author has dealt with several of these questions
elsewhere.350
With the advent of AI-enabled predictive analytics, it would be foolish
to rely solely on human judgment for Interface cases when doing so
would be inferior.351 Like the rule of reason, predictive analytics requires
fact gathering, weighing alternative interpretations, and selecting the
most likely future. AI can scour depositions and provide a quicker and
more consistent analysis of facts and law than attorneys can, and will be
better at accounting for interactions among different indicators.352 One
key reason AI can do this is that it can avoid cognitive bias involved in
ignoring salient information. 353 It most closely approximates
neoclassical economics’ rational person.354 Another reason is that AI can
make connections that escape us because of how we contextualize and
associate information with what we—both individually and within our
traditional legal, scientific, or economic disciplines—are personally
familiar with.
As discussed earlier in Part I, merger review comes closest to the kind
of forecasting that analysis at the Interface requires to more reliably
achieve dynamically efficient outcomes, and it requires us to do so
Individual
Whistleblowers,
KLUWER
COMP.
L.
BLOG
(Mar.
21,
2017),
http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2017/03/21/eu-antitrust-enforcement-2-0-europeancommission-raises-concerns-about-algorithms-and-encourages-individual-whistleblowers/
[https://perma.cc/4RTM-7RNX] (noting that “[p]ricing algorithms need to be built in a way that
doesn’t allow them to collude” and that “companies can’t escape responsibility for collusion by
hiding behind a computer program”).
349. Kelly Smith Fayne et al., FTC Hearing Evaluates Regulatory Oversight of Big Data and
Privacy, LATHAM & WATKINS CLIENT ALERT COMMENT. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.lw.com/
thoughtLeadership/FTC-hearing-regulatory-oversight-big-data-privacy [https://perma.cc/2WBGLXS8].
350. See generally Lim, AI & IP, supra note 1.
351. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 21–22 (“Today, it’s no longer impossible to
imagine a forecasting competition in which a supercomputer trounces superforecasters and
superpundits alike. After that happens, there will still be human forecasters, but like human
Jeopardy! contestants, we will only watch them for entertainment. . . . And machine learning, in
combination with burgeoning human-machine interactions that feed the learning process, promises
far more fundamental advances to come. ‘It’s going to be one of these exponential curves that we’re
kind of at the bottom of now,’ Ferrucci said.”).
352. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 69 (“As the number of dimensions for such interactions
grows, the ability of humans to form accurate predictions diminishes, especially relative to
machines.”).
353. Id. at 68 (“Humans often overweigh salient information and do not account for statistical
properties.”).
354. Jim Guszca & Timothy Murphy, Cognitive Collaboration: What Data Science Can Learn
from Psychology, BEHAV. ECON. GUIDE 2017, http://www.behavioraleconomics.com/
BEGuide2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/43HQ-M55A] (“[A]lgorithms don’t suffer from bounded
rationality, cognitive biases, or simple fatigue.”).
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quickly in order that market conditions have not rendered the analysis
irrelevant. 355 Industrial organization already uses data to estimate
demand and cross-price effects. These advances allow economists to
simulate mergers, factor in simple market reactions, and test the accuracy
of their predictions.356 However, results currently vary wildly based on
functional assumptions. 357 In theory, using more non-parametric
techniques such as natural experiments can mitigate these variations.358
In practice, without fully embracing predictive analytics, what can be
done is of limited use.
A. The Science & Art of Predictive Analytics
Predictive analytics is a science because the likelihood of innovation
being harmed or the likelihood of antitrust intervention being appropriate
is measurable. Courts or agencies assessing possible antitrust intervention
face a similar challenge to sports fans deciding whether to buy next year’s
season tickets. Fans prefer to go to games where their team wins, and will
need both data from past seasons and current data about teams to make a
good prediction.359 Data from past seasons provide the training data used
to generate the algorithm, current data help contextualize predictions
made by the algorithm, and feedback data from its human users improve
the AI’s performance.
AI needs to be trained in the relationships between variables such as
market power, price, output, and innovation. 360 The variables the AI
needs will depend on the strength of each variable as a predictor and how
355. Boyer et al., supra note 57, at 30–31 (“[E]conomists must predict effects on competition
and efficiencies based on an analysis that will normally require that they (i) define markets; (ii)
assess the importance of barriers to entry; (iii) contemplate possible theories of harm; (iv) quantify
the potential harm to competition, (v) quantify the potential efficiencies; (vi) combine harm and
efficiencies into a net effect, allowing for various approaches to the trade-offs; and (vii) assess the
potential impacts on the market of any proposed remedies, such as divestitures. And, given that
many reviewable mergers will involve multiple product and geographic markets, all of these tasks
may need to be undertaken many times, all with a clock ticking as the merging firms press for
clearance to proceed with their transaction quickly.”).
356. Id. at 30 (“Developments in empirical industrial organization—and better data—have
allowed us to estimate systems of demand relationships and measure cross-price effects. This has
opened up the possibility of simulating mergers to allow for simple reactions by other firms.”).
357. Id. (“There is concern, for example, that different functional form assumptions can lead to
very different predictions on post-merger prices.”).
358. Id. (“Alternatives to merger simulations using more non-parametric techniques may be
available—perhaps through the use of natural experiment opportunities.”).
359. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 47 (“[C]ombination of input data and outcome
measures to create the prediction machine, and then use input data from a new situation to predict
the outcome of that situation.”).
360 . Id. at 74 (“That prediction is possible because training occurred about relationships
between different types of data and which data is most closely associated with a situation.”).
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costly a mistaken prediction will be. For instance, if the relevant market
is of little economic importance and mistakes are not a big deal, the AI
needs only a few sources of data. If the allegedly anticompetitive conduct
is a weak predictor of a violation, or if a false positive could jeopardize
the nation’s economic future, then many more data points are needed. The
more AI can observe technology markets and its stakeholders, the better
it will be at predicting the static and dynamic outcomes that result from
their interactions.361
Like other scientific processes, predictive analytics can be honed by
improving the process of collecting better data and revising variables
upon which we make predictions.362 Ex-post analysis goes some way to
determining whether antitrust intervention was appropriate. 363 The
exercise helps improve the effectiveness of future intervention to the
extent that past lessons are transferrable.364 It also promotes transparency
and accountability in the enforcement process provided that the results
are made public.365 In practice, the complexity of ex-post evaluations,
scarcity of data, and the resources needed, make these cases rare.366
For instance, predictive analytics can provide information on churn in
relation to an allegedly anticompetitive licensing strategy. Licensees can
be difficult to acquire and losing them through churn can be costly.
Business consultants traditionally use multivariate regression to predict
churn.367 The problem is that this method relies on theoretical robustness
361. Id. at 18 (“Prediction facilitates decisions by reducing uncertainty, while judgment assigns
value. In economists’ parlance, judgment is the skill used to determine a payoff, utility, reward, or
profit. The most significant implication of prediction machines is that they increase the value of
judgment.”).
362. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 18 (“It is the product of particular ways of
thinking, of gathering information, of updating beliefs.”).
363. Juan Delgado & Hector Otero, Why Ex-Post Evaluation Is So Important (And So Little
Used)
In
Antitrust,
CPI
ANTITRUST
CHRON.
(Apr.
17,
2016),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/why-ex-post-evaluation-is-so-important-and-solittle-used-in-antitrust/ [https://perma.cc/F35M-6US4] (“Such quantification should not only
consider direct effects on consumer welfare but also the potential deterrence effect on future
anticompetitive conducts.”).
364. Id. (“The ex-post evaluation of impact provides essential feedback for improving future
antitrust and merger decisions.”).
365. Id. (“It does not only help improve antitrust decisions but also internal organization
decisions regarding prioritization and resource allocation. . . . Ex-post analysis is useful to audit
their activities and also to increase the public awareness about the benefits from competition.”).
366. Id. (“Even though there are powerful reasons to develop ex-post evaluation schemes, the
evidence shows their use is fairly rare. . . . There are structural obstacles limiting the implementation
of ex-post analysis schemes, related mostly to the complexity of the analysis and the amount of
resources and data needed.”); id. (“A related structural obstacle is the availability of public statistics
and industry data.”).
367. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 32 (“Historically, the core method for predicting churn
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and can lead to systematically wrong results in practice, and it is limited
in the number of combinations and interactions.368 In contrast, machine
learning allows bias in exchange for reducing variance by proving it
works better in practice.369 It also gives programmers the ability to finetune their algorithm with big data and combine variables in unexpected
ways.370
A challenge in data gathering is that antitrust cases are rare compared
to cases in other areas such as contract, tort, or criminal disputes.371 That
is a good thing, but courts and agencies also are reduced to making
speculative predictions about innovation. 372 While cases cannot be
replicated to provide the data points needed to know whose narrative of
dynamic efficiency is empirically true, AI offers the possibility of doing
realistic simulations to provide glimpses of “but for” worlds that can help
illuminate determinations whether and how to intervene.373
One way to generate more data points is to look at more granular
was a statistical technique called ‘regression.’”); id. at 33 (“It finds a prediction based on the
average of what has occurred in the past. For instance, if all you have to go on to determine whether
it is going to rain tomorrow is what happened each day last week, your best guess might be an
average. If it rained on two of the last seven days, you might predict that the probability of rain
tomorrow is around two in seven, or 29 percent.”).
368. Id. at 34 (“Regression can keep missing several feet to the left or several feet to the right.
Even if it averages out to the correct answer, regression can mean never actually hitting the
target.”); id. at 36 (“Because they are hard to foresee, modelers do not include them when predicting
with standard regression techniques. Machine learning gives the choices of which combinations
and interactions might matter to the machine and not the programmer.”).
369. Id. at 35.
370. Id. at 40–41 (“Traditional statistical methods require the articulation of hypotheses or at
least of human intuition for model specification. Machine learning has less need to specify in
advance what goes into the model and can accommodate the equivalent of much more complex
models with many more interactions between variables. Recent advances in machine learning are
often referred to as advances in artificial intelligence because: (1) systems predicated on this
technique”); id. at 36 (“Now, machine learning methods, and especially deep learning methods,
allow flexibility in the model and this means variables can combine with each other in unexpected
ways.”).
371. Id. at 59 (“[W]e know our predictions will be relatively poor in situations where we do not
have much data.”); id. at 60 (“While computer scientists are working to reduce machines’ data
needs, developing techniques such as “one-shot learning” in which machines learn to predict an
object well after seeing it just once, current prediction machines are not yet adequate.”).
372. Delgado & Otero, supra note 363 (“There is little information on whether the application
of competition law is too harsh or too lenient. Even if the literature has made an extensive analysis
of the problems with under-application and over-application of competition policy, it is not clear
how far we are from an optimal scenario. In addition, it is not clear whether competition policy is
having sufficient deterrent effects.”).
373. Id. (“To do so, one has to determine what would have happened in the absence of
intervention by a Competition Authority, and then measure the degree to which the intervention by
the antitrust agency has contributed to enhance consumer welfare in comparison with the
counterfactual scenario.”).
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variables. For instance, presidential elections are rare, but focusing on
state-level elections gives fifty results per election.374 As with all policy
tools, the results of predictive analytics should be tested whenever
possible using randomized control trials, the gold standard of scientific
research.375 Agencies should have similar teams conducting tests of new
ideas. The rate of that process depends on both observations and the rate
at which stakeholders can find new things to test.376
At the same time, predictive analytics is an art because the results
require judgment and context to be meaningful and effective. Like other
forms of art, it works best with an open-mind, curiosity, focus, and a selfcritical attitude.377 How good we can get at it depends on what we are
trying to predict, how far into the future, and under what
circumstances.378 Predictions about tomorrow’s weather are reasonably
reliable. Each added day farther out in time makes the forecast
significantly less so.379 If an event has never happened before, human
judgment is needed to provide an analogical bridge. In his book The Black
Swan, Nassim Nicholas Taleb reminds us that old data is insufficient to
enable users to predict new events.380 Technological innovations, such as
the transition from buying CDs in record stores to digital music files over
the Internet, dislocated the music industry. The human decision-maker
can intervene when the AI has insufficient data to make a good
prediction.381
374. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 62 (“We could focus on the state level in
presidential elections, for example, which would give us fifty results per election, not one.”).
375. THALER, supra note 246, at 338 (“In an RCT, people are assigned at random to receive
different treatments (such as the wording of the letters in the tax study), including a control group
that receives no treatment (in this case, the original wording).”).
376. RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, THE MEANING OF IT ALL: THOUGHTS OF A CITIZEN-SCIENTIST 27
(2005) (“[R]ate of the development of science is not the rate at which you make observations alone
but, much more important, the rate at which you create new things to test.”).
377. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 20 (“I’ll describe this in detail, but broadly
speaking, superforecasting demands thinking that is open-minded, careful, curious, and—above
all—self-critical. It also demands focus.”).
378. Id. at 13 (“How predictable something is depends on what we are trying to predict, how
far into the future, and under what circumstances.”).
379. Id. at 13 (“Weather forecasts are typically quite reliable, under most conditions, looking a
few days ahead, but they become increasingly less accurate three, four, and five days out.”).
380. See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN (2007) (referring to the
Europeans’ discovery of a new type of swan in Australia); see also AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note
33, at 60 (“To eighteenth-century Europeans, swans were white. Upon arrival in Australia, they
saw something totally new and unpredictable: black swans. They had never seen black swans and
therefore had no information that could predict the existence of such a swan.”).
381. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 69 (“[H]umans are often better than machines when
understanding the data generation process confers a prediction advantage, especially in settings
with thin data.”).
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Humans have a comparative advantage when it comes to predicting
with little data. We recognize faces we see again only years later, and can
recognize them from different angles though we may have only seen them
once before.382 Humans can make judgments based on little or no data
because they can analyze by analogy and mental modes which even deeplearning-enabled AI cannot.383 This underscores the need for predictive
analytics to include a safety valve—a protocol where AI calls in human
judgment when needed. In this, AI functions much like the human’s
assistant to provide recommendations rather than decisions.
B. Prediction & Judgment
David Ricardo espoused a theory of labor allocation based on
comparative advantage. 384 With predictive analytics, AI reduces the
cognitive bias in human judgment while humans mitigate the systemic
weakness in an AI’s ability to predict outcomes when there is little data
or when it requires goal-setting and weighted values.385 As seen in Part
II, we are resistant to evidence that undercuts our own beliefs, which can
be a serious issue in the malleable environment where legal policy or case
law are decided, such as with antitrust law.386 At the Interface, the AI can
provide an initial prediction which stakeholders can use to factor into
their own assessments. This is particularly useful in counterfactual
analyses. It also can provide a retrospective analysis to validate or
invalidate human judgment.
The superiority of AI-human outcomes was illustrated in 2016 by a
Harvard/MIT team competing to produce algorithmic detections of
metastatic breast cancer from biopsy slides. 387 The deep-learning AI
correctly predicted 99.5 percent of the time when paired with a

382. Id. at 60 (“We can identify a fourth-grade classmate forty years later, despite numerous
changes in appearance.”).
383 . Id. at 120 (“Humans use analogies and models to make decisions in such unusual
situations.”); id. (“Machines cannot predict judgment when a situation has not occurred many times
in the past.”).
384 . See generally DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
TAXATION (1817).
385. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 2 (“AI is a prediction technology, predictions are
inputs to decision making, and economics provides a perfect framework for understanding the
trade-offs underlying any decision.”).
386. See generally ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE (1999)
(discussing confirmation bias).
387. Dayong Wang et al., Deep Learning for Identifying Metastatic Breast Cancer, CAMELYON
GRAND CHALLENGE (June 18, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.05718.pdf [https://perma.cc
/LRJ2-6ETZ] (combining the predictions of their algorithm and a pathologist’s; the result was an
accuracy of 99.5 percent).
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pathologist, reducing the human error rate from 3.4 percent to 0.5 percent,
and translating into an error reduction of eighty-five percent.388 Beyond
improving accuracy, however, this illustration also shows the
comparative strength of AI and human counterparts: pathologists were
usually right when identifying the presence of cancer while the AI was
better at identifying its absence. 389 Similarly, human-AI predictive
analytics could dramatically reduce the concern for false positives at the
Interface. How then should that judgment be employed?
The first step is to observe. For instance, in looking at a patentee
refusing to license rivals or implementers, one question to ask first is
where is the origin of the innovation? The patentee is one obvious source,
but there may be others. Would deference to the patentee result in
continued innovation? To answer that question, predictive analytics
would not simply look at the patentee’s current efforts. Rather, it would
look at how often the patentee innovated in the past, say on a five-year
model, to predict the future. However, rivals and implementers
aggregating technology onto a single interoperable standard may
contribute to innovation too. Each additional way in which a patentee
could have made its rights commercially available, but did not, tilts the
probability toward the conclusion that it may have acted to stifle
innovation by others.
The second step is to consider who might be harmed. AI can recognize
demand beyond existing products and services in a way that human
analysis, focusing only on markets that fulfilled past demand, cannot. At
the Interface, technologies from different industries could substitute
previously supplied products just as phones and computers, considered
two markets for so long, now often substitute each other. It is important
to start from an outside estimate rather than an inside estimate to draw
conclusions because of the tendency for the anchoring bias to set in and
be fixated on an estimate that has little or no meaning. 390 In contrast, an
external view will have a better contextual basis.391 Equally important is
to find evidence that cuts the other way in order to avoid confirmation
bias. The judgment, once made, should be written down, which provides
388. Id.
389. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 65 (noting it was unusual to have a situation in which
the human said there was cancer but was mistaken; “[i]n contrast, the AI was much more accurate
when saying the cancer wasn’t there”).
390. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974) (influencing judgment merely by exposing them to even obviously
meaningless numbers, like one randomly selected by the spin of a wheel).
391. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 120 (“But if she starts with the outside view, her
analysis will begin with an anchor that is meaningful. And a better anchor is a distinct advantage.”).
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distance from the conclusions and can be useful to avoid anchoring and
status quo biases. The judgment should also be open to critique.392 This
allows others in the organization to spot flaws and offer their own
perspectives.393 Analyzing the issue in this way avoids the biases and lays
out a road map for subsequent analysis.
The third step is to have defined terms, timelines, and to use
numbers. 394 Numerous repeated simulations are also necessary to
calibrate the predictions over time.395 If the analysis shows a sixty-toforty percent chance of the event occurring, and the event does not occur,
those putting the figures forward risk being pilloried either way. The safe
route would be to use elastic and vague terms such as “a fair chance” and
“a serious possibility.”396 Without quantitative measures, however, the
ability of the AI to measure, learn, and improve its predictions, the
accuracy of prediction, will be stymied. A good forecast should also filter
out “noise”—irrelevant information—while updating the forecast based
on relevant information. The change is usually small—a few percentage
points.397
Thus, if the hypothesis is that the patentee shuts its rival out, what
would it take for that to be true? First, the patentee had, or could obtain,
market power to do so. Second, the patentee wanted its rival out badly
enough to take the risk of violating antitrust law. Each of these elements
can be researched to get a sense of the likelihood of the components of
the hypothesis being true. A prima facie case that persuades courts and
agencies that the case is worth looking into means that the likelihood of
392 . Id. at 126 (“People should take into consideration evidence that goes against their
beliefs.”).
393. Stefan Herzog & Ralph Hertwig, The Wisdom of Many in One Mind, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI.
231, 234 (2009) (finding that merely asking people to assume their initial judgment is wrong, to
seriously consider why that might be, and then make another judgment, produces a second estimate
which, when combined with the first, improves accuracy almost as much as getting a second
estimate from another person).
394. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 59 (“Forecasts must have clearly defined terms
and timelines. They must use numbers.”).
395. Id. (“And one more thing is essential: we must have lots of forecasts. We cannot rerun
history so we cannot judge one probabilistic forecast—but everything changes when we have many
probabilistic forecasts.”).
396. Id. at 58 (“If the event happens, ‘a fair chance’ can retroactively be stretched to mean
something considerably bigger than 50%—so the forecaster nailed it. If it doesn’t happen, it can be
shrunk to something much smaller than 50%—and again the forecaster nailed it. With perverse
incentives like these, it’s no wonder people prefer rubbery words over firm numbers.”).
397. Id. at 168 (“And notice how small Tim’s changes are. There are no dramatic swings of
thirty or forty percentage points. The average update was tiny, only 3.5%. That was critical. A few
small updates would have put Tim on a heading for underreaction. Many large updates could have
tipped him toward overreaction. But with many small updates, Tim slipped safely between Scylla
and Charybdis.”).
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a violation is considerably above zero, say 20 percent. It would not be
100 percent or else it would have been dealt with summarily, so it would
be safe to say between 20–80 percent, which gives a midrange of 50
percent. Fifty percent then becomes the anchor.
The key idea is to train the AI and refine results by looking for the
variables that would cause innovation to be affected, and what
information would allow predictive analytics to make a useful forecast.
For instance, if we need to calculate the number of rival innovators it
would take to ease a competitive bottleneck, then that number of rival
innovators would depend on how much room there is for licensing and
the number of resources it takes to sustain a rival innovator. The question
therefore depends on four facts: (1) the number of licenses; (2) how much
demand there is for the licenses; (3) how long it takes for market entry;
and (4) what the average innovator provides. By breaking down the
question, we can better identify what we can know from what we cannot.
This reduces the scope for “black box” guesswork and promises more
accurate predictions than whatever pops out of the “black box” of judges’
or enforcers’ minds.
An element of predictive analytics is the confidence in which the
analysis is made. If innovation is very likely to be dampened by antitrust
liability for breach of FRAND obligations, the only way to settle it
definitively would be to find the probability based on all possible
counterfactuals. Even if we could attribute a figure, say 70 percent to it,
we would not know whether that would be “very likely.” When the CIA
planned to topple the Castro regime in 1961, President Kennedy turned
to the military for their prediction that the small army of Cuban
expatriates at the Bay of Pigs would succeed in its mission. The answer
came back—“fair chance”—which was intended to mean about thirty
percent. However, President Kennedy was never told what it meant, and
reasonably assumed it was much more positive.398
The lesson here is that predictive analytics should narrow the range of
estimates and have designated numerical values. 399 For instance,
“probable” would mean a 60–80 percent chance of happening and
reducing the risk of confusion. Moreover, by requiring predictive
analytics to translate terms like “fair chance” to numbers, it encourages
398. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST R. MAY, THINKING IN TIME 143 (1988).
399. Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(Nov. 2002), https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol1no5.htm. [https://
perma.cc/NET3-2BHA] (“[A]nalysts should narrow the range of their estimates whenever they can.
And to avoid confusion, the terms they use should have designated numerical meanings, which
Kent set out in a chart.”)

232

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 51

those involved in the process to think more carefully about how they
arrived at the numerical range, reducing cognitive bias by
metacognition.400 Over time and with practice, the AI-human team will
get better at distinguishing finer shades of uncertainty.
Predictive analytics can deal with epistemic uncertainties, which are in
theory knowable. It can predict the workings of legal doctrine by looking
at how it has been applied over the years. Legal rules are after all,
clocklike at least in how they are articulated. AI systems are already
deployed to address simple tax, family, and contract questions. In 2018,
twenty top corporate lawyers were pitted against an AI system developed
by LawGeex, where they reviewed and approved contracts, including
non-disclosure agreements, over two months. LawGeex’s AI notched a
ninety-four percent accuracy rate and completed a task within twenty-six
seconds, compared to the human lawyers’ eighty-five percent accuracy
taking rate over ninety minutes.401 Courts use AI to assess the risk of
recidivism in criminal cases, a development which raises concerns over
bias that are also relevant to its use in IP law and antitrust law, both
individually, as well as at the Interface which this Article discusses in
Part III.C.1.
Unpacking the question into components allows us to distinguish
between what is known and what is not. It lays out the rules and
assumptions. The problem should then be viewed using an “outside
view”—a “comparative perspective that downplays its uniqueness and
treats it as a special case of a wider class of phenomena.”402 By breaking
a decision down into elements, stakeholders can more effectively
outsource predictive analytics to AI where the value of human input is
small.
As AI becomes more commonly used in predictions, the value
judgments that stakeholders make will be more valuable. For instance,
only an appointed judge, agency official, or company can decide which
innovation outcomes are most critical. Rival search engines produce
similarly good results for common search terms.403 Should we focus on
400. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 57 (“And they have another benefit: vague
thoughts are easily expressed with vague language but when forecasters are forced to translate terms
like ‘serious possibility’ into numbers, they have to think carefully about how they are thinking, a
process known as metacognition.”).
401. Kyree Leary, The Verdict Is In: AI Outperforms Human Lawyers in Reviewing Legal
Documents, FUTURISM (Feb. 27, 2018), https://futurism.com/ai-contracts-lawyers-lawgeex
[https://perma.cc/F2GZ-7UHU].
402. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 153.
403. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 50 (“For example, most search engines provide similar
results to common searches. Whether you use Google or Bing, the results from a search for ‘Justin
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process innovation that presents that information in unusually helpful
ways? 404 Or would more incremental innovation coupled with the
promise of greater dissemination among competing implementers be the
way forward? The ubiquity of AI in predictive analytics will also present
stakeholders with a more vivid picture of the alternatives and more
opportunities to make decisions about them.
Any system is only as good as its weakest link, and predictive analytics
is no exception. The synergistic possibilities that humans and algorithms
offer depend on their interplay. The AI must be constantly tweaked to
remain one step ahead of other networks that may be used to outwit it.
Judgment requires time, effort and experimentation.405 And each slice of
human ingenuity comes spiked with a dose of cognitive bias. For this
reason, it becomes imperative to understand, mitigate, and where
appropriate, harness those biases.
C. Limitations & Recommendations
1. Data Points
The first limitation is the data. To improve predictive accuracy,
stakeholders will have to devote resources to collecting data and training
the AI at the expense of short-term considerations such as operational
performance. It will also mean encouraging more data transparency. The
value of each data point decreases as the number of data points increase,
making biases less likely. The twentieth set of licensing terms of the
relevant technology in a FRAND dispute will skew the average much less
than the third and help improve the prediction.
Aggregating the FRAND licenses in different contexts is effective
because the collective pool of information becomes much bigger.
Collectively, these licenses offer stakeholders many data points. Like
dragonflies, which have a vision so superb that they can see in almost
every direction simultaneously, an AI system fed with a wealth of
FRAND license terms can synthesize them with clarity and precision.
In this regard, Professor Jorge Contreras suggests establishing a nonBieber’ are similar.”).
404. Id. (“Most people use Google for both rare and common searches. Being even a little better
in search can lead to a big difference in market share and revenue.”).
405. Id. at 94 (“Figuring out the relative payoffs for different actions in different situations takes
time, effort, and experimentation.”); id. (“Under conditions of uncertainty, we need to determine
the payoff for acting on wrong decisions, not just right ones.”); id. (“Often, however, there are too
many action-situation combinations, such that it is too costly to code up in advance all the payoffs
associated with each combination, especially the very rare ones. In these cases, it is more efficient
for a human to apply judgment after the prediction machine predicts.”).
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governmental, global FRAND rate-setting tribunal to determine
“FRAND royalty rates in a transparent, consistent and comprehensive
manner.” 406 The Searle Center Database at Northwestern University
consists of quantiﬁable characteristics of nearly 800,000 documents
related to standards, including a database of over 3.8 million references
between standard documents. The Searle Database also includes and
describes rules of thirty-six SSOs on SEPs, openness, participation, and
standard adoption procedures. 407 It provides a rich repository of
prevailing license rates upon which courts can adjudicate notions of
“fairness.”
Sample bias could creep into training data when the data fails to
accurately represent the technological or business environment. In this
case, the algorithm would be trained on data that persistently represent
the variables in an inaccurate manner. Since an algorithm cannot be
trained on the entire universe of data it might interact with, this is a
systemic issue.408 At the same time, choosing a subset of that universe
large and representative enough can mitigate sample bias.409
In this regard, a ProPublica investigation about judges who use AIgenerated recidivism scores to determine the likelihood of individuals
reoffending is instructive. Used since 2000, a low scorer benefits from a
shorter sentence.410 Since the score seems objective, it can be pivotal to
the judge’s determination. However, the investigation revealed that it
406. Contreras, Global Rate-Setting, supra note 204 (manuscript at 8).
407 . Justus Baron & Daniel F. Spulber, Technology Standards and Standard Setting
Organizations: Introduction to the Searle Center Database, 27 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 462,
463 (2018) (“The Database identiﬁes institutional membership for a sample of 191 standards
organizations including SSOs and other organizations directly involved in the development of
technology standards. Using the Internet Archives, we track both institutional member-ship and
SSO rules and procedures over time since the inception of the Archives in 1996. We identify 69,572
organizations (including companies, universities and public authorities) participating in at least one
standards organization.”).
408. Sara Chodosh, Courts Use Algorithms to Help Determine Sentencing, but Random People
Get the Same Results, POPULAR SCI. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.popsci.com/recidivismalgorithm-random-bias [https://perma.cc/N34R-DL5K] (“It seems reasonable to assume that
turning our decisions over to a data-crunching computer would save us from potential human biases
against people of color, but that’s not the case. The algorithms are just doubling down on the same
systemic mistakes we’ve been making for years, but churning out results with the misleading veneer
of impartiality.”).
409. Glen Ford, 4 Human-Caused Biases We Need to Fix for Machine Learning, THE NEXT
WEB (Oct. 27, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/contributors/2018/10/27/4-human-caused-biasesmachine-learning/ [https://perma.cc/H28Y-C2EU]; id. (“This science is well understood by social
scientists, but not all data scientists are trained in sampling techniques.”); id. (“This kind of bias
can’t be avoided simply by collecting more data.”).
410. Chodosh, supra note 408 (“Algorithms sold to courts across the United States have been
crunching those numbers since 2000.”).
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wrongly predicted black defendants who didn’t go on to reoffend as “high
risk” while mistakenly assigning a higher number of “low risk” labels to
white convicts who did. Investigators found that the AI used 137 features
to make its prediction.411 When pared down to two: age and number of
prior convictions, accuracy was about the same, revealing that those are
the two biggest factors determining recidivism.412 For a given white or
black person who committed the same crime, the black person was more
likely to get arrested, convicted, and incarcerated. Over time and on a
national scale, blacks were more likely to have criminal records which
were “most likely what caused the false positive and false negative error
rate.”413
The risk here too is that the AI provides wrong answers with
confidence that they are correct. Consider that low prices may be
associated with low sales, such as with hotel prices during the off-peak
season. A simple and erroneous correlation may lead to the conclusion
that raising prices will raise sales. A human can guide the AI to identify
the right data metrics, such as considering seasonality and other market
factors to better model pricing and predict sales. The same can be said
about determining fair FRAND rates and judging the justifiability of
injunctions on SEPs. The takeaway here is that the AI data needs to be
transparent and stakeholders need to be aware of the limitations and
biases that abound. If the data contains biases, the algorithms trained on
them would reflect these biases.
Predictive analytics must also address the wrong side of certainty. If
the system predicts a 60 percent chance of implementers and consumers
being harmed and it does not happen, was it wrong? Not necessarily,
since the analysis also indicates a 40 percent chance it will not happen,
so it might have been right. One prediction does not provide enough data
to judge the accuracy of the prediction.414
Sometimes, all stakeholders can do is to wait for the prediction to
manifest and use it as feedback. Then, the outcome provides a data point
that becomes feedback to improve the next prediction. Similarly, even the
human-AI form of predictive analytics cannot deal with aleatory
uncertainty. These predictions are too far out and infused with too many
uncertainties, such as whether it will rain in Chicago a year from now.
Likewise, innovation trajectories and counterfactuals will likely only be
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 57 (“It’s not possible to judge with only that one
forecast in hand. The only way to know for sure would be to rerun the day hundreds of times.”).
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robust within a period spanning months rather than years. Not quite a
moonshot, but much better than blind speculation.
2. The Algorithm
The second limitation is the algorithm itself. Algorithms are inherently
limited by the linearity of their equations and data.415 The multiplicity
and chaos of real-world innovation limits the ability of predictive
analytics to model the evolution of present decisions and their impact on
future innovation outcomes.416 However, this may soon change for the
better. Scientists have recently harnessed machine learning to predict the
evolution of chaotic systems out into stunningly distant time horizons by
relying on data rather than equations.417 The algorithm, called reservoir
computing, learns the dynamics of an archetypal chaotic system and
predicts eight times further into the future than previous methods.418 Just
as reservoir computing could significantly enhance weather predictions
and monitoring cardiac arrhythmias, it can enable stakeholders to better
predict the outcome of intervention.419
As discussed in Part II, there need to be sandboxes and safe harbors to
develop the law. Error tolerance depends on the consequences of the
error, the likelihood it will occur, and the benefits of the decision. It will
also mean being willing to give users a relatively untrained AI to start
415 . Jason Brownlee, Gentle Introduction to the Bias-Variance Trade-Off In Machine
Learning, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (Mar. 18, 2016), https://machinelearningmastery.com/
gentle-introduction-to-the-bias-variance-trade-off-in-machine-learning/ [https://perma.cc/2FMGVW29].
416. Natalie Wolchover, Machine Learning’s “Amazing” Ability to Predict Chaos, QUANTA
MAG. (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.quantamagazine.org/machine-learnings-amazing-ability-topredict-chaos-20180418 [https://perma.cc/MZ3H-PCYA] (“[I]t typically sets the horizon of
predictability. . . . [I]n many cases, the equations describing a chaotic system aren’t known,
crippling dynamicists’ efforts to model and predict them.”).
417. Id. (“In a series of results reported in the journals Physical Review Letters and Chaos,
scientists have used machine learning—the same computational technique behind recent successes
in artificial intelligence—to predict the future evolution of chaotic systems out to stunningly distant
horizons.”).
418. Id. (explaining reservoir computing as a three-step procedure). Assuming the question is
predicting how fire might spread, (1) feeding data-streams in to randomly chosen artificial neurons,
which triggers connected neurons in turn and sending a cascade of signals throughout the network;
(2) monitor, weight, and combine signal strengths of randomly chosen neurons to consistently
match the next set of inputs; (3) the reservoir, having learned the system’s dynamics, can reveal
how it will evolve by essentially asking itself what will happen next. See also id. (noting that the
Kuramoto-Sivashinsky equation “describes drift waves in plasmas and other phenomena, and
serves as ‘a test bed for studying turbulence and spatiotemporal chaos’”).
419. Id. (“Besides weather forecasting, experts say the machine-learning technique could help
with monitoring cardiac arrhythmias for signs of impending heart attacks and monitoring neuronal
firing patterns in the brain for signs of neuron spikes.”).

2019]

Predictive Analytics

237

collecting data. One way to reduce real-world risk is to use a simulated
environment. Pilots use simulators for their training. This was also how
Google trained DeepMind’s AlphaGo AI to “to defeat the best Go players
in the world not just by looking at thousands of games played between
humans but also by playing against another version of itself” through
adversarial machine learning.420
3. Biases
Third, human biases can only be mitigated, never eliminated. Human
biases can creep into judgments, creating contradictory inconsistencies
when done without a formula.421 Princeton economist Professor Orley
Ashenfelter devised a means of predicting the future value of Bordeaux
wine based on information available in the year that the wine was
made.422 Like antitrust intervention, wine takes time to produce results,
and like technology that is heterogeneous, the price of the same wine
product may vary dramatically across different vintages. Ashenfelter’s
formula provided more accurate forecasts than experts.423
This may have been because, according to Professor Daniel
Kahneman, the experts “try to be clever, think outside the box, and
consider complex combinations of features in making their
predictions.”424 He notes that “[c]omplexity may work in the odd case,
but more often than not it reduces validity. Simple combinations of

420. DeepMind’s AlphaGo AI is trained by:
pit[ting] the main AI and its objective against another AI that tries to foil that
objective. For example, Google researchers had one AI send messages to another
using an encryption process. The two AIs shared a key to encoding and decoding
the message. A third AI (the adversary) had the messages but not the key and tried
to decode them. With many simulations, the adversary trained the main AI to
communicate in ways that are hard to decode without the key.] Such simulated
learning approaches cannot take place on the ground; they require something akin
to a laboratory approach that produces a new machine learning algorithm that is
then copied and pushed out to users. The advantage is that the machine is not
trained in the wild, so the risk to the user experience, or even to the users
themselves, is mitigated. The disadvantage is that simulations may not provide
sufficiently rich feedback, reducing, but not eliminating, the need to release the
AI early. Eventually, you have to let the AI loose in the real world.
AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 187–88.
421 . See KAHNEMAN, supra note 247, at 225 (observing that experienced radiologists
contradicted themselves one in five times when evaluating X-rays; auditors, pathologists,
psychologists, and managers exhibited similar inconsistencies, and concluding that if there is a way
of predicting using a formula instead of a human, the formula should be considered seriously).
422. Id. at 223.
423. Id. at 224.
424. Id.
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features are better.”425 Another reason is that “humans are incorrigibly
inconsistent in making summary judgments of complex information.
When asked to evaluate the same information twice, they frequently give
different answers.”426 Kahneman noted that “[t]he surprising success of
equal-weighting schemes has an important practical implication: it is
possible to develop useful algorithms without any prior statistical
research. Simple equally weighted formulas based on existing statistics
or on common sense are often very good predictors of significant
outcomes.”427
Further, decision-makers may engage in attribute substitution, which
functions as a bait and switch. When asked for the correct judgment to a
complex antitrust question, the decision-maker may unconsciously
replace it with a simpler one: “what do I think of patent rights?” The
easier question becomes the proxy for the original harder question, and
the answer for one will become the answer for the other.428 Similarly,
hindsight bias replaces an assessment of the decision with an assessment
of the outcome. The saying “All’s well that ends well” does not validate
a judgment call itself, since the outcome may have taken place in spite
of, rather than because of, that judgment call. Any validation from the
experience may be false and misleading.
A study of bail decisions by judges in New York revealed the foibles
of human bias and the benefits of AI data analysis. 429 That decision
depends on the risk that the accused may flee or commit other crimes
while out on bail. The AI, trained using 750,000 records spanning five
years, predicted that sixty-two percent of the one percent of riskiest
accused persons would commit crimes while out on bail. 430 Despite this,
judges granted bail to almost half of them based on irrelevant factors like
their appearance and demeanor in court, while discounting relevant
factors like length of unemployment in a way that biased their
prediction. 431 Eventually, sixty-three percent of those offenders
425. Id. at 224–25.
426. Id. at 225–26.
427. Id. at 226.
428. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 40 (“That question becomes a proxy for the
original question and if the answer is yes to the second question, the answer to the first also becomes
yes.”).
429. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 33.
430. Id. (“The information included prior rap sheets, the crimes people were accused of, and
demographic information.”).
431. Id. (“One possibility is that judges use information unavailable to the algorithm, such as
the defendant’s appearance and demeanor in court. That information might be useful—or it might
be deceiving. Given the high crime rate of those released, it’s not unreasonable to conclude that it
is more likely the latter; the judges’ predictions are fairly horrible.”).

2019]

Predictive Analytics

239

committed crimes while out on bail. Had the AI made the call, those
crimes might have been averted.432
Stakeholders involved in predictive analytics need to be told what they
are expected to do when making judgment calls, and they must be held
accountable to those standards. Further, the process should consider
contrary evidence and alternative hypotheses.433 Even with an AI-human
combination some bias, whether in the data or in the decision makers
themselves, may be inevitable. The key is to minimize those biases by
expressly accounting for them. Adjustments may need to be made to the
level of confidence in the prediction. A bar set at “beyond a reasonable
doubt,” might flip a decision to intervene if the decision were
downgraded from seventy percent to sixty percent because of bias.
CONCLUSION
The premise of this Article is that we should not continue to build
doctrine at the IP-antitrust interface on theoretical neoclassical
assumptions alone, but also on the reality of markets using all that AI has
to offer us. Behavioral economics and AI do not replace traditional
antitrust analysis. Rather they are complements and imbue antitrust law
with continuing durability.
Predicting competitive effects is difficult and we need tools to predict
outcomes as precisely and reliably as possible. Until now, antitrust law
has only been able to operate before a veil of assumptions and rhetoric.
Stakeholders have only been able to think about whether and how to
intervene in the exercise of IP rights, particularly patent rights, in the
broadest terms since even the smallest perturbations in a complicated set
of variables can set off ripples that lead to dramatically divergent
outcomes. Facts have always mattered in antitrust law, and a more
expansive toolkit can only increase our likelihood of getting it right.
Behavioral economics sheds light on anticompetitive conduct that
neoclassical antitrust may regard as irrational and therefore improbable.
Once we recognize that it is rational and probable, we need to quantify
and value the effects of the conduct. To do this, we need to employ more
of the analogical reasoning intrinsic in antitrust law. For that, predictive
analytics is very good at helping stakeholders with pattern recognition
and simulation runs. This brings us closer to being able to ascribe value,
432. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 32, at 23 (“So what I want is that human expert paired
with a computer to overcome the human cognitive limitations and biases.”).
433. Id. at 87 (“To have accountability for process but not accuracy is like ensuring that
physicians wash their hands, examine the patient, and consider all the symptoms, but never
checking to see whether the treatment works.”).
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to which human judgment can be brought to bear. In these value
judgments, AI provides stakeholders with augmented capabilities to
confront the computational challenges these tasks require.
As much ground as this Article has covered, more work remains to be
done. 434 Predictive analytics can provide useful range estimates to
uncertain behavioral responses in IP markets. At the same time, the
output is only as good as the input. Where would the data come from?
Much of the data, particularly in the FRAND space, remains tightly under
wraps. But as the Searle Center database shows, meaningful progress can
continue to be made. How one inputs valuation measures and probability
estimates also matters. And further research is needed to illuminate how
predictive analytics takes valuation uncertainties into account. These
should indicate how the data can be distilled into “markers” that can help
identify dynamically inefficient outcomes, prognosticate how the arc of
innovation might have been affected, and formulate smarter remedies to
address them.
Challenging questions also remain as to how those employing
predictive analytics can code for hindsight biases as well as other
heuristics and biases—should they be ignored, included, or discounted
(and at what rate) for predicting and selecting outcomes? If information
asymmetries result in SEP licensing rates that are “irrational” because
implementers lack information, what does this inform us about antitrust
law decisions?
Behavioral economics makes it easier for stakeholders to identify how
they decide so they can make more informed decisions. AI-enabled data
is a key component for stakeholders to make decisions under uncertainty,
but it should not be conflated with the decision itself, which involves
judgment and execution. AI and humans should work in tandem, as each
is good at different aspects of the decision-making process, to build a
more accurate model of the complicated world where IP resides. The
maturation of behavioral economics and AI will provide us with the tools
to fill gaps in our knowledge. In the meantime, the insights should
continue to be relevant as behavioral economics and AI mature, and as
predictive analytics become more accurate and capable of dealing with
new, emerging scenarios at the IP-antitrust interface.

434. I am grateful to Josh Sarnoff for these insights.
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POSTSCRIPT
On May 21, 2019 Judge Koh handed down her judgment against
Qualcomm.435 She found Qualcomm had market power in the modem
chip market.436 Losing Qualcomm’s chip supply would have devastated
handset makers, forcing them to sign on to Qualcomm’s terms so that
“[c]ollectively, the harms caused by Qualcomm’s anticompetitive
practices take repeated aim at the elements necessary for a rival modem
chip supplier to compete in the market” and “create insurmountable
barriers for rivals.”437 Specifically, Qualcomm’s market power in turn
enabled it to harm competition in three ways.
First, Qualcomm required that its OEM customers separately license
technology rather than exhausting patent rights on that technology
through the sale of the chips themselves. 438 Qualcomm’s “carrot and
stick” strategy against OEMs allowed it to both secure higher royalty
rates than comparable chips and provide conditional rebates on chip sales
that created near-exclusive supply arrangements.439
Second, Qualcomm breached its duty to deal with its rivals. It
unilaterally terminated a voluntary and profitable course of dealing and
refused to deal even though it was being compensated at retail price and
refuses to provide rivals with a product that is other customers could buy
in a retail market.440 Despite Qualcomm having the same understanding
of its FRAND commitments as its rival chip makers, it willfully reneged
on those obligations and breached its antitrust duty to license SEPs to
rivals in accordance with Supreme Court precedent. 441 Emails,
handwritten notes, recorded statements to tax authorities and internal
company presentations showed “Qualcomm knew its licensing practices
could lead to antitrust liability, knew its licensing practices violate
FRAND, and knew its licensing practices harm competition, yet
continued anyway—even in the face of government investigations in
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, the European Union, and the United
435. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, slip op. at *233 (N.D.
Cal. May 21, 2019).
436. Id. at 21–42. The court found two relevant chip markets, including CDMA and “premium”
LTE modem chips, which are generally used to enable cellular communications in handheld
devices. Id. at 37–68; aee also id. at 102 (“We are the only supplier today that can give them a
global launch. . . . [W]ithout us they would lose big parts of North America, Japan and China. That
would really hurt them.”).
437. Id. at 193.
438. Id. at 113.
439. Id. at 114.
440. Id. at 134–42.
441. Id. at 141.
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States.”442 Further, despite earning profits from collecting royalty fees,
Qualcomm ultimately chose to stop this practice. In doing so, Qualcomm
exhibited “anticompetitive malice” in terminating a profitable course of
dealing with its rivals, and in doing so shut off an existing retail market
for licensing from competition.443
Significantly, Judge Koh noted that “Qualcomm stopped licensing
rival modem chip suppliers not because Qualcomm’s view of FRAND
changed, but rather because Qualcomm determined that it was far more
lucrative to license only OEMs.”444 Refusing to extend licenses delayed
or prevented to rival chip makers from introducing alternatives in the
marketplace, which “promoted rivals’ exit, and delayed rivals’ entry,”
“limited OEMs’ chip supply options, which has enabled Qualcomm’s
anticompetitive conduct toward OEMs, sustained Qualcomm’s
unreasonably high royalty rates, and required OEMs to spend more
money on royalty payments to Qualcomm rather than on new technology
and product development for consumers.”445
Third, Qualcomm’s exclusive deals with Apple shrunk rivals’ sales
and foreclosed rivals from dealing with Apple to maintain its modem chip
monopoly. 446 Apple and Qualcomm agreed that Apple would receive
conditional incentive payments for Qualcomm chips it used in iPhones
and iPads. Qualcomm incentivized handset markers to buy chips through
“chip incentive funds” that reduced the price of Qualcomm’s chips. 447
This exclusive deal substantially foreclosed Qualcomm’s rivals from
Apple’s business and other network effects in doing business with
Apple.448 Those deals also allowed Apple to charge royalty rates set by
its chip market share rather than the value of its patents, which had
declined in proportion to the value of new features found in new
generations of handsets. 449 Judge Koh also found that Qualcomm’s
pegging of its royalty to the handset rather than its chip was inconsistent

442. Id. at 208.
443. Id. at 139–40. (highlighting a Qualcomm presentation that urged employees to “make sure
[a competitor] can only go after [certain] customers” to accomplish the goal of “reduc[ing the]
number of [competitor’s] 3G customers.”). The court found that these statements and others
demonstrated that Qualcomm’s conduct was “characterized by a ‘willingness to sacrifice shortterm benefits’—like profitable licenses from modem chip rivals—‘in order to obtain higher profits
in the long run from the exclusion of competition.’” Id.
444. Id. at 128.
445. Id. at 124.
446. Id. at 142–58.
447. Id. at 185–90.
448. Id. at 146–47.
449. Id. at 167–72.
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with Federal Circuit law on royalty apportionment.450
Judge Koh concluded that “[b]y attacking all facets of rivals’
businesses and preventing competition on the merits, these practices
‘“harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers.’”451 The
Justice Department filed a Statement of Interest to provide input on
appropriate remedies should Judge Koh find an antitrust violation.452 She
declined on the basis of the “considerable testimony, evidence and
argument” presented at trial and the lack of “acute factual
disagreements.”453 Qualcomm has appealed to the Ninth Circuit but the
district court has denied its motion with to stay the order pending
appeal.454 The Ninth Circuit granted Qualcomm's request for a partial
stay, pending appeal, of an injunction from the district court, and ordered
oral argument to be set in January 2020.455

450. Id. at 172–73 (citing Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc., 904
F.3d 965 (Fed. Cir. 2018) and LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51 (Fed
Cir. 2012)).
451. Id. at 194.
452. Id. at 226.
453. Id. at 227.
454. Stephen Nellis, U.S. Judge Blocks Qualcomm Effort to Put Antitrust Ruling on Hold,
REUTERS, (Jul. 3, 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-antitrust/u-s-judge-blocksqualcomm-effort-to-put-antitrust-ruling-on-hold-idUSKCN1TY2P6
[https://perma.cc/74GMB5EW].
455. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2019).

